VISIT…

# Foucault and Power

The Influence of Political Engagement on Theories of Power

**Marcelo Hoffman**

BLOOMSBURY

# Foucault and Power

# Foucault and Power

## The Influence of Political Engagement on Theories of Power

Marcelo Hoffman

BLOOMSBURY
NEW YORK • LONDON • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

**Bloomsbury Academic**
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Inc

1385 Broadway
New York
NY 10018
USA

50 Bedford Square
London
WC1B 3DP
UK

**www.bloomsbury.com**

**Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc**

First published 2014

© Marcelo Hoffman, 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author.

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**
Hoffman, Marcelo.
Foucault and power: the influence of political engagement on theories of power/by Marcelo Hoffman.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4411-8094-0 (hardback)
1. Foucault, Michel, 1926–1984–Political and social views. 2. Foucault, Michel, 1926–1984–Influence. 3. Power (Social sciences)–Philosophy. 4. Political science–Philosophy. I. Title.
JC261.F68H64 2013
320.092–dc23
2013018703

ISBN: HB: 978-1-4411-8094-0
ePDF: 978-1-4411-8763-5
ePub: 978-1-4411-7657-8

Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

*To my family - Dorothy, Caetano, Josenilda, Dan, and Nelia*

# Contents

Acknowledgments viii

1 Foucault: Militant Analyst of Power 1
2 Foucault, the Prisoner Support Movement, and Disciplinary Power 15
3 Beyond the Bellicose Model of Power? 47
4 People versus Population: Foucault on the Iranian Revolution 93
5 Foucault, Poland, and *Parrhesia* 123
6 Conclusion 149

Appendix: *Investigation in 20 Prisons* by the Information Group on Prisons 155
Bibliography 205
Index 213

# Acknowledgments

This book bears the marks of many journeys and encounters over a period of more than a decade. I want to thank Nancy Brown for her incredible generosity. Without auditing her seminars on Michel Foucault in the Philosophy Department at the University of Denver in late 1990s, I never would have had the curiosity requisite for this undertaking. Nancy drew me to the contents of Foucault's Collège de France courses before any of them were translated into English. I owe Jack Donnelly and George DeMartino an enormous debt for their willingness to facilitate this project in its earlier incarnation as a dissertation. I owe a particular debt to Alan Gilbert for encouraging me to probe the details of Foucault's political practices.

I journeyed to the Foucault archives in Paris in 2002 and 2004 to conduct the research on the archival sources in this book. José Ruiz Funes, Martine Ollion, Agnès Iskander, Nadia Titouh, Latifa Benabou, André Derval, and Hélène Favard were instrumental in allowing me to access the materials of the Foucault archives at the Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine. Catherine Piganiol, Julie Bodéré, and Marie-Renée Cazaban provided me with access to the Foucault archives at the Collège. Pagona Papadopoulou, Konstantin Vetechnkov, Georges Kiourtzian, and Bernard Manchec were helpful in facilitating my consultation of materials at the Byzantine Library.

Two of the chapters in this book are modified and more elaborate versions of my previous publications. The second chapter draws extensively from my article "Foucault and the 'Lesson' of the Prisoner Support Movement" in *New Political Science* (Volume 34, Number 1, March 2012), reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd., http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals). The second chapter also draws from a section of my chapter "Disciplinary Power" in *Michel Foucault: Key Concepts* edited by Dianna Taylor (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2011), which has been reprinted with permission by Acumen. The third chapter draws from my article "Foucault's Politics and Bellicosity as a Matrix for Power Relations" in *Philosophy & Social Criticism* (Volume 33, Number 6, September 2007), portions of which have been reprinted with permission by SAGE publications.

The translation of *Investigation in 20 Prisons* by the Information Group on Prisons is based on the original pamphlet published by Champ Libre in May 1971. A new edition of the pamphlet is available in *Intolérable* by the Information Group on Prisons (Paris: Éditions Verticales/Gallimard, April 2013) with a chronology and afterword by Philippe Artières. I am deeply grateful to Yves Pagès of Éditions Verticales for clarifying the copyright status of *Investigation in 20 Prisons*. Unless otherwise indicated, I am responsible for all of the translations of French sources in this book, including *Investigation in 20 Prisons*.

Drafts of individual chapters in this book were presented at the meeting of the Society for Social and Political Philosophy in New York in 2005, the meetings of the Foucault Circle in Orlando in 2005 and in Baltimore in 2010, the meetings of the American Political Science Association in Toronto in 2009 and in Washington DC in 2010 and the meeting of the Association for Political Theory in Portland in 2010. I also presented drafts of individual chapters from the book at the Reading Foucault in the Postcolonial Present conference at the University of Bologna in 2011, the Radical Foucault conference at the Centre for Cultural Studies Research of the University of East London in 2011 and the Riot, Revolt, Revolution conference at the Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics of the University of Brighton in 2012.

I am indebted to Lawrie Balfour, Jodi Dean, Mikko Jakonen, Emanuele Leonardi, Nancy Love, Richard Lynch, Shannon Mariotti, Mark Mattern, Todd May, Julian Reid, Steven Roach, Anne Schwan, Stephen Shapiro, Dianna Taylor, Kevin Thompson, Paul Timmermans, Cornel West, and anonymous reviewers for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Daniel Defert for his generous response to a query.

I owe a special thanks to Marie-Claire Antoine for enthusiastically embracing this book project from its inception. I also owe a special thanks to Matthew Kopel and Kaitlin Fontana at Bloomsbury Academic for supporting this book project through its submission and production phases.

These acknowledgments would be incomplete without mention of some people close to my heart. My mother Josenilda and father Dan were steadfast in their support of the endeavors leading to this book. My sister Nelia motivated me to stay upbeat. My wife Dorothy endured every step in the production of the book, which would have been inconceivable without her unwavering support. My son Caetano inspired me to finish the book.

1

# Foucault: Militant Analyst of Power

Roughly three decades after his death, Michel Foucault continues to be widely regarded as one of the preeminent theorists of power, if not *the* preeminent theorist of power. Indeed, the name "Foucault" and the word "power" appear to have become so densely intertwined that it is difficult to even imagine a sustained discussion of one without reference, at least, to the other. However, until somewhat recently there were enormous gaps in our understanding of the development of Foucault's thinking about power owing to the nearly 8-year period separating the publication of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality: Volume One*, *An Introduction* from the publication of *The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality* and *The Care of the Self: Volume 3 of the History of Sexuality*. How could one account for Foucault's apparent leap from the elaboration of techniques of power to the elaboration of practices of the self? How could one understand Foucault's shift in historical focus from modern Europe to Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity? How could one comprehend Foucault's seeming shift from a bellicose depiction of power relations to a far more governmental portrait of these relations? In sum, what exactly happened to power as a central axis of his research?

The resources for answers to these questions were seen to reside in Foucault's labyrinthine Collège de France courses, the majority of which are now published and translated into English. Interpreters of Foucault mined these courses to varying degrees for answers to questions about the big changes in his analyses of power left unanswered by his books and other published materials. On the basis of their explorations, some interpreters declared that Foucault had simply abandoned power *tout court* in favor of ethics.[1] Others took a categorically opposed position, insisting that he had actually intensified his long-standing focus on power relations.[2] Still others maintained that Foucault had abandoned a bellicose understanding of power relations in favor of a more open-ended governmental understanding of these relations.[3]

This book will not buck the well-established trend of sifting through the details of Foucault's Collège courses for answers to the grand questions about the trajectory of his thinking about power. It relies quite extensively and enthusiastically on Foucault's published as well as unpublished Collège courses for the simple reason that these courses are altogether indispensable to any marginally elaborate analysis of the *development* of Foucault's thinking about power. But the uniqueness of this book does not consist in its attention to the thematic of power in these courses. It resides in a meticulous exploration of the *relationship* between Foucault's political life and the development of his thinking about power from the early 1970s to the 1980s. Foucault is no doubt widely accepted as *the* theorist of power of our times, and the reference to Foucault as a political militant agitating on behalf of various causes often accompanies the most intricate interpretations of his analyses of power. But what do we really know of the relationship between Foucault the political militant and Foucault the analyst of power?

## Foucault's militant life

Foucault led a vibrant and controversial political life that interwove with major political events and transformations in the late twentieth century. Foucault even lived what he described à propos of the Cynics shortly before his death in June 1984 as a "militant life" consisting of combative (and thus perilous) relations with the self and others. The provocation for his transformation into a political militant could hardly have been expected throughout a considerable portion of his career, especially during the period in the 1960s leading to his rise to intellectual stardom in France. Throughout the bulk of this period, Foucault avoided political engagements owing to a disappointing 3-year experience as a member of the French Communist Party that culminated in his quiet departure from the party in 1953.[4]

The provocation behind Foucault's path to political engagements and his embrace of a militant life in particular came much later and from outside of France. From September 1966 to October 1968, Foucault lived and taught in Tunisia, where he wrote *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Toward the near end of his stay in Tunisia, Foucault had witnessed Marxist students risk physical injury and up to "eight, ten, even fourteen years behind bars," if not death, to participate in mass demonstrations against the regime of Habib Bourguiba.[5]

His exposure to the courage of these students compelled him to think of political life as an experience encompassing a personal and an even physical commitment to address specific problems rather than as an outgrowth of the Marxist theories then prevalent in France.

> People in France spoke of hyper-Marxism, of a proliferation of theories, of a splintering into small groups. It was exactly the opposite, the reverse, the contrary of what had intrigued me in Tunisia. That may explain the way in which I tried to approach things from that time onward, away from those endless discussions, that hyper-Marxization, that irrepressible discursivity which characterized university life, and, in particular, Vincennes in 1969. I tried to do things that required a personal, physical, and real involvement, things that would address problems in concrete, precise, and definite terms in a given situation.[6]

Foucault did not wait until his return to France to experiment with this conception of political life. He actually began to realize it in Tunisia, hiding a Roneo machine for the production of antigovernment leaflets in his home and attempting to speak at the trial of a student.[7]

Upon his return to France, Foucault soon found himself in a political climate profoundly altered by the student revolts of May 1968, one more open to the issues he had addressed in his "archaeology," in *History of Madness*, issues which broadly concerned the silencing and exclusion of others in Western societies.[8] As Foucault recalled in an interview from 1978, "The things I concerned myself with began to be part of the public domain. Problems that in the past had not found any echo, with the exception of anti-psychiatry, became current issues."[9]

In this more accommodating political context, Foucault soon immersed himself in a veritable myriad of struggles and his involvement in these struggles was certainly not limited to the occasional speech or petition signature. In 1971 alone, Foucault took a lead role in the formation of at least three organizations. In February, he co-founded the Information Group on Prisons (GIP), an organization designed with the express purpose of heightening public intolerance toward the prison system by allowing prisoners to speak *for themselves* about conditions in the prisons. Throughout most of the following 2 years, Foucault exhibited an extraordinary commitment to basic, run-of-the-mill activities of the GIP. As David Macey notes, "addressing envelopes, drafting press releases and handing out leaflets were all part of his daily life."[10] Foucault even transformed his apartment into the headquarters of the GIP.

In June 1971, he helped form an information commission to investigate the police beating of a journalist, Alain Jaubert.[11] His work with the commission took him for the first time into the Arab neighborhood of Goutte d'Or in Paris, where he attempted to no avail to locate a witness to the beating of Jaubert.[12] Foucault nevertheless managed to conduct interviews with other witnesses to the beating and he reflected the information gathered from these interviews in the final report of what became known as the "Jaubert affair."[13] In November, he helped establish a committee to investigate whether racism underpinned the murder of a teenager, Djellali Ben Ali, in Goutte d'Or. His work with this committee took him back to the Arab neighborhood, where he interviewed residents and participated in demonstrations organized by the Djellali committee.[14]

The GIP dissolved itself in December 1972 on grounds that it had succeeded in enabling prisoners to speak on their own. Foucault nevertheless continued to remain personally and physically committed to an array of political struggles cutting across all kinds of geographical boundaries. In September 1975, he traveled to Madrid to participate in the reading of a statement of protest against the sentencing, under General Francisco Franco's special tribunals, of Basque separatists and antifascists to execution by garroting.[15] In November 1977, Foucault defended the rights of Klaus Croissant, a West German lawyer for the Red Army Faction or "Baader-Meinhof Gang," to asylum as well as legal representation.[16] His participation in a protest against the extradition of Croissant to West Germany even resulted in a physical injury. The police at the protest beat Foucault harshly enough to fracture his ribs.[17] Foucault traveled to Iran twice in the fall of 1978 to report on the revolution there for the Italian daily, *Corriere della Sera*. The journeys to Iran culminated in what are by far Foucault's most controversial political writings, but the controversies stirred up by the writings and the tragedy of the Iranian revolution did not result in political quietism. After General Wojciech Jaruzelski's coup d'état in Poland in December 1981, Foucault spoke out against the new French government's hands-off position on the coup d'état. He also became an active member of the Solidarity trade union movement support committee organized by the French Democratic Confederation of Labor. In September 1982, Foucault even traveled to Poland as part of a humanitarian caravan.[18]

Biographers of Foucault have certainly brought these details to light. Interpreters of Foucault of the most varied stripes have been well aware of them, at least in broad outline, for quite some time. They have gestured toward his political engagements and even dwelled on them to varying degrees for a

wide range of purposes. In the early 1980s, Michael Walzer famously and glibly dismissed the totality of Foucault's political engagements as an expression of "infantile leftism."[19] From an entirely opposed perspective, Gilles Deleuze praised Foucault for inventing a novel type of group in the GIP that succeeded in creating conditions for the production of new statements about prisons in France by prisoners and non-prisoners alike.[20] Deleuze intimated that Foucault's experiences in the GIP provided him with fertile experiential ground to develop and refine his emergent conception of power in the mid-1970s.[21] In the midst of his own articulation of ethics as a fidelity to the event, Alain Badiou briefly recalled Foucault's agitation on behalf of prisoners to remind his readers in the early 1990s that proponents of the critique of Man were in fact "attentive and courageous militants of a cause."[22]

More recently, Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson have discerned in Foucault's reflections on the Iranian revolution an Orientalist commitment to tradition over modernity.[23] Eric Paras has contended that this engagement reflected and nourished Foucault's progressive, if incipient, turn toward liberalism correlative to his shift "beyond" the thematic of power.[24] Alain Beaulieu has echoed a remarkably similar argument about the role of the Iranian revolution in precipitating Foucault's orientation toward liberalism and away from a warlike conception of power.[25] Michael Hardt has claimed that Foucault's defense of Croissant stood out for refusing to indict the West German state as fascist and for compelling him to explain why the West German state was neoliberal rather than fascist in his Collège course from the academic year 1978 to 1979, *The Birth of Biopolitics*.[26]

Clearly, there is no shortage of attention given to Foucault's political practices and the manifold perspectives above hardly exhaust the literature addressing these practices, as we shall see in the succeeding chapters. But interpreters of Foucault who have dealt with his political activities in a sustained fashion rather than merely gesturing toward them have tended to focus on only one of his political episodes to the detriment of other episodes, thereby creating a striking unevenness in the attention given to his political engagements. This imbalance is fully apparent when one considers the disparities in the literature on Foucault's political activities. Whereas dozens of articles and a whole book have been devoted to Foucault's reflections on the Iranian revolution, there is not even a freestanding article in English on his political activities concerning Poland. This unevenness cannot be extricated from deeply embedded impressions of Foucault. The absence of a literature on Foucault's support for Solidarity outside

of his biographies appears to attest to and reinforce the general impression that he became less political, if not apolitical, in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution.

This limitation to the existing literature is intimately bound up with another limitation. For all of the attention lavished on Foucault over the last few decades, the relationship between his political practices and the development of his analyses of power remains remarkably unclear. As indicated above, interpreters of Foucault have no doubt focused on singular episodes in his political life to account for particular shifts in his thinking about power but even these observations tend to be somewhat conjectural and general. And to date there is no study offering anything even remotely akin to a comprehensive account of the relationship between Foucault's political engagements and the development of his thinking about power in spite of all of the resources now available.

This book sets out to overcome these limitations in two ways. First, it focuses on the intricacies of Foucault's most sustained and long-lasting political engagements, namely, his immersion in the GIP, his engagement with the Iranian revolution, and his activities on behalf of Solidarity. More than any other episodes in Foucault's political life, these three engagements absorbed a considerable portion of his time beyond his teaching and research commitments and resulted in a dense layer of interviews, articles, and declarations. Second, this book explores the relationship between Foucault's major political engagements and the development of the fine and gross details of his analyses of power for a period of nearly a decade and a half.

The core question in this book is rather straightforward: what difference, if any, did Foucault's political engagements make in the development of his thinking about power and, conversely, what difference, if any, did his analyses of power make in his political engagements? What, in other words, were the implications of both his manifold political activities for his analyses of power and his analyses of power for his political activities?

Posing the question in this manner may seem to raise a few problems at first glance. One basic problem is that Foucault did not go to great lengths to clarify the relationship between his political engagements and analyses of power. Even as Foucault embroiled himself in various political struggles, he managed to keep something of a distance between his discussions of these struggles and his theoretical presentations, as if they belonged to markedly distinct, if not separate, registers. Strikingly, Foucault maintained this distance even when his political engagements and analyses were thematically consistent, as was

the case with his political and theoretical endeavors concerning the prison in the early 1970s.

Foucault no doubt rarely referred to his political engagements in his theoretical presentations out of a strong sense that such references were simply out of place in the context of a theoretical elaboration. But Foucault's aversion in this regard also seems to have had roots in his pronounced sense that whatever he had to say about his various political engagements might too easily shade into a flippant and inconsequential imperative discourse. As Foucault once explained to his Collège auditors:

> It seems to me that the dimension of what is to be done can only appear within a field of real forces, that is to say within a field of forces that cannot be created by a speaking subject alone and on the basis of his words, because it is a field of forces that cannot in any way be controlled or asserted within this kind of imperative discourse.[27]

For this reason, Foucault tended to gravitate toward "conditional imperatives" in his theoretical presentations,[28] perhaps the most famous of which consisted in his appeal to a new right "*if* we are to struggle against disciplines, or rather against disciplinary power, in our search for a nondisciplinary power" (italics mine).[29]

It must also be said that Foucault's few allusions or references to his political activities in otherwise densely theoretical analyses were sometimes strongly worded but also vague, as we shall see in the subsequent chapter. They therefore tended to offer as many questions as answers. But if Foucault's opaqueness about his political activities in his theoretical presentations can be a source of immense frustration, it can also serve as a powerful provocation to probe further. Indeed, if we are to make real headway in dealing with the relationship between Foucault's political engagements and the development of his analyses of power, we must (and will) get well beyond how *he* construed this relationship.

The overarching argument in this book is not only that Foucault's political practices made a difference in his analyses of power but also that it is altogether difficult, if not outright impossible, to ascertain a comprehensive or even adequate enough understanding of the *development* of his analyses of power *without* addressing his political practices. The reason is not only because if we stick purely to Foucault's analyses we come up against difficulties in explaining his analyses of power that almost seem to necessitate a kind of extra-analytical recourse, as we shall see in Chapter 3. More fundamentally, it is because

Foucault's thinking about power was *dialectically* related to his political practices. Far from bearing no theoretical consequences, Foucault's rich political trajectory provided a strong impetus for his reflections on power in their various permutations over the course of roughly a decade and a half. Foucault's activities on behalf of the prisoner support movement facilitated his emerging account of disciplinary power and the prison by providing him with key insights about practices constitutive of disciplinary individuality in the early 1970s. Foucault's militant political practices during this period also nourished his embrace of a bellicose understanding of power at the core of his account of disciplinary power. Similarly, if we jump ahead by nearly a decade, we find that Foucault's confrontation with the newly elected French government over its handling of the military coup d'état in Poland reinforced, if not instigated, his turn to *parrhesia* as a form of truth-telling intimately bound up with power relations.

But Foucault's analyses of power also yielded various effects in his political engagements. At certain junctures in his analyses, Foucault spoke back to political movements of which he had been a part, highlighting various obstacles and dangers for them. He engaged in this sort of critical, if implicit, dialogue with the prisoner support movement in particular and anti-disciplinary movements more generally. Foucault also articulated conceptual distinctions that would permeate and inflect his political engagements. Foucault's distinction between the people and population in his analyses of biopolitics and liberal governmentality structured his engagement with the Iranian revolution.

Broadly speaking, the point of teasing out this loosely dialectical interplay between Foucault's political practices and analyses of power is not only to ascertain a much greater sense of the specificity of both his political practices and analyses of power over a broad swath of time (and space), but also to respond to certain well-established and long-standing critiques, entrenched interpretations, and even deeply ingrained impressions of Foucault. From the standpoint of an exploration of the intricacies of Foucault's political practices, *Discipline and Punish* reads like a book thoroughly stimulated through mass and collective resistance to a fissured, if not fractured, disciplinary world rather than as yet another "dystopian" narrative about liberal modernity. Similarly, from the standpoint of Foucault's political practices, we gain a much greater appreciation of the extent to which his analyses at the very end of his life were thoroughly intertwined with the thematic of power rather than somehow "beyond" power and purely ethical. Alternatively, from the standpoint of Foucault's conceptual developments in the late 1970s, we can see how his much-maligned enthusiasm

for the Iranian revolution derived from the sudden appearance of the collective subject of the people rather than from a sweeping commitment to tradition over modernity. More generally, a consideration of the dialectical interplay between Foucault's political practices and analyses of power puts us in a position to respond to a recent iteration of the charge that Foucault left us with too few coordinates to envision a life *beyond* the subjugation of bodies and populations to modern techniques of power. Each of the steps in this narrative discloses the extent to which political events compelled Foucault to grapple with strivings for forms of life beyond the subjugation of bodies and populations and to articulate these forms of life to varying degrees, albeit not without certain difficulties and problems. In so doing, he provided materials to provoke us into envisioning forms of life beyond the dominant ones. Ultimately, then, teasing out the dialectical interplay between Foucault's political practices and analyses of power in a detailed fashion gets us away from some rather ritualistic gestures in the dense realm of Foucault interpretation and thereby enables us to read him in a markedly different way.

## Overview of the book

All of the chapters in this book interweave a detailed narrative about the relationship between Foucault's political engagements and the development of his analyses of power over the course of roughly a decade and half. With the exception of Chapter 3, each of the core chapters focuses on one of Foucault's major political engagements, starting from his engagement with the prisoner support movement in the early 1970s all the way up to his engagement with Solidarity in the early 1980s.

Chapter 2 addresses the theoretical implications of Foucault's first major political engagement, his militancy on behalf of the GIP. As indicated above, Foucault co-founded the GIP with the express purpose of heightening public intolerance toward the prison system by facilitating the voices of prisoners. Foucault immersed himself in the activities of this organization for the better part of 2 years. Chapter 2 explores the historical intricacies of Foucault's involvement in the GIP, provides an account of his famous overview of disciplinary power, and suggests that his insights about the practices subtending the constitution of disciplinary individuality were gleaned from reports produced through the GIP. Overall, I submit that a loose dialectic

between Foucault's theories of disciplinary power and his political practices transpired throughout the early 1970s, with his analyses of disciplinary power both emerging from his participation in collective struggles against the prison and serving to inform such practices after his withdrawal from the prisoner support movement. This dialectic helps us appreciate the extent to which resistance pervaded Foucault's seminal account of disciplinary power in *Discipline and Punish*.

Chapter 3 turns to the broad framework behind Foucault's account of disciplinary power throughout the early 1970s. Foucault in his Collège course from 1975 to 1976, *"Society Must Be Defended"* retrospectively dubbed this framework "Nietzsche's hypothesis" or the "war model." It posited that power consists of warlike relations between forces resulting in the domination of some forces over others. But Foucault in *"Society Must Be Defended"* suddenly began to scrutinize the war model, going so far as to provide a genealogy of its emergence in discourses of race war and, ultimately, state racism. What is more, by interlacing his own voice with the voices of exponents of the discourses of race war, Foucault even seemed to inscribe his own militancy within this genealogy and, consequently, hint at a kind of self-critique. According to some interpreters, Foucault's sudden scrutiny of the war model served as a catalyst for his eventual abandonment of the war model in favor of a governmental view of power as conduct over conduct. I suggest this argument is overstated. Foucault did not *replace* a warlike understanding of power so much as *displace* it. Strong traces of Foucault's warlike conception of power appeared in his analyses *even* up through the early 1980s. Foucault could *not* cast aside the war model because, for all of its shortcomings, it still addressed the possibility of situations of domination.

Chapter 4 examines the changes in Foucault's account of population from his articulation of biopolitics to his articulation of governmentality and security as well as the implications of these changes for his most controversial political episode, namely, his engagement with the Iranian revolution. One widely held view among some of Foucault's most prominent interpreters is that he preserved the much-vaunted concept of biopolitics, introduced in the final lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended,"* even as his research centered increasingly on governmentality in his Collège courses at the end of the 1970s. Against this view, I maintain that the concept of biopolitics remained deeply problematic owing to its reference to population mainly as a mere object of regulations. Foucault induced nothing short of a rupture with this concept through his articulation of population as a subject-object correlative to security techniques in his Collège

course from 1977 to 1978, *Security, Territory, Population*. I further use this shift in Foucault's thinking about population to clarify his engagement with the Iranian revolution. I contend that Foucault's rethinking of population rather than a commitment to tradition over modernity nourished through Orientalism sustained his enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution. The appearance of a people bound together by a collective will captivated Foucault because it challenged the familiar figure of population. The implications of this argument are twofold: if we should opt for the greater sense of the self-direction of behavior implied by population as a subject-object, the lesson of Foucault's analyses of the Iranian revolution is that this subject-object does not remain beyond the pale of contestation.

Chapter 5 examines the interplay between Foucault's political militancy and his theoretical explorations in the 1980s. Foucault's analyses during this period are widely regarded as more ethical than political, as more concerned with practices of the self than practices of power. Paras in particular even claims that Foucault in the 1980s outright *abandoned* power as an axis of research. I claim that this view is deeply misguided. The dialectic between Foucault's political practices and analyses of power that first appeared at the outset of the 1970s not only remained intact but also acquired whole new dimensions during the 1980s. Far from succumbing to political quietism after the tragedy of the Iranian revolution, Foucault threw himself back into militant political engagements. In December 1981, Foucault jostled openly with the new Socialist government in France over its hands-off policy toward the coup d'état in Poland that sought to crush a growing Solidarity trade union movement through the imposition of a regime of martial law. His confrontation with the French government not only formed the immediate backdrop to his extensive involvement in activities on behalf of Solidarity for nearly a whole year. It also framed his sharp turn to analyses of *parrhesia* in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity during the last few years of his life. Indeed, as we shall see, Foucault implicitly *staged* a parrhesiastic scene in his confrontation with the French government over its foreign policy toward Poland that left all kinds of effects in his theoretical explorations of *parrhesia*. Foucault's focus on *parrhesia* was intimately and explicitly bound up in its turn with the thematic of power and pushed his thinking about power in whole new directions. Foucault articulated a categorical alternative to disciplinary life in Cynic *parrhesia*, portraying the Cynic as a militant figure *entirely* at odds with the disciplined subject. Foucault's militant political practices therefore facilitated

his accelerated move toward power and his move toward power generated a whole set of reflections on the experiences of modern political militancy.

The conclusion steps back to draw out the implications of the larger argument in this book. It suggests, first of all, that what we get from a focus on the dialectical interplay between Foucault's major political engagements and analyses of power is the view that these engagements mattered in shaping the long trajectory of his thinking about power *even* (and perhaps especially) when these struggles appeared to not matter much at all in his theoretical presentations. Second, the conclusion shows that this focus enables us to ascertain a clearer understanding of basic continuities in Foucault's political practices across time and space. Third, the emphasis on a dialectical interplay between Foucault's political engagements and reflections on power provides us with a far more refined understanding of various continuities and discontinuities in his analyses of power. Finally, this emphasis equips us to respond directly to the charge that Foucault fell short of providing us with the resources for thinking about and envisioning forms of life *beyond* the disciplinary subjugation of bodies and the biopolitical subjugation of populations.

## Notes

1 Eric Paras, *Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge* (New York: Other Press, 2006).
2 Jeffrey T. Nealon, *Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since 1984* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
3 Alain Beaulieu, "Towards a liberal Utopia: The connection between Foucault's reporting on the Iranian Revolution and the ethical turn," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 36, 7 (September 2010): 801–18.
4 David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 37–43. The catalyst for Foucault's departure from the party was its initial justification of a plot fabricated by the Soviet Union about an arrested group of predominantly Jewish doctors that had set out to assassinate the Soviet leadership.
5 Michel Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 3, *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 2000a), 279.
6 Ibid., 281.
7 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 204–5.
8 Michel Foucault, *History of Madness*, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa, (New York: Routledge, 2006a), xxviii.

9 Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," 282.
10 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 257.
11 Michel Foucault, "L'article 15," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, vol. 1, *1954–1975* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001a), 1066–7.
12 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 296–7.
13 Michel Foucault, "Rapports de la commission d'information sur l'affaire Jaubert," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Defert and Ewald, vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1067–71.
14 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 306–8.
15 Ibid., 341–50.
16 Michel Foucault, "Va-t-on extrader Klaus Croissant?" in *Dits et écrits: 1954–1988*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, vol. 2, *1976–1988* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001k), 361–5.
17 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 394–5.
18 Ibid., 439–48.
19 Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," *Dissent* 30 (Fall 1983): 481.
20 Gilles Deleuze, "The Intellectual and Politics: Foucault and the Prison," *History of the Present* 1, 2, (Spring 1986): 1–2, 20–1.
21 Ibid., 1–2; Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. and ed. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 24.
22 Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward (New York: Verso, 2001a), 6.
23 Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
24 Paras, *Foucault 2.0*, 95–7, 155–6.
25 Beaulieu, "Towards a liberal Utopia," 806.
26 Michael Hardt, "Militant Life," review of *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, Cours au Collège de France, 1982–1983* and *Le courage de la vérité: Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II, Cours au Collège de France, 1983–1984*, by Michel Foucault, *New Left Review* 64, (July/August 2010): 153–4.
27 Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007c), 3.
28 Ibid.
29 Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976*, eds Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003f), 39.

2

# Foucault, the Prisoner Support Movement, and Disciplinary Power

Though many interpreters of Michel Foucault acknowledge his commitment to a wide range of political causes throughout the 1970s and 1980s, very few of them attempt to tease out, much less elucidate, the precise relationship between his political practices and theoretical development. Moreover, to the extent that the relationship between Foucault's theory and practice is even implicitly clarified, there seems to be a striking imbalance in the attention given to his political practices. Foucault's remarkably contentious analyses of the Iranian revolution in particular have garnered a lot of attention over the last few years, even resulting in a book-length study—Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson's *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*.[1] By contrast, Foucault's involvement in the prisoner support movement has received very little attention outside of his biographies, at least in the English-speaking world. Yet, if there is any episode in Foucault's political life that may serve to illuminate the relationship between his political practices and theories, it is certainly his deep and thoroughgoing involvement in the prisoner support movement in the early 1970s. Whereas Foucault wrote enthusiastically and prolifically about the revolution in Iran on the basis of two short journeys there in the fall of 1978, he engaged in a great deal more than writing about the prisoner support movement. Foucault founded an organization ultimately designed to heighten public intolerance toward the prison system, the GIP, and devoted himself to the everyday activities of this organization for the better part of 2 years. Even Afary and Anderson, who go great lengths to make as much as possible of Foucault's problematic handling of the Iranian revolution, readily concede that the cause of prisoners consumed his political energies more intensely than any other cause in his lifetime.[2]

Surprisingly, however, Foucault's engagement with the prisoner support movement in the early 1970s has received little sustained attention outside

of his biographies and a handful of articles. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the bulk of this attention has not been used to reflect more explicitly on the relationship between his theories of disciplinary power and the prison, on the one hand, and his political practices concerning the prison, on the other hand. Cecile Brich, for instance, focuses primarily on the contradictions *within* Foucault's political practices. She criticizes the GIP not only for failing to meet its ostensible goal of enabling the voices of prisoners, but also for contradicting this goal by effectively constraining these voices in favor of Foucault's own political agenda.[3] Taking a markedly different approach, Michael Welch suggests that the GIP exhibited benevolent traits toward prisoners that Foucault would later theorize as pastoral power, thereby implying that Foucault's experiences in the GIP anticipated his articulation of pastoral power over half a decade later in his lectures at the Collège de France.[4] Keith Gandal certainly stands out in the context of these arguments for using the experience of the GIP to manifestly develop general claims about Foucault's theory and practice. Gandal challenges the view of a contradiction between Foucault's "nihilist" theories and his "radical" politics, stressing instead that Foucault considered the articulation of value systems deleterious to political action and accepted co-optation as a crucial dimension of political struggle. For this reason, Gandal depicts Foucault as a radical reformist. In his words, "Foucault's politics, then, was not a radicalism that attempted to avoid co-optation, but rather a 'radical reformism' that accepted it from the beginning as inevitable and necessary."[5] However, even Gandal does not dwell on how Foucault's experiences in the GIP may have configured what would seem to be the most immediate and obviously related theoretical consequence of this experience, namely, Foucault's account of disciplinary power and the prison in particular.

The sparse attention given to Foucault's immersion in the prisoner support movement and its import for his theoretical productions is curious because he repeatedly reminded his readers of the importance of the wave of revolts in prisons and of his practical work with the prisoner support movement for his analyses. In the introduction to *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, for instance, Foucault alluded to the import of struggles against the prison for his central conclusions. "That punishment in general and the prison in particular belong to a political technology of the body is a lesson that I have learnt not so much from history as from the present." He went on to suggest that the outbreak of prison revolts in France and elsewhere in the preceding years concerned the "very materiality" of the prison "as an instrument and vector of power."[6] In an

interview published in January 1977, Foucault attributed his shift away from a merely negative conception of power to his involvement in struggles over the prison in the early 1970s. "There came a time when this [negative conception of power] struck me as inadequate. It was during the course of an experience I had with prisons, starting in 1971–1972."[7] One year later, Foucault told members of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist League that in *Discipline and Punish* he sought to "invest at base the lesson of a practice in a history book."[8] In 1980, he became quite specific about the organizational framework for this "practice," severely reproaching Paul Thibaud, the editor of the Catholic journal *Esprit*, for failing to understand that *Discipline and Punish* was deeply indebted to the activities of the GIP, which Foucault co-founded with his partner Daniel Defert and others in 1971.

> I began and completed my book on the prisons after the experience of the GIP. And what disturbs me is not that you have the bizarre idea of deducing from my book, which I fear you misunderstood, my venomous influence on the GIP; *it's that you did not have the altogether simple idea that this book owes a lot to the GIP and that if it contained two or three good insights they came from the GIP* (italics mine).[9]

If Foucault here left the relationship between his experiences in the prisoner support movement and his theoretical developments frustratingly vague, his recurrent employment of the term "lesson" across some of the statements above suggests that these experiences left him with nothing short of an education *in* theory encapsulated precisely by *Discipline and Punish*.

Foucault's disparate affirmations of a theoretical education through the prisoner support movement invite us to beg far more detail. Indeed, these affirmations compel us to ask a basic series of questions. What exact lessons did Foucault draw from the prisoner support movement, and how were they obtained? How were his practices and theories interrelated? What is the significance of this relationship? I suggest not only that Foucault's deep involvement in collective political practices over prisons went a long way toward instigating, framing and informing the very production of *Discipline and Punish* but also that this relationship was not one way. Foucault spoke *back* to participants in the prisoner support movement years after his withdrawal from the movement by specifying obstacles to their ongoing struggles in *Discipline and Punish*. The specification of these obstacles was a manner of *re*-invigorating these struggles, provoking their participants to think in new ways about the resiliency and fragility of

mechanisms of disciplinary power. A kind of loose dialectic thus transpired between Foucault's political practices and theories, with his theories both emerging from his participation in collective political practices and serving to further inform such practices. The significance of this dialectic is that it helps us understand the extent to which resistance remained at the very core of Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power and the prison.

## Generating intolerance: Foucault and the GIP

Foucault's immersion in struggles over the prison grew out of heightening tensions between the French government and the Maoist Proletarian Left (GP) after the tumultuous events of May 1968. In its efforts to forge an autonomous workers' movement, the GP had encouraged its militants to adopt various illegal tactics employed by workers "during and after 1968," including "occupying plants, holding bosses hostage until they gave into demands, resisting the para-military CRS when it attempted to recapture plants, and sabotage."[10] Alarmed at the use of these tactics by GP militants on factory floors throughout France, the government responded with the arrests of the editors of the GP newspaper *The People's Cause* in March 1970 as well as the proscription of the GP by ministerial decree in May 1970.[11] These measures provoked violent demonstrations in the Latin Quarter of Paris, which prompted the adoption of an "'anti-wreckers' law" assigning responsibility for violence committed by demonstrators to the organizers of demonstrations.[12]

The overall climate of repression in France not only led to the imprisonment of many GP and former GP members, but also transformed the prison into a space for political struggle. In September 1970, imprisoned GP and former GP members staged hunger strikes to demand, among other things, the status of political prisoners, which would afford them special rights under French law.[13] The imprisoned GP and former GP members sought to use the strike as an opportunity to highlight prison conditions and to demand improvements for all prisoners. The Minister of Justice, René Pleven, denied their demand for the status of political prisoners but the government conceded more relaxed conditions of detention for the strikers, leading to the end of the strike after 3 weeks. Given that the core demand of the strikers was not met, however, the strike in September was followed, in the winter of 1971, by a far more publicized wave of hunger strikes inside and outside of prisons. The hunger

strikers demanded the extension of special rights to all prisoners detained as a consequence of their political activities.[14] Pleven responded to this wave of strikes with the announcement of the formation of a commission to explore the criteria for obtaining the special rights granted to political prisoners and the strikes were once again called off.[15]

It was this second wave of hunger strikes that caught Foucault's attention and served as the catalyst for his involvement in the prisoner support movement.[16] As Foucault recounted in an interview published in July 1971:

> Last December, a number of political prisoners, *gauchistes* and Maoists went on hunger strike in order to struggle against the conditions of detention, political and common law, in general. This movement began in the prisons and developed outside them. It was from that moment on that I began to take an interest.[17]

This "interest" quickly developed into nothing short of a militant commitment to intensifying intolerance toward the prison system as a whole. In February 1971, on the day of the end of the second wave of hunger strikes and amid hunger strikers at the Chapelle Saint-Bernard in Paris, Foucault announced the creation of the GIP. The core rationale for its establishment was fairly straightforward: published information about conditions in the prisons was sorely lacking. Foucault succinctly laid out this rationale before an audience at Chapelle Saint-Bernard: "Little information is published about prisons; this is one of the hidden regions of our social system, one of the dark areas in our lives."[18]

From this vantage point, Foucault addressed a problem that Karl Marx did not face in his account of the capitalist mode of production in volume one of *Capital*. Marx did not encounter a dearth of information about working conditions in the factories and elsewhere in England. To the contrary, he relied quite extensively on the reports of factory inspectors commissioned by Parliament to enforce laws curtailing the working day. Marx praised the factory inspectors for disclosing the truth of working conditions in England and he repeatedly deferred to *their* voices, employing variations of the expression "Let us listen for a moment to the factory inspectors."[19] Marx thus used an official knowledge to reveal working conditions in industrial England and thereby lend substance to his argument about the capitalist mode of production.

By contrast, Foucault and other members of the GIP encountered a lack of information about prisons. The GIP distinguished itself by seeking to make information about the prison available not so much through an expert discourse as through the prisoners themselves. Indeed, its immediate purpose was to

enable prisoners to speak for themselves about conditions in the prisons. As the back cover to the first GIP pamphlet declared, "The GIP (Information Group on Prisons) does not propose to speak for the prisoners of different prisons: it proposes, on the contrary, to give them the possibility to speak themselves and to say what is happening in the prisons."[20]

Foucault contrasted this purpose with the more commonplace reform agenda that he would later diagnose as part and parcel of the very functioning of the prison system.[21] As Foucault clarified in the same interview from July 1971 quoted above, "We literally want to give speech to the prisoners. Our aim is not to do the work of a sociologist or reformer. It's not about proposing an ideal prison."[22] However, the seemingly simple task of giving a voice to the prisoners was impeded by prison regulations, which, as Brich points out, "forbade communication with unauthorized persons (i.e. everyone but close family members) while the daily press was not allowed inside and radio broadcasts were regularly censored."[23] The GIP attempted to circumvent these regulations through recourse to its own version of investigations (*enquêtes*), which had figured so centrally in various strands of French Maoism as well as in the Italian Marxism affiliated with Raniero Panzieri's journal *Quaderni Rossi* in the early 1960s.[24] The GIP conducted its investigations into the prisons through the illegal distribution of questionnaires about prison conditions to prisoners via their family members, former prisoners, lawyers, and social workers.[25] The information gathered from the questionnaires then served as the basis for the publication of the results of the investigations. The GIP published four investigations under a series entitled "Intolerable" between May 1971 and January 1973. The investigations contained a wide range of contents, from prisoners' responses to questions about the conditions of daily life in 20 prisons,[26] to descriptions of one "model-prison,"[27] to a list of cases of prisoner suicides as well as the reproduction of a whole series of letters from a prisoner—"H.M." or Gérard Grandmontagne—who committed suicide.[28] One investigation even obtained an international scope, addressing the strategies underpinning the assassination of Black Panther member George Jackson at San Quentin prison in August 1971.[29] As the first GIP investigation, *Investigation in 20 Prisons*, is especially germane for our purposes, we will probe its contents in some detail in the final section of this chapter.

Brich in her recent critique takes the method behind the GIP investigations to task for effectively *constraining* the voices of prisoners. She contends that the privileging of the written medium in GIP questionnaires tended to exclude

illiterate, semiliterate, or nonnative French speakers; that the question-answer format of the questionnaires imposed unequal relationships and political expectations on the prisoners; that the solicitation of personal narratives from prisoners reduced prisoners to mere bearers of experiences counterpoised to GIP intellectuals as the analysts of these experiences; and that the publication of answers from the questionnaires was heavily framed by the GIP political agenda rather than an impartial reflection of the contributions of prisoners.[30] One can readily accept all of these criticisms yet realize that they tend to lose sight of the bigger picture. Just as Brich invites her readers to scrutinize GIP pronouncements as a means of getting beyond hagiographic accounts of the organization, she seems to accept some of these pronouncements without weighing their relative importance within GIP strategies. In the first place, Brich seems to misconstrue the GIP task of facilitating the voices of prisoners as implying a silence on the part of non-prisoners, especially intellectuals. More importantly, however, she does not question the extent to which offering a voice to prisoners served as the underlying purpose of the GIP. The goal of the GIP was not "simply" to offer a "platform" to prisoners, as Brich repeatedly suggests.[31] Offering a "platform" to prisoners constituted a *means* to the *end* of generating mass intolerance toward the prison system as a whole. As a GIP statement written by Foucault and even quoted by Brich declares, "Our investigation is not designed to amass facts, *but to increase our intolerance, and transform it into active intolerance*" (italics mine).[32] As if this appeal to intolerance is not clear enough, the same statement goes on to encourage its readers to adopt a more generalized intolerance toward a range of institutions: "Let us become intolerant toward prisons, justice, the hospital system, psychiatric service, military service, etc."[33] Indeed, published GIP investigations were tellingly dubbed "intolerance-investigations" ("*enquêtes-intolerances*").[34] From this perspective, Brich's apparent expectation of "neutrality" from Foucault and other intellectuals in the GIP, denoted most explicitly by her quip that the "tone" in the opening paragraph of the first published GIP investigation was "far from neutral," seems completely unwarranted, if not strange.[35] There was indeed nothing "neutral" about the GIP, as the hostility of its manifold pronouncements toward the prison system made eminently clear. Consequently, GIP intellectuals were *invariably* enmeshed in the tasks of mediating the voices of prisoners rather than simply allowing them to emanate freely, as if unencumbered by any overarching political perspective whatsoever.

The efforts to increase public intolerance of the prison by highlighting prison conditions through the prisoners themselves were timely, to say the least. Less than a year after the creation of the GIP revolts erupted throughout the French prison system.[36] As Foucault insisted that these revolts provided him with the impetus for the making of what would eventually become *Discipline and Punish*, it would be worth our while to dwell on them a bit before turning to the next section.

The revolts of the winter of 1971–1972 were precipitated by Pleven's revocation of the long-standing right of prisoners to receive Christmas food parcels in November 1971, which itself constituted a collective punishment for disparate incidents involving the killing of several hostages by a handful of prisoners in the preceding months.[37] One major revolt took place at the Central Ney prison in Toul in December. It began with the refusal of hundreds of inmates to return to their cells in protest of a warden suspected of torture and culminated a few days later with prisoners barricading themselves inside the prison after learning that their agreement with the administration for the transfer of the warden had not been honored.[38] The revolt was violently repressed by security forces but another major revolt involving hundreds of prisoners took place only a month later at the Charles III prison in Nancy.[39] On this occasion, prisoners communicated their demands, which ranged from improvements in food and hygiene to a more equitable exercise of justice inside the prisons, to outsiders through leaflets thrown from the occupied rooftop of the Charles III prison. The revolt at Nancy was also violently repressed by security forces.[40]

Unsurprisingly, the GIP reacted swiftly to the revolts. Only a few days after the end of the revolt at Toul, the GIP co-sponsored a press conference with the newly created Truth Committee of Toul (CVT) to publicize a report by Dr Édith Rose, the prison psychiatrist of the Central Ney. Read by Foucault at the conference, Rose's report highlighted the excessively harsh treatment of prisoners.[41] As examples of this treatment, Rose mentioned that prisoners could only play sports if they had served a whole year without any misconduct and that one prisoner ended up with "mental problems" after prison authorities deprived him of a photo of his younger brother on account of the strict regulation of the number of photos in cells.[42] At another press conference co-sponsored with the CVT in early January 1972, Foucault praised Rose for her courage in denouncing specific personnel and actions at Toul, and he offered his own diagnosis of the revolt.[43] Foucault insisted that the prisoners obtained a "double victory" by disclosing the prison administration's "flagrant crime of the abuse

of trust and of lying" and by establishing a political struggle within the prison.[44] As he concluded, "In fact, what happened at Toul is the beginning of something new: the initiation of a political struggle against the entire penal system led by the social stratum which is its first victim."[45] At a GIP press conference on the premises of the Ministry of Justice less than 2 weeks later, Foucault addressed the revolt at Nancy by returning to the theme of a "victory" by prisoners. This "victory," which Foucault traced back to the problematization of prisons made possible by the hunger strikes of the previous year, consisted in collective self-organization, direct appeals to public opinion through "force and violence," and public support from outside of the prisons.[46] Foucault nevertheless acknowledged the persistence of serious threats to prisoners, especially in the form of solitary confinement for prisoners who merely made their demands for improvements known to prison administrators. Indeed, he pointed out that it was precisely this vengeful form of punishment that triggered the revolt at Nancy, forcing prisoners to take the alternative route of making their demands known by throwing leaflets from the rooftop of the Charles III prison. As a means of further publicizing these demands, Foucault proceeded to read and comment on the leaflet written by prisoners at Nancy.[47]

Obviously, throughout such episodes Foucault played no minor role. Alain Badiou observes that Foucault "maintained a particularly rigorous commitment [*engagement*] to a revision of the status of prisoners, and devoted to this question much of his time and the whole of his immense talent as an organizer and an agitator."[48] These words nicely capture the depth of Foucault's commitment to the GIP, which implied a remarkably broad range of activities above and beyond the founding of the organization. Foucault engaged in the daily tasks of "addressing envelopes, drafting out press releases and handing out leaflets."[49] He transformed his apartment into the *de facto* center of activities for the GIP and held regular meetings there with former prisoners and prisoners' family members.[50] Foucault assumed responsibility for the distribution of GIP questionnaires at La Santé prison in Paris.[51] On the basis of the information gathered at La Santé and other prisons, he edited and prefaced *Investigation in 20 Prisons*, published in May 1971.[52] In addition to publicizing the GIP objectives in numerous articles and interviews, Foucault co-authored an analysis of the assassination of Jackson with Catharine von Bülow and Defert, which appeared as a section of *The Assassination of George Jackson*.[53] Foucault's activities on behalf of the GIP even resulted in his arrest on one occasion. He was arrested at La Santé for failing to properly

copyright GIP leaflets and was physically abused by a police officer after his release.[54]

After less than 2 years, the GIP disbanded itself on grounds that it had fulfilled its goal of enabling prisoners to speak for themselves about what is intolerable in prisons.[55] Gilles Deleuze indicated that Foucault nevertheless felt disappointed by the work of the GIP only a few years afterward, owing to the persistence of the status quo regarding prisons and prisoners.[56] Yet, as Michael Welch suggests, Foucault's judgment in this instance seems to have been excessively self-critical.[57] The work of the GIP led to specific as well as general changes in the condition of prisoners. The GIP contributed to the realization of the right of prisoners to read the daily press.[58] It also laid the groundwork for two other prisoners' organizations, the Prisoners' Action Committee headed by a former prisoner, Serge Livrozet, who drew inspiration from Foucault, and the Association for the Rights of the Detained, which co-authored *Suicides of Prison* with the GIP.[59] More generally, however, the GIP rendered the prison *a problem* in the eyes of the public. David Macey writes, "Largely as a result of the work of the GIP, the prison issue had been placed on the public and political agenda, much more so than in Britain or the USA, where no comparable group ever succeeded in organizing large-scale actions outside the walls of prison."[60]

Deleuze corroborated this conclusion in his own peculiar way, noting that the "success" of the GIP consisted of the production of new statements about prisons by prisoners and non-prisoners that had previously been "unthinkable."[61] From this perspective, the GIP does seem to have gone some distance toward realizing its overarching goal of heightening intolerance toward the prison system. Indeed, toward the end of his life, Foucault regarded the GIP as precisely "an enterprise of 'problematization,' an effort to make problematic and to throw into question the practices, the rules, the institutions, the habits and the self-evidences that have piled up for decades and decades."[62] Let us now look at the effects in his theories of this "enterprise of 'problematization.'"

## Strangeness of prisons

Only a little more than a year after the self-dissolution of the GIP, Foucault began to deliver his Collège course from the academic year 1972 to 1973,

*The Punitive Society.*[63] At its core, this course sought to strip away the self-evidence of the prison and address its extreme peculiarity as the generalized form of punishment in Western societies over the preceding century and a half. As Foucault formulated the question, "Why this *strange* institution which is the prison" (italics mine)?[64] The strangeness of the prison derived from a number of traits. Historically, prisons existed on the very margins of the penal system prior to the nineteenth century, serving to guarantee persons rather than punish them.[65] At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the prison occupied the center of the penal system to the point of effacing other long-standing punishments, such as "pillorying, quartering, hanging and burning at the stake."[66] Moreover, imprisonment as the general form of punishment simply could not be deduced from the penal theories elaborated by late-eighteenth-century reformers, such as Cesare Beccaria, Jacques Pierre Brissot, and Le Peletier de Saint-Fargeau. These theories pivoted around the articulation of the criminal as a social enemy. Accordingly, they prescribed forms of punishment that were indexed to the defense of society, such as dishonor, retaliation, and even slavery for the benefit of society.[67] Finally, prison was fiercely criticized from the very outset of its appearance at the center of the penal system for failing to lower the number of criminals, producing recidivism, and constituting a delinquent milieu. It was therefore "strange" from the perspective of its putative function.[68]

Foucault addressed the problem of the tenacity of the prison by sketching, for what appears to have been the very first time, the hypothesis that prison produces effects that serve a purpose within a broader economy of power. More precisely, he ventured the argument that the production of delinquency by prisons serves ultimately to control popular illegalities.[69] Foucault thus ascertained the unconventional view that prison should be regarded as something of a success rather than an abysmal failure, as legions of reformers would have it. Notably, he reiterated this argument roughly 2 years later in *Discipline and Punish*.

> For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous—and, on occasion, usable—form of illegality; in producing delinquents, in an apparently marginal but in fact centrally supervised milieu; in producing the delinquent as a pathologized subject.[70]

What is more, Foucault, in *The Punitive Society,* avoided any conceptualization of the prison as a freestanding institution. Rather, he situated the prison within

an economy of disciplinary power specifically, characterized for the very first time as a means of constituting individuals as productive forces through apparatuses of sequestration as well as instruments for "the acquisition of disciplines or customs."[71] Clearly, the terms of Foucault's presentation of disciplinary power would undergo considerable changes but even a cursory glance at the elaboration of disciplinary power in *Discipline and Punish* would indicate that he would still depict this power as a means of constituting useful (and docile) individuals. Furthermore, the echoes of Foucault's location of the prison within an economy of disciplinary power would resound throughout his core argument in *Discipline and Punish*. "The prison," as Foucault wrote, "came from elsewhere—from the mechanisms proper to disciplinary power."[72] Indeed, it was the ascendance of these mechanisms that facilitated the shift from punishment through spectacles of public torture and execution to punishment through imprisonment.

## Disciplinary power

Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power acquired a truly systematic form in his Collège course from the academic year 1973 to 1974, *Psychiatric Power*, as well as in *Discipline and Punish*. We shall see in the succeeding chapters that it also served as a springboard for Foucault's elaboration of other techniques of power and even informed his analyses of practices of the self in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity. It is therefore crucial that we go over Foucault's account of disciplinary power in some detail before proceeding. The point of the following overview is rather general and modest. It is that the exercise of disciplinary power was not totalizing for Foucault *even* in the context of an ominous sounding "disciplinary society." The exercise of disciplinary power in his view fell short of its endeavor to produce and reproduce a self-subjecting individual (and individuality) and, consequently, left ample room for resistance.

Foucault claimed that at its most elementary the concept of disciplinary power concerns individuals. As he noted in his depiction of the ideal exercise of this power, "We are never dealing with a mass, with a group, or even, to tell the truth, with a multiplicity: we are only ever dealing with individuals."[73] However, in opposition to political theories which take the individual as a given for the purpose of constructing sovereignty, as in the notable case of Thomas Hobbes's version of the social contract, Foucault set about showing that the individual first

and foremost amounts to a construction of disciplinary power. The individual was in his view an *effect* of this form of power rather than the raw material upon which it impinges. Foucault wrote, "Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise."[74]

Foucault maintained that disciplinary power yields such individualizing effects by targeting bodies. Of course, bodies and physical relations in general figured quite prominently in all of his accounts of disciplinary power. But we should keep in mind that the targeting of bodies for Foucault was not unique to the exercise of disciplinary power. He even claimed that "what is essential in *all* power is that ultimately its point of application is *always* the body" (italics mine) and his accounts of other modalities of power certainly corroborated this claim.[75] Foucault insisted that sovereign power, which he placed in categorical opposition to disciplinary power, sets its sights on the body as an object of violence or honor during exceptional moments.[76] Similarly, Foucault discerned in the exercise of pastoral power a whole attention to the individual body animated through care.[77]

Disciplinary power stood out for Foucault for its endeavor to constitute bodies as bearers of a highly particular relationship between utility and docility, whereby increases in the utility of bodies correspond to increases in their docility *and* vice versa. In Foucault's words, disciplinary power seeks to make the body "more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely."[78] But how can the skills and aptitudes of bodies increase without also serving as possible sources of resistance to disciplinary power? Disciplinary power faces the problem of the potential resistances aroused from *its own* investments in the body. Foucault claimed that techniques of disciplinary power attempt to resolve this problem through a control of the body that produces not only an individual but also *individuality*, understood, in terms borrowed from Hannah Arendt, as an amalgam of qualities that render an individual distinct from others.[79] Foucault argued that disciplinary power produces a peculiar individuality consisting of cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory traits through several techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. It is the fabrication of this individuality that holds together the exercise of disciplinary power and gives it a self-reproductive semblance. Let us spell out this dense strand of argument.

Foucault insisted that disciplinary power creates a cellular form of individuality by ordering individuals in space. He called this ordering "the art of

distributions." Cellular individuality rests on the separation of individuals from others. The art of distributions produces this individuality by first of all enclosing a space different from all others through the use of walls or gates, as in the case of barracks and factories.[80] It partitions this space into individual cells in order to break up collective activities that deter from the goal of utility, such as desertion or vagabondage. The art of distributions also codes space with specific functions to make it as useful as possible.[81] As an example of this coding, Foucault referred to the production of printed fabrics at the Oberkampf manufactory at Jouy. The workshops at the manufactory were divided into operations "for the printers, the handlers, the colourists, the women who touched up the design, the engravers, the dyers."[82] Each worker occupied a space defined by his or her specific function within the overall production process. Lastly, the art of distributions creates a cellular individuality by ascribing the unit of rank to individuals. For Foucault, the seating of pupils in a classroom according to their age, grade, and behavior nicely illustrated the import of rank.[83]

Foucault maintained that within this enclosed space disciplinary power produces an organic individuality by exerting a control over bodily activities. This individuality is "organic" in so far as it lends itself to disciplinary practices all on its own, as if spontaneously and naturally.[84] The control of bodily activities realizes this organic individuality, first of all, through a temporal enclosure afforded by the use of timetables, which prevent idleness by partitioning activities into minutes and seconds.[85] The control of activities also breaks down movements of the body into an ever-greater number of acts and indexes these acts to temporal imperatives. Foucault identified the prescription of the duration and length of the steps of marching soldiers as an example of the temporal elaboration of the act.[86] The control of activities further implies a relationship between the general position of the body and its gestures. In this regard, Foucault discussed the upright posture of pupils and the correct positioning of their elbows, chins, hands, legs, fingers, and stomachs as the conditions for good handwriting.[87] The control of activities goes even further, correlating the gestures of the body with the parts of the object used by it, as in the case of manifold gestures employed by a soldier to manipulate the barrel, butt, trigger-guard, notch, molding, lock, screw, and hammer of a rifle.[88] Finally, rather than merely preventing idleness, the control of activities forges an organic individuality by exhaustively using time.

With the activities of the body controlled, disciplinary power proceeds to constitute a genetic form of individuality by subjecting the body to the demand

for a perpetual progress toward an optimal end. Foucault dubbed this demand the "organization of geneses." Drawing from the example of the military, he submitted that perpetual progress toward an end yields a genetic individuality in the following ways: first, through the division of time into distinct segments, such as periods of practice and training; second, through the organization of these segments into a plan proceeding from the simplest elements, such as the positioning of the fingers in military exercise; third, through the ascription of an end to these segments in the form of an exam; and, finally, through the production of a series that assigns exercises to each individual according to rank.[89]

Finally, disciplinary power establishes a combinatory form of individuality characterized by articulations with other bodies to obtain a level of efficiency greater than the level of efficiency realized by the mere sum of the activities of these bodies.[90] Foucault called this process the composition of forces. This composition gives rise to a combinatory individuality by first treating individual bodies as mobile elements to be connected to other individual bodies as well as to a totality of bodies; second, by coordinating the time of each of these bodies to maximize the extraction of their forces and to combine them with others for the optimal results; and, lastly, by commands that can be transmitted through signs and therefore do not necessitate verbalization, much less explanation.[91]

We now know *how* disciplinary power works and *what* it produces. It works by distributing individuals, controlling activities, organizing geneses, and composing forces, and these functions correspond to the production of cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory individualities, respectively. Yet, at the risk of drawing too fine of a distinction, Foucault went further in his analysis to impart a sharp sense of how disciplinary power *gets going* and *keeps going*. He attributed the success of this power to several basic techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination.

If architecture figures within the art of distributions as a means of ordering multiplicities into cellular individuals, it plays the role within hierarchical observation of rendering individuals visible with the overall effect of structuring their behavior. In making individuals seeable architecture serves, as Foucault wrote, "to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them."[92] Still, he suggested that outside of any ideal schema, architecture alone falls short of making visibility constant. What makes this visibility perpetual is the implementation of a hierarchical network within the group of individuals who occupy a particular architectural space. Foucault offered many examples

of these networks. For instance, he suggested that surveillance operated in the asylum in the early nineteenth century not only through a doctor but also through supervisors who reported on patients and servants who feigned servitude to patients while gathering and transmitting information about the patients to the doctor.[93] This example clearly demonstrated the communication of the gaze from the top to the bottom, its manifestly "hierarchical" character. Yet, Foucault was keen to remind his readers that the gaze can operate in a more multidirectional manner to the point of bearing on the supervisors themselves.

> Although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network "holds" the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised.[94]

Such a dense network of vigilant and multidirectional gazes no doubt causes disciplinary power to appear ubiquitous, but the sheer simplicity of its mechanism also makes it seem rather inconspicuous.[95]

In a disciplinary world, however, it is not enough to see bodies so as to yield from them specific effects. One has to be able to *judge* them as well. Disciplinary power therefore depends on normalizing judgment for its continued exercise. Foucault indicated that this form of judgment consists of features that make it look quite different from judgment in, for example, criminal courts. These features are summed up in terms of the following forms of punishment: first, even minute departures from correct behavior are punished; second, a failure to adhere to rules established on the basis of regularities observed over time is punished; third, exercise is used specifically as a corrective punishment; fourth, gratification is used in addition to punishment for the purposes of establishing a hierarchy of good and bad subjects; and, finally, rank understood as the place occupied in this hierarchy is used as a form punishment or reward.[96] What ultimately stood out here for Foucault is the concept of the norm. Disciplinary power judges according to the norm. By "norm," however, it should be obvious that Foucault had in mind something other than a strictly legal concept. He depicted the norm as a standard of behavior that allows for the measurement of forms of behavior as "normal" or "abnormal." In his words, "the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences." The norm

thus establishes the figure of the "normal" as the very "principle of coercion" for the figure of the "abnormal."[97]

The examination combines the techniques of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment in "a normalizing gaze" to lend further sustenance to the exercise of disciplinary power.[98] This gaze, as Foucault pointed out in a splendidly economical formula, "manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected."[99] Put differently, the examination binds the exercise of disciplinary power to the formation of a disciplinary knowledge. It does so in several ways. First of all, the examination facilitates the exercise of disciplinary power by objectifying subjects through observation. As Foucault posited, "Disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification." In this regard, he discussed the first military review of Louis XIV as a form of examination yielding the objectification of subjects. This review subjected 18,000 soldiers to the gaze of a barely visible sovereign who commanded their exercises.[100] Second, the examination constitutes individuality through an administrative form of writing that leaves behind a dense layer of documents, as in the examples of medical records and student records. This writing makes it possible to describe individuals as objects and track their development, or lack thereof, as well as to monitor through comparison phenomena within the larger aggregate of population.[101] Finally, the accumulation of documents through the examination forges the individual as a case defined in terms of a status bound up with all of the "measurements," "gaps," and "marks" characteristic of disciplinary power.[102]

In historical terms, Foucault sketched the shift from a society (prior to the sixteenth century) in which disciplinary power played a marginal but critical and innovative role from within the confines of religious communities to a society (beginning in the eighteenth century) in which it played a preponderant role from a myriad of institutions. In this sketch, disciplinary power spread initially through several "points of support" with religious underpinnings,[103] such as the education of youth inspired by the ascetic ideal embraced by the Brethren of the Common Life with its focus on progressive stages of education, rules of seclusion, submission to a guide, and military organization; colonization as practiced by the Jesuits in the Guarani republic of Paraguay with its emphasis on the full employment of time, permanent supervision, and the cellular constitution of families; and, lastly, the confinement of marginal elements of the population under the management of religious orders. From these peripheral positions,

disciplinary power began to cover more spheres of society without any religious backing, appearing in the army by the end of the seventeenth century and working class by the eighteenth century.[104]

Foucault maintained that this formidable extension of disciplinary power across the surface of society reflected a deeper ensemble of transformations. First, disciplinary power began to function as a technique more for the constitution of useful individuals than for the prevention of desertion, idleness, theft, and other problems. Second, disciplinary mechanisms began to extend beyond their institutional parameters to yield lateral effects. In this regard, Foucault mentioned the quite fascinating example of schools using information gathered from students to monitor parental behavior. Lastly, disciplinary power began to bear on society as a whole through the organization of a police apparatus concerned with intricacies of individual behavior.[105]

These transformations were bound up in their turn with broad historical processes in the economic, juridical, and scientific domains. The generalization of disciplinary power took place against the background of the eighteenth-century problem of indexing the rapid growth in population to the rapid growth in production apparatuses.[106] It attempted to resolve this problem by offering a means of administering the growth in the number of human beings and making them useful. The generalization of disciplinary power also entailed consequences for the juridical system, introducing asymmetries that vitiated the egalitarian juridical framework forged in the eighteenth century. As Foucault explained, disciplinary power established relationships of constraint between individuals rather than relationships of contractual obligation, and it defined individuals hierarchically rather than universally. The play of such asymmetries within the time and space proper to the exercise of disciplinary power effectively suspended the law.[107] Lastly, the generalization of disciplinary power implied a tightening of relations between power and knowledge to the point of their mutual constitution by the eighteenth century. The objectification of individuals became the means for their subjection and the subjection of individuals became the means for their objectification.[108] Through the diffusion of psychology and psychiatry, the examination became incarnated in "tests, interviews, interrogations and consultations" that reproduced mutually constitutive power-knowledge relations within disciplinary institutions.[109]

Foucault found the "formula" for the generalization of the exercise of disciplinary power in Jeremy Bentham's architectural plan for the model prison, *Panopticon*, published in 1791.[110] He related that Bentham depicted the Panopticon

as an annular building with an internal periphery consisting of cells containing iron grate doors opening to the interior and windows opening to the exterior as well as to a multi-floored central tower containing wide windows with blinds and partitions. Foucault considered this building design *the* perfect expression of disciplinary power for a host of reasons. First, with each of the cells designed to be occupied by only one inmate at a time the building produced individualizing effects at its periphery. Second, venetian blinds and partitions on the tower concealed whether anyone actually occupied it, guaranteeing anonymity at the center. Third, the artificial light from the central tower as well as the natural light entering through the cell windows assured the visibility of inmates in the cells. Finally, this visibility allowed for the perpetual writing about inmates and, consequently, the constitution of an administrative knowledge about them.[111]

These features rendered the Panopticon in Foucault's judgment a magnificent machine not only for subjection but also for *self*-subjection. By inducing *in* inmates an awareness of their own constant visibility, the Panopticon compelled them to structure their own behavior in accordance with its power mechanism.[112] Notably missing from this ideal process was any reliance on violence or ostentatious displays of force. Remarkably, the play of visibility facilitated by spatial arrangements and lighting sufficed to make inmates the very *conduits* of the power mechanism embodied in the Panopticon.

Though Bentham conceived of the Panopticon as an ideal prison for the resolution of the vexing problem of pauperism,[113] Foucault did not tire of reminding his readers and auditors that Bentham considered it applicable to a broad array of settings *besides* the prison. As Foucault explained, "Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used."[114] Moreover, lest we think that the Panopticon simply remained a product of Bentham's imagination, Foucault pointed out that, "In the 1830s, the Panopticon became the architectural program of most prison projects" and that institutions apart from the prison adopted its architectural dispositions for a wide variety of purposes.[115] As an example of this adoption, Foucault detailed all of the Panoptic features of the architecture of the asylum in the early nineteenth century, demonstrating that the Panoptic architecture of the asylum building was construed as the very cure to madness.[116] This cross-institutional takeover of Panoptic architectural dispositions intensified the spread of disciplinary power.

For all of the reasons elaborated above, namely, the diffusion of disciplinary power from one institution to another as well as its various transformations into

an ever more productive and pervasive modality of power culminating in the extension of Panoptic architectural features, Foucault found warrant in speaking somewhat grandiosely about the advent of a "disciplinary society." Yet, we should not take away from the phrase "disciplinary society" the connotation of a kind of dystopian society in which disciplinary power holds exclusive and total sway to the point of churning out nothing but self-subjecting individuals.

First of all, Foucault clearly wanted his readers and auditors take away from his phrase "disciplinary society" an understanding of a society in which the exercise of disciplinary power is pervasive enough to interact with and alter other modalities of power rather than one in which it simply effaces these other modalities.[117] Disciplinary power, in other words, is not the only technique available in "disciplinary society," even if it is preponderant. But besides the active presence of other modalities of power in disciplinary society, there are reasons to be wary of the suggestion that Foucault considered the exercise of disciplinary power totalizing. He portrayed the exercise of this power mainly as an ideal only to show how this ideal shaded to varying degrees into real, concrete practices. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Foucault suggested that through its incessant investments in the body disciplinary power arouses potential resistances that necessitate control. For every investment of disciplinary power in the utility of the body there is a risk that this investment will go terribly wrong, resulting in heightened demands from disciplined subjects. Disciplinary power thus appears highly unstable. One obvious implication of this instability is that disciplinary power leaves ample room for contestation even in a "disciplinary society." Indeed, the very drive of disciplinary power to invest the forces of the body nourishes potential resistances to its exercise. Keeping this general point in mind, let us now turn to how Foucault's involvement in the prisoner support movement facilitated his manifold insights about the exercise of disciplinary power and the prison.

## Theoretical lessons of the GIP

We know from a previous section of this chapter that Foucault's arguments about disciplinary power and the prison did not appear out of the blue. Quite the contrary, Foucault had been consumed by collective struggles over the prison, the disciplinary institution par excellence, for the better part of two years. Moreover, as indicated above, he repeatedly stressed the importance of his experiences in

these struggles for his analyses of disciplinary power and the prison in particular. He even attributed the formulation of his views that prison belongs to a political technology of the body and that power is not simply negative to his experiences in these struggles. What we do not know is how exactly Foucault could have arrived at these views.

This final section suggests that the rudiments of a wide range of theoretical insights that would culminate in *Discipline and Punish* may be gleaned from one GIP document in particular, *Investigation in 20 Prisons*. Foucault not only helped compile the information for this document by distributing questionnaires at La Santé, but also edited its contents, which consisted primarily of responses from prisoners to questions about visitations, mail, censorship, rights, rules, cell conditions, food, work, walks, leisure, medical care, surveillance, hazings, searches, prison courts, solitary confinement, suicides, strikes, and revolts. These responses disclosed an amalgam of themes that would figure centrally in *Discipline and Punish*.

One such theme is the breakup of collective activities among prisoners. A prisoner from Douai reported that "singing and outbursts of laughter" were prohibited during walks and leisure activities.[118] A prisoner from La Roquette conveyed the intensity of such prohibitions in his response: "All forms of solidarity are prohibited. I had to throw away a large part of my Christmas parcel that risked going rotten rather than send it to another even completely unknown prisoner."[119] Foucault would later stress that the exercise of disciplinary power depends on the breakup of collective activity. The point of partitioning space into individual cells is to break up collective activities that threaten to detract from the disciplinary goal of amplifying the utility of individual bodies.[120] What is more, Foucault would discern from Bentham's architectural plan, *Panopticon,* an ideal means of realizing the break-up of collective activities. As Foucault wrote with reference to the plan, "The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities."[121] Notably, he mentioned singing as an effect that Bentham sought to dispel through *Panopticon*.[122]

Another theme running throughout *Investigation in 20 Prisons* is the temporal regulation of daily life in the prisons. A prisoner from Nevers provided details of this regulation in the following laconic excerpt, "Wakeup time: 6:40AM. You dress in clothes that you were required to leave outside the cell the prior evening. 7:30AM: breakfast. 11:30AM: lunch. 5:30PM: dinner. 6PM: you get

undressed. You put your clothes and the stool outside so that you must lie down at 6PM. Lights out: 9PM."[123]

This description may easily recall the timetable of a prison in Paris that Foucault would contrast with the gruesome public execution of Damiens from 80 years before in the opening pages of *Discipline and Punish*.[124] Foucault would consider the use of timetables altogether crucial to the exercise of disciplinary power. Timetables prevent idleness by partitioning bodily activities into minutes and even seconds. Consequently, they lay the groundwork for the constitution of bodies seemingly engaged in disciplinary movements all on their own, without any apparent instigation.[125]

Still another pervasive theme in *Investigation in 20 Prisons* is the prospect of a near-perpetual surveillance over prisoners and guards alike. A prisoner from Gradignan remarked that thanks to an intercom system, "The guard can listen when he wants to the activity of a prisoner."[126] Asked to describe his surveillance system, a prisoner from Fresnes responded, "Guards appear on each floor every 10 minutes. They look at the cell. They check the bars every day."[127] A prisoner from La Santé offered the following brief account of the extent of his own monitoring, "The despicable peephole. There are times when it has no importance. There are others on the other hand. . . I did often see an eye looking at me while I was bathing or sitting on the toilet."[128]

Some prisoners stressed that the guards themselves did not escape surveillance. A prisoner at La Santé reported, "There is a head guard who terrorized the guards on our floor. He hid behind the staircase to surprise them." Another prisoner from La Santé asked, "How could you make a guard understand that he has a human being in front of him when he himself is poorly treated by his superiors? I saw a guard completely panic in the presence of an especially formidable sergeant."[129]

Of course, it would be quite difficult to overstate the significance of surveillance in the exercise of disciplinary power. *Panopticon* amounted to an ideal expression of this power precisely because it facilitated an anonymous and perpetual surveillance of inmates through a play of architectural dispositions and lighting. The "peephole" scorned by one prisoner at La Santé clearly reflected these features, albeit with the only drawback of allowing the prisoner to know when he was being subjected to a gaze. Strikingly, however, Foucault would insist that surveillance bears not only on individuals subjected to a gaze but also on the very supervisors who transmit the gaze. The supervisors are

"perpetually supervised"[130] and, at the extreme, citizens can even engage in the task of "supervising the supervisor who supervises."[131] The ideal upshot of this surveillance is the constitution of self-monitoring and therefore self-subjecting individuals.

Other themes in *Investigation in 20 Prisons* seem to be echoed in Foucault's more specific claims about the prison. One of these themes is the autonomy of the prison administration from any form of juridical regulation. A prisoner from La Santé complained about feeling "subjected" and being "subjected to the arbitrariness of the guards," explaining that the caprice of the guards simply had to be endured "because the guard at La Santé and in all of the prisons in general is king."[132] The same prisoner went on to implicate the entire prison administration in arbitrary rule: "What is most intolerable is being subjected to the arbitrariness, not just of the guards but also of the whole administrative personnel."[133] A prisoner from Nevers stressed the overriding importance of obedience to the guards: "We do not know the rights we have in prison. To tell prisoners about their rights is contrary to the spirit of prisons: we have only the right to obey the guards."[134]

Needless to say, Foucault would place obedience at the center of his account of disciplinary power. What, after all, was a "docile body," if not an obedient one? Perhaps less noticeably, however, Foucault would emphasize the autonomy of the prison administration from juridical regulations and even depict the violence of guards as a reflection of this autonomy. "The sign of this autonomy is very apparent in the 'useless' acts of violence perpetrated by warders or in the despotism of an administration that has all the privileges of an enclosed community."[135] In keeping with his location of the prison within a general economy of disciplinary power, Foucault would proceed to insist that the prison administration acquired autonomy from juridical regulations because it was entrusted with the eminently disciplinary task of transforming prisoners rather than simply depriving them of their liberty. Indeed, he elaborated that it was this task that explained the recourse of prisons to the use of isolation, labor, and curing, *all* of which were addressed, we might add, as perfectly commonplace elements of prison life in *Investigation in 20 Prisons*.

The examples above are hardly exhaustive but they give us a vivid sense of how exactly Foucault could have arrived at his abstract, overarching "lesson" that prison belongs to a "political technology of the body," as well as his conclusion that power is not simply negative. Indeed, the examples above convey the

production of disciplinary individualities among prisoners through (in order of appearance) the breakup of collective activities through spatial partitions, the temporal division of bodily activities through the use of timetables, and the use of hierarchical surveillance through a network of gazes. We can also see how the examples above could have provided Foucault with the impetus for far more specific claims about the overriding importance of obedience in prison life.

The point, however, of teasing out various affinities between *Investigation in 20 Prisons* and *Discipline and Punish* is not simply to substantiate Foucault's contention that the GIP left a very strong imprint on his articulation of disciplinary power as well as on his unconventional reading of the prison. The point is, rather, to demonstrate that the collective struggles against the prison system in which Foucault played a prominent role structured, if not generated, his analyses by yielding crucial insights about intricate workings of disciplinary power and the prison.

What is more, Foucault implicitly responded to the prisoner support movement years after his withdrawal from it by registering certain obstacles and limitations to struggles against the prison system *in* theory. For instance, if he had insisted in no uncertain terms that the revolting prisoners at Toul constituted themselves as a collective force,[136] his subsequent emphasis on the decomposition of collective activities through spatial partitioning in the exercise of disciplinary power stressed that prisoners endeavoring to constitute themselves as a collective force against the prison system would come up against an ongoing obstacle. How would an institution that constantly produces cellular individualities through spatial partitioning serve as a space for the constitution of a collectivity? Paradoxically, even the prisoners' revolts themselves were later used, as Foucault pointed out, to reinvigorate calls from reformers for a far more thoroughgoing application of disciplinary techniques embodied in penitentiary principles rather than to subject these techniques to critique. As he noted, "The prisoners' revolts of recent weeks have been attributed to the fact that the reforms proposed in 1945 never really took effect; that one must *return* to the fundamental principles of the prison" (italics mine).[137] Perhaps above all, however, Foucault's location of the prison within a generalized economy of disciplinary power implied that struggles against the prison needed to address *this* economy in order to be effective. It would, in other words, not suffice to wage a purely localized struggle against the prison. It would be necessary to connect with movements poised against *other* disciplinary institutions. This conclusion may be read as one of the

more general political messages of Foucault's "lesson" that prison belongs to "a political technology of the body." Such instances of a critical dialogue with the prisoner support movement, which may well have arisen from Foucault's sense of disappointment with the outcome of the activities of the GIP, were certainly not a manner of declaring the omnipotence of disciplinary power and the prison so much as a way of pushing participants in the prisoner support movement (and other anti-disciplinary movements) in new directions. From a bird's-eye viewpoint, we can therefore see that a sort of dialectic arose between Foucault's theories and practices, with his theories both emerging from collective political practices and serving to further inform these practices. In other words, Foucault was not simply a theorist of power but also a theorist of power deeply enmeshed in struggles over power, and the latter left discernible effects on his theories, thereby setting the stage for another series of battles.

Understanding this dialectic between Foucault's theory and practice gives us a much deeper appreciation of the extent to which resistance really pervaded *Discipline and Punish*. It is not just that resistance inhered in Foucault's view that power consists of a relation defined by a warlike clash of forces or "pitting force against force."[138] It is not simply the case that he acknowledged the resistance of the dominated to the "grip" power "has on them"[139] or that he concretely supplemented this acknowledgment with a discussion of the resistance of the early nineteenth-century workers' movement to the disciplinary production of delinquency as an illegality distinct from popular illegalities.[140] It is also not simply the case that Foucault explicitly framed the whole argument in *Discipline and Punish* against the backdrop of a disciplinary institution—the prison—that had been badly shaken by the outbreak of revolts over the preceding years. What a consideration of Foucault's immersion in the prisoner support movement shows is that even when he meticulously probed the manifold strengths of disciplinary power, as in the lengthy section of the book devoted to the disciplines proper, he was doing so precisely from a perspective heavily animated, not merely informed, by resistances to this modality of power.

## Notes

1 Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

2 Ibid., 8.

3 Cecile Brich, "The Groupe d'information sur les prisons: The voice of prisoners? Or Foucault's?" *Foucault Studies* 5 (January 2008): 26–47.
4 Michael Welch, "Pastoral power as penal resistance: Foucault and the Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons," *Punishment & Society* 12, no. 1 (January 2010): 47–63.
5 Keith Gandal, "Michel Foucault: Intellectual Work and Politics," *Telos* 67 (1986): 122.
6 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 30.
7 Michel Foucault, "The History of Sexuality," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980b), 184.
8 Michel Foucault, "[Discussion avec la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire destinée au journal *Rouge*]," Early 1978, C 82, Audio Cassette, Fonds Foucault, Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.
9 Michel Foucault, "Toujours les prisons," in *Dits et écrits: 1954–1988*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, vol. 2, *1976–1988* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001j), 916.
10 A. Belden Fields, *Trotskyism and Maoism: Theory and Practice in France and the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 102.
11 Ibid., 103, 107.
12 David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 258.
13 Fields, *Trotskyism and Maoism*, 119.
14 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault,* 259.
15 Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 226; Philippe Artières, Laurent Quéro and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel (eds), *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons: Archives d'une lutte, 1970–1972*, (Paris: Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003), 328–9.
16 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault,* 262.
17 Michel Foucault, "Je perçois l'intolérable," *Journal de Génève*, July 24, 1971, Samedi littéraire, 13, quoted in Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 262.
18 Michel Foucault, "Création d'un Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons," *Esprit*, March 1971, 531, quoted in Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 258. Foucault would subsequently describe the prison as "that darkest region of justice" in *Discipline and Punish*, 256.
19 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 349, 398.
20 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans 20 prisons* (Paris: Champ Libre, 1971c).

21 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 234–5, 264–71.
22 Michel Foucault, "Je perçois l'intolérable," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, vol. 1, *1954–1975* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001d), 1072.
23 Brich, "Groupe d'information sur les prisons," 28.
24 On the significance of investigations in French Maoism, especially in Alain Badiou's thought, see Bruno Bosteels, "Post-Maoism: Badiou and Politics," special issue of *positions: east asia cultures critique* 13, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 578–83. On the role of investigations in *Quaderni Rossi*, see Steve Wright, *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism* (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002), 21–5, 32–62.
25 Michel Foucault, "Non, ce n'est pas une enquête officielle. . .," in Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, *Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 67; Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 258.
26 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans 20 prisons.*
27 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans une prison-modèle: Fleury-Mérogis* (Paris: Champ Libre, 1971b).
28 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Suicides de prison* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973).
29 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *L'Assassinat de George Jackson* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971a).
30 Brich, "Groupe d'information sur les prisons," 30–41.
31 Ibid., 34, 46.
32 Ibid., 28.
33 Michel Foucault, "(Sur les prisons)," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Defert and Ewald, vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1044.
34 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans 20 prisons*, 3.
35 Brich, "Groupe d'information sur les prisons," 38. I also find Michael Welch's suggestion that the GIP exercised pastoral power vis-à-vis prisoners and that, accordingly, its "ultimate task" consisted in "improving the *salut* (safety) and *santé* (health) of those incarcerated" problematic. Welch, "Pastoral Power as Penal Resistance," 53. This understanding of the purpose of the GIP seems to sit too easily with the reformism that the GIP explicitly challenged. It also seems to assume the absence a critical perspective on the exercise of pastoral power by Foucault, even though this power configured modern governmentalities and bore very strong affinities with disciplinary power, such as individualization and perpetual observation. On pastoral power, see Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007c), 123–226.
36 In his final and unfinished work, Jean Genet treated these revolts as nothing short of a deeply disruptive awakening, describing them as a "wind" that was

about "to blow through the prisons and upset the nocturnal activity that had been going on there for so long—rotting, railing, groaning, wailing, dreaming solitary but proud". Genet, *Prisoner of Love*, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: New York Review Books, 2003), 363.

37 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault,* 272.

38 Ibid., 274–5; Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, *Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 134–5.

39 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault,* 279.

40 Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, *Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 191.

41 Ibid., 135.

42 Édith Rose, "Rapport de Mme Rose psychiatre de la Centrale de Toul," in Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, *Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 165.

43 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 276. Dr Rose exhibited features that Foucault would later identify with the courageous truth-telling known as *parrhesia* in ancient Greece. Rose's denunciation of conditions at Toul exposed her to the risk of a punishment and therefore required her courage. Dr Rose in fact incurred a punishment in the form of a forced departure from the prison service. On risk and courage as central features of *parrhesia*, see Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 54–6, 62–6.

44 Michel Foucault, "Pour échapper à leur prison. . .," in Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, *Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 154.

45 Ibid., 155.

46 Michel Foucault, "Il y a un an à peu près. . .," in ibid., 196.

47 Ibid., 197–8.

48 Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward (New York: Verso, 2001a), 6.

49 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 257.

50 Ibid., 264, 267–8.

51 Ibid., 266.

52 Daniel Defert, Note to "Préface," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, by Michel Foucault, eds Defert and Ewald, vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1063.

53 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *L'Assassinat de George Jackson*, 41–61. For the translation, see Michel Foucault, Catharine von Bülow and Daniel Defert, "The Masked Assassination," in *Warfare in the American Homeland: Policing and Prison in a Penal Democracy*, ed. Joy James (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 140–60.

54 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault,* 270–1.

55 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 233.

56 Gilles Deleuze, "The Intellectual and Politics: Foucault and the Prison," *History of the Present* 1, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 2.
57 Welch, "Pastoral Power as Penal Resistance," 58.
58 Brich, "Groupe d'information sur les prisons," 26; Welch, "Pastoral Power as Penal Resistance," 58.
59 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 288–9.
60 Ibid., 289.
61 Deleuze, "Intellectual and Politics," 21.
62 Michel Foucault, "Interview de Michel Foucault," *Actes* 45–6 (June 1984a): 3, quoted in Gandal, "Michel Foucault," 127.
63 Michel Foucault, "La société punitive," 1972–1973, TS by Jacques Lagrange, Bureau de Mme Marie Renée-Cazaban, Service de Bibliothèques et Archives, Collège de France, Paris, France. The summary of this course can be found in Foucault, "The Punitive Society," in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 1, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 1997), 23–37.
64 Foucault, "Société punitive," 192.
65 Ibid., 59; Foucault, "Punitive Society," 24.
66 Foucault, "Société punitive," 192.
67 Ibid., 61–4, 192; Foucault, "Punitive Society," 28–9.
68 Foucault, "Société punitive," 192.
69 Foucault, "Punitive Society," 36.
70 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 277.
71 Ibid., 208.
72 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 256.
73 Michel Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–1974*, ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006b), 75. This dissociation of individuals from multiplicities was overstated. Foucault provided a much more finessed gloss on the disciplinary relationship to multiplicities in *Security, Territory, Population*, 12.
74 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 170.
75 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 14
76 Ibid., 44–5.
77 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 126–8.
78 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 138.
79 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: A Harvest Book, 1985), 454.
80 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 141–3.
81 Ibid., 143–5.

82 Ibid., 145.
83 Ibid., 146–7.
84 Ibid., 155–6.
85 Ibid., 150–1.
86 Ibid., 151–2.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 153.
89 Ibid., 157–9.
90 Ibid., 167.
91 Ibid., 164–7.
92 Ibid., 172.
93 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 4–6.
94 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 176–7.
95 Ibid., 177.
96 Ibid., 177–83.
97 Ibid., 184.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 184–5.
100 Ibid., 188.
101 Ibid., 189–91.
102 Ibid., 192.
103 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 66.
104 Ibid., 66–71.
105 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 210–16.
106 Ibid., 218–20.
107 Ibid., 222–3.
108 Ibid., 224.
109 Ibid., 226–7.
110 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 41.
111 Ibid., 75–8.
112 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 201.
113 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 111–13.
114 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 205.
115 Ibid., 249.
116 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 102–7.
117 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 216.
118 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans 20 prisons*, 35.
119 Ibid., 40.

120 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 143.
121 Ibid., 201.
122 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 75.
123 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans 20 prisons*, 23.
124 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 6–7.
125 Ibid., 150–1.
126 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans 20 prisons*, 31.
127 Ibid., 40.
128 Ibid., 41.
129 Ibid.
130 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 177.
131 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 76.
132 Le Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons, *Enquête dans 20 prisons*, 20.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., 22.
135 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 248.
136 Foucault, "Pour échapper à leur prison. . .," in Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, *Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 152.
137 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 268.
138 Ibid., 26.
139 Ibid., 27.
140 Ibid., 285–92.

3

# Beyond the Bellicose Model of Power?

In the last chapter, we explored the relationship between Michel Foucault's political activities in the early 1970s and his account of the exercise of disciplinary power. We will now turn our attention to the broad framework underpinning his account of disciplinary power throughout this period. Foucault in his Collège de France course from 1975 to 1976, *"Society Must Be Defended,"* retrospectively dubbed this framework "Nietzsche's hypothesis" or the "war model." It posited that power consists of warlike relations between forces resulting in the domination of some forces over others. Foucault in *"Society Must Be Defended"* suddenly began to scrutinize the war model, going so far as to provide a genealogy of its emergence in discourses of race war and, ultimately, state racism. Indeed, Foucault even seemed to inscribe his own militancy within this genealogy. According to some interpreters, Foucault's sudden scrutiny of the war model served as a catalyst for his eventual abandonment of the war model in favor of a governmental view of power as conduct over conduct in the late 1970s. From this perspective, Foucault divested his thinking about power of its bellicose dimension, thereby opening the space for a more open-ended conception of the effects of power rather than one centered on *the* effect of domination.

This chapter develops a twofold argument about the war model. The first part concerns Foucault's introduction of this model, which poses something of an enigma. Foucault did not elaborate his reasons for his adherence to the war model, preferring instead to simply point to the limitations of alternative (and highly caricatured) frameworks. Understanding the impetus behind Foucault's embrace of a bellicose understanding of power at a purely analytical level therefore poses some difficulties. This chapter gets around these difficulties by once again taking into consideration his political engagements. Strikingly, Foucault's most sustained and intense political engagements in the early 1970s not only coincided perfectly with his introduction of the war model but also nourished his deployments of this model. Indeed, Foucault did not hesitate to

deploy the constituent elements of the war model *in* his political interventions, thereby blurring any tidy division between his theoretical analyses and his practical-political activities. Foucault in *"Society Must Be Defended"* even lent support to the suggestion that his introduction of the war model was intimately bound up with his immersion in political struggles through a surreptitious move. Foucault traced his own warlike understanding of power to a discourse of race war that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and insisted that exponents of this discourse, above all the aristocratic historian Henri de Boulainvilliers, introduced warlike struggle as a grid of historical intelligibility in response to their own particular conditions of political struggle. Foucault proceeded to intertwine his own voice with the voices of Boulainvilliers and other exponents of the discourse of race war, thereby implying that *his own* adoption of the war model *also* arose from *his own* position of political struggle. Foucault thus invited us to take into account his own position *as* a subject of struggle in his reading of power *as* warlike struggle.

The second part of the argument in this chapter addresses the implications of Foucault's sudden questioning of the war model as well as his subsequent articulation of governmentality as a model for power relations. It suggests that Foucault did not *replace* a warlike understanding of power so much as *displace* it. Elements of this understanding appeared in his analyses even at the very end of his life. Foucault could not simply cast aside the war model because, for all of its shortcomings, it still addressed situations of domination.

To flesh out this argument, we will rely primarily on a highly detailed reading of *"Society Must Be Defended,"* since it contains the most promising leads about why Foucault accepted the war model only to then scrutinize it. Yet, we will interlace this reading with a much broader account of his embrace of this model spanning from 1971 to the end of his life in 1984. We will thus bring into relief the depth of Foucault's commitment to the war model. We will then be in a position to better appreciate subsequent developments in his thinking about power.

## War as a matrix for power relations in theory and practice

Foucault introduced the notion of perpetual war in his statement of genealogical method from the early 1970s. In his seminal essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy,

History," published in 1971, Foucault cast Nietzschean genealogy in express opposition to forms of historical analyses that disclose the development of an essential meaning from its concealment in an origin to its resplendent culmination in the present. Genealogy designated the "struggle" of "forces" constitutive of an "emergence" or an "*Entstehung*" in German rather than putatively essential meanings. As Foucault put it: "The analysis of *Entstehung* must delineate this interaction, *the struggle these forces wage against each other*" (italics mine).[1] The inequality of these forces implied that their struggle transpires in a "non-place" distinguished only by "the endlessly repeated play of dominations."[2] Foucault added that even the reign of the law in society does not signify a resolution of this struggle because the law itself indulges the violence of forces. On this basis, he inverted conceptions of progress toward perpetual peace, concluding that humanity passes from one form of domination to another.

> Following traditional beliefs, it would be false to think that total war exhausts itself in its own contradictions and ends by renouncing violence and submitting to civil laws. On the contrary, the law is a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in promised blood, which permits the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence. The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, and the tacit acceptance of the law, far from representing a major moral conversion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the law, are but its result and, in point of fact, its perversion: "guilt, conscience, and duty had their threshold of emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of any major event on earth, was saturated in blood." Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.[3]

What is certainly not obvious is that Foucault produced this lively declaration of perpetual war at the same moment as he immersed himself for the first time in a veritable myriad of political struggles. The declaration appeared in print during the same year that Foucault transformed himself into nothing short of a political militant through his activities in the GIP, as we saw in the previous chapter. Foucault was also involved in other campaigns and causes during this period. In June 1971, he helped form an information commission to investigate the police beating of a journalist, Alain Jaubert.[4] Foucault's work in the commission

took him for the first time to the Arab neighborhood of Goutte d'Or in Paris, where he conducted interviews with witnesses to the beating. He reflected the information gathered from these interviews in a report of what became known as the "Jaubert Affair."[5] In November, Foucault helped establish a committee to investigate whether racism underpinned the murder of a teenager, Djellali Ben Ali, in Goutte d'Or. His work in the committee took him back to the same neighborhood, where he once again interviewed residents and participated in demonstrations.[6]

During this period Foucault *lived* struggle at the same time that he posited it. In other words, struggle was not simply an abstraction or lyrical expression intended to impart the spirit of his method. It was also an *experience*. Perhaps the best proof that Foucault's emergent conception of power as a warlike struggle of forces was bound up with this experience resides in his public statements delivered in the midst of the revolts of prisoners. These statements show that Foucault did not keep this conception of power at arm's length from his political engagements, as if these activities could be neatly separated. Quite the contrary, Foucault manifestly brought his emergent conception of power as warlike struggle to bear in these engagements, above all in his public declarations regarding the revolt at the Central Ney prison in Toul in December 1971. We know from the previous chapter that this revolt provided a stimulus for central points about the exercise of disciplinary power and prison life in *Discipline and Punish* but it also revealed the extent to which Foucault was deeply committed to the war model *in* his political engagements.

Foucault delivered two statements about the revolt at a press conference for the Truth Committee of Toul (CVT) on 5 January 1972. One statement concerned the novelty of the revolt and the other concerned the scandal and stupor provoked by Dr Édith Rose's highly specific denunciation of abuses at the Central Ney. Explicit references to the struggle of "forces" figured centrally in both statements. Foucault contended that the very idea of tackling a problem only "at its roots" in the technical-bureaucratic speak of the administration and unions actually implied that the problem would be dealt only "far from the event, from the clash of forces and the act of domination." In contrast with this evasion of power relations, Dr Rose denounced abuses that took place "on such and such a day, in such and such a place, in such and such circumstances" from her own position as a psychiatrist *within* the "system of power."[7] With regard to the dynamics of the revolt, Foucault insisted that the constitution of the prisoners as a "force" through collective decisions enabled them to confront and lock out the

administration. Foucault even spoke of the redistribution of "forces" implied by the appearance of this "force." "The other day at Toul the forces were redistributed and, all of a sudden, things changed direction: the prisoners, because they were prisoners, and humiliated, used and exploited, became a collective force against the administration."[8]

Notably, Foucault would return to this language of force many years later in his contentious analyses of the Iranian revolution, describing the role of Shi'ite Islam in the revolution as precisely a "force."[9]

Given his genealogical declaration of perpetual war as well as his experience of struggle, it is not altogether surprising that Foucault eventually attempted to develop his concept of war far more thoroughly and systematically. In a letter to Daniel Defert from December 1972, he announced his plan to analyze power relations from "'the most discredited of all wars: neither Hobbes, nor Clausewitz, nor the class struggle, civil war'."[10] Foucault in his Collège course from the academic year 1972 to 1973, *The Punitive Society,* vigorously pursued this agenda. He analyzed the emergence of imprisonment as a form of punishment against the background of civil war. In order to mobilize the concept of civil war, however, Foucault made it abundantly clear that he first had to engage in a preliminary labor consisting in the dissociation of the concept of civil war from its alternative usages.

One usage no doubt resided deep within the Marxist tradition. Marxism had a long history of conceptualizing class struggle as precisely a civil war brewing beneath the ostensible peace of contractual mechanisms in capitalist societies. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* famously identified the struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie as a "more of less hidden civil war within existing society."[11] Marx in his chapter on the working day in volume one of *Capital* returned to his treatment of class struggle as a latent civil war. "The establishment of a normal working day is therefore the product of a protracted and more or less concealed civil war between the capitalist class and working class."[12] The upshot of this civil war was the constitution of a new temporality within the matrices of capitalism and, more specifically, a reconfigured distribution between necessary labor time and surplus labor time. Lenin in his critique of the labor aristocracy in *Imperialism* also affirmed class struggle as civil war and placed members of the labor aristocracy squarely on the side of the bourgeoisie in this war.[13] More generally, Lenin's theory of imperialism anticipated the dialectical transformation of imperialist war into a civil war between classes.[14]

Foucault did not set out to dissociate his own usage of civil war from its usage in this tradition, even though he had distinguished civil war from class struggle in his letter to Defert. Foucault focused his critical attention elsewhere. He objected to "a certain tradition" in political theory that equates civil war with the war of all against all.[15] Foucault maintained that this "tradition" arose simply because of a void or lacuna in the history of political theory. In his account, eighteenth-century critics of Thomas Hobbes did *not* dispute Hobbes's claim in *Leviathan* that civil war provides an idea of the "manner of life" without a "common power to fear."[16]

> Civil war is therefore a historically determined case of the war of all against all; it's, in any case, a sort of epistemological model from which one should be able to decipher this war of all against all, which is necessary for understanding the foundation and functioning of the sovereign. Moreover, it is characteristic to see that those who in the following century criticize this notion of the war of all against all do not criticize the *assimilation* of civil war and the war of all against all. One will deny the existence of something like a war of all against all as an original or archaic state. One will reproach Hobbes for making war a sort of model of the state of nature (italics in the original).[17]

Based on Jacques Lagrange's transcription of *The Punitive Society* at our disposal from the Collège archives, the suggestion that the "*assimilation*" of Hobbes's war of all against all with civil war acquired the status of a "tradition" in political theory seems rather difficult to accept. First, Foucault seems to have reasoned awkwardly that since eighteenth-century critics of Hobbes did *not* criticize this "*assimilation*," they *must* have implicitly agreed with it to the point of forging a "tradition" in political theory. Second, he does not seem to have entertained the possibility that the distinction between the war of all against all and civil war would have been entirely beside the point for at least some of these critics, since they denied the war of all against all (or peace) in the state of nature in the first place, as was certainly the case with Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *On the Social Contract*.[18]

Be that as it may, Foucault's perception of this "tradition" was at least not unproductive, since it provoked him into working out his own concept of civil war. Foucault worked out this concept by leveling two challenges to the "*assimilation*" of the war of all against all with civil war. First, he stressed that competition, diffidence, and glory as the immediate causes of the war of all against all were for Hobbes individual phenomena, whereas civil war involves collective

dynamics.[19] Foucault posited not only that groups struggle against one another in civil war but also that civil war *constitutes* these groups.

> In fact, there is no civil war that is not a confrontation of collective elements: parents, clients, religions, ethnic groups, linguistic communities, classes, etc. . . It is always by masses, by collective and plural elements that civil war arises, unfolds and exercises itself. It is therefore not at all the natural dimension of relations between individuals as individuals. It is always groups as groups that are the actors in civil war. Moreover, civil war not only presents collective elements, but it constitutes them. Far from being the process through which one comes down again from the republic to individuality, from the sovereign to the state of nature, from the collective order to the war of all against all, civil war is the process through and by which a certain number of new collectivities that had not seen the light of day constitute themselves.[20]

Second, Foucault insisted that the war of all against all relates to sovereign power in an antagonistic fashion, because it either precedes the constitution of this power or resurges during its demise, whereas civil war draws support from sovereign power, and vice versa. Marshalling an array of historical examples, he emphasized not only that groups engaged in civil wars reactivate the rituals of this power, invert its relations, and deploy its symbols as well as its myths, but also that "all the instruments of coercion" at the disposal of sovereign power suggest that the prospect of civil war actually "haunts" it.[21] Foucault elaborated that this haunting consists far less in scaring sovereign power than animating its existence.[22] To summarize, then, he treated civil war as a *collective* struggle involving *positive* relations to sovereign power through a refutation of what he perceived to be a "tradition" in political theory.

Given his argument about the mutual support of power and civil war, Foucault seems to have leaped to the conjecture that the *everyday* exercise of power should be cast in terms of a civil war. "The everyday exercise of power should be able to be considered a civil war."[23] On this basis, he inverted, quite possibly for the very first time, Carl von Clausewitz's formulation of war as a continuation of politics.[24] "If it is true that external war is the prolongation of politics, it must be said, reciprocally, that politics is the continuation of civil war."[25]

This commitment to civil war as matrix for power relations and, consequently, politics certainly made sense. It seems to have derived quite simply from the image of power that Foucault projected throughout *The Punitive Society*. He

depicted power as a never-ending series of strategically driven struggles between a veritable multiplicity of actors yielding to unstable victories and defeats rather than as something to be possessed in a manner analogous to wealth.[26] Civil war thus seems to have constituted a reasonable background to comprehend this exercise of power. The alternative background of civil peace would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for Foucault to reconcile with his notion of power as an ensemble of struggles. However, in deriving the background of civil war from this notion, he only forced the deeper question of why the manifold relations implied by power should be considered through the lens of struggle in the first place. That he does not appear to have even pursued this question leaves us with the distinct impression that the underpinnings of his bellicose model of power required further elucidation.

## Nietzsche's hypothesis

Foucault in his subsequent courses at the Collège ceased to propose *civil* war specifically as a matrix for power relations, perhaps because the notion of civil war ran the risk of connoting a binary struggle incompatible with his multifarious understanding of power relations. He nevertheless continued to set his analyses against the background of war. Foucault in his Collège course from the next academic year, *Psychiatric Power*, described the exercise of proto-psychiatric power in early nineteenth-century asylums as a "battle" between not only the doctors and their representatives, on the one hand, and patients, on the other hand, but also *within* patients themselves.[27] Similarly, Foucault in his Collège course from the academic year 1973 to 1974, *Abnormal*, suggested that the exercise of Christian techniques for spiritual direction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries encompassed a "battle" between not only the confessors and possessed nuns but also *within* the bodies of possessed nuns in the form of convulsions.[28] In *Discipline and Punish*, published in February 1975, he left his commitment to the war model unambiguous. Foucault proposed outright "perpetual battle" rather than the contract or conquest as the "model" for his analysis of the "microphysics of power."[29] Still, a more elaborate reasoning about why the relations implied by power should be seen in terms of warlike struggles did not accompany his retention of this model.

Foucault in the opening lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended"* acknowledged that his analyses of power from the preceding years belonged between what he dubbed "Reich's hypothesis," according to which the exercise of power is primarily repressive, and "Nietzsche's hypothesis," according to which power consists of relations defined by "a warlike clash between forces.[30] Foucault conjectured that though distinct these "two grand hypotheses" may fuse together in a continuum or "schema," since war can produce repression as an "effect" of domination. He opposed this "schema" of "war-repression," "domination-repression," or "struggle-repression" to a "juridical schema," wherein the violation of a contract by a sovereign results in "oppression."[31] Foucault recognized that his analyses applied the former schema. "It is obvious that everything I have said to you in previous years is inscribed within the struggle-repression schema. That is indeed the schema that I was trying to apply."[32] But in attempting to "apply" this "schema" in his previous courses, Foucault worked disproportionately. As early as *The Punitive Society*, he voiced unease with the suggestion that the repression of sexuality served as the foundation for the regulation of schools in the nineteenth century, quipping that "this very term 'repression' appears to me more irritating than exact."[33] Foucault submitted that through a strict, material blockage of heterosexuality as well as banning of homosexuality schools produced, somewhat paradoxically, heterosexuality as the norm throughout society.

> From this double system of the *blockage* of heterosexuality and the *banning* of homosexuality, which characterizes schools, something diffuses itself, which is a certain *image* of society where heterosexuality would be permitted as a reward in return and homosexuality is recognized as not existing or constituting such a marginal phenomenon, so abnormal that it cannot but concern a restricted number of individuals (italics in the original).[34]

At work here was a complex play of negative mechanisms that *produced* a specific sexuality rather than the pure and simple repression of a preexisting sexuality. In *Abnormal*, Foucault maintained that the notion of repression reduces power to nothing more than a negative mechanism.[35] In an altogether similar vein, Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* identified this notion with a negative understanding of power.[36] He acknowledged these criticisms in the opening lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended."*

> Without wishing to boast, I think that I have in fact long been suspicious of this notion of "repression," and I have attempted to show you, in relation to the

> genealogies I was talking about just now, in relation to the history of penal law, psychiatric power, controls on infantile sexuality, and so on, that the mechanisms at work in these formations were very different from—or at least much more than—repression.[37]

By contrast, *until* the opening lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended,"* Foucault appears to have had *nothing* critical to convey about the notion of war. If anything, he implicitly refined this notion, as indicated above. Consequently, "Nietzsche's hypothesis" seems to have weighed more heavily than "Reich's hypothesis" in his application of the "struggle-repression schema."

The starting point of the war model or "Nietzsche's hypothesis" was the inequality of forces. From this starting point, Foucault deduced the brute fact of domination rather than the necessity of sovereignty, reasoning that inequality leads to a warlike struggle between forces culminating in the domination of some of the forces over others. This understanding of power underpinned his analyses not only of disciplinary power but also of sovereign power. As we saw in the previous chapter, Foucault cast disciplinary power as the technique par excellence for increasing forces of the body while subjecting these same forces. "Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)."[38] This disciplinary relationship to forces contrasted sharply with the sovereign relationship to them. Punishment through the exercise of sovereign power *decimated* the body and its forces rather than maximizing these forces while subjecting them. "The dissymmetry, the irreversible imbalance of forces were an essential element of public execution. A body effaced, reduced to dust and thrown to the winds, a body destroyed piece by piece by the infinite power of the sovereign constituted not only the ideal, but the real limit of punishment."[39]

Of course, Foucault dramatized this point in *Discipline and Punish* through his gruesome opening account of the torture and execution of Damiens the regicide as well as through his subsequent accounts of public torture and execution.[40]

Still, we really can go only so far in our efforts to clarify "Nietzsche's hypothesis" because if we ask the basic question of what exactly Foucault had in mind by the concept of "force," the answer would hardly be obvious. Notwithstanding the possibility that his Collège courses unavailable to the public contain important clarifications, it seems that Foucault did not go very far in elaborating this concept at the very heart of the "hypothesis" which had structured his thinking about power in the first half of the 1970s! Indeed, we may concur up to a point

with Mark Philp that although Foucault did not tire of reminding his readers and auditors that power consists first and foremost of relations, he somehow managed to leave the constituent element of "force" in these relations radically underdeveloped.[41]

The obliqueness of "force" in Foucault's analyses should not at all imply that some of his most astute interpreters have not attempted to elaborate the concept in greater detail. Paul Patton identifies force as a constitutive capacity for acting as well as being acted upon.[42] Jeffrey Nealon in his own masterful reading offers a similar gloss on force, treating it as a capacity and a capacity for work in particular.[43] However, these moves amount to creative (and useful) extrapolations *for* Foucault rather than *by* Foucault. Foucault himself did not elaborate force in these ways.

If we consult prominent renderings of force in late-twentieth-century social and political thought, we can ascertain a greater sense of the specificity of the space from which Foucault put forth his version of the concept. Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* equated force with violence, using these terms interchangeably in a wide variety of passages.[44] In one such passage, Fanon situated this equation within the broader dialectics of the struggle between the colonizers and colonized:

> The existence of an armed struggle is indicative that the people are determined to put their faith only in violent methods. The very same people who had it constantly drummed into them that the only language they understood was that of force, now decide to express themselves with force. In fact the colonist has always shown them the path they should follow to liberation. The argument chosen by the colonized was conveyed to them by the colonist, and by an ironic twist of fate it is now the colonized who state that it is the colonizer who only understands the language of force. The colonial regime owes its legitimacy to force and at no time does it ever endeavor to cover up this nature of things.[45]

If force here designated the substance of violence in the guise of armed struggle, it must be understood that it was not reducible to acts of physical violence. Force founded, pervaded, and nourished the entire Manichaean structure of colonial social orders. It thus entailed effects that were as much psychological as physical even after national independence. The arduous and vexing task of the colonized for Fanon was not just to re-channel this force against the colonizers at a propitious historical moment but also to overcome the long-standing (and immensely deleterious) psychological effects wrought by the foundational

violence of colonialism, thereby laying the groundwork for the construction of a new humanity.

Hannah Arendt in *On Violence*, which responded directly to Fanon's affirmation of violence among his enthusiasts and adherents on the New Left, distinguished force from both violence and power, among other concepts. Arendt treated force as a kind of discharge or, in her words, "the energy released by physical or social movements" whereas she cast violence as the use of instruments to amplify individual strength and power as the human capacity to act together.[46] Unlike violence and power, force did not necessarily arise from human capacities. It distinguished itself as a constraint on human behavior arising from social *and* natural phenomena. For this reason, Arendt considered the expressions "force of circumstances" and "forces of nature" entirely apt ways of employing the term "force."[47] Arendt elaborated all of the distinctions between force, violence, and power (as well as strength and authority) to challenge the view that power boils down to domination understood as relations of command and obedience guaranteed through violence.

In comparison with Fanon and Arendt, we can say that Foucault attempted to trek his own path. On the one hand, Foucault did not equate force with violence. He associated force with an ensemble of *physical* relations bearing on material elements and yielding docile and useful bodies. Foucault insisted that these physical relations do not necessitate violence (or ideology).

> The body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. This subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence or ideology; it can also be direct, physical pitting force against force, *and yet without involving violence*; it may be calculated, organized, technically thought out; it may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet remain of a physical order (italics mine).[48]

What left Foucault rather uneasy about violence was its commonplace "connotation of physical power, of an unregulated, passionate power, an unbridled power" as if physicality itself somehow defied regulation and rational ordering.[49] On the other hand, Foucault obviously construed force relations *as* the very core of power and these relations clearly resulted in effects of domination. Therefore, while he did not subscribe to Fanon's equation of violence with force, his own construction of force grated against the thrust of Arendt's effort to distinguish force from power and salvage thinking about power from domination in particular.

Even with this contextualization of the specificity of force for Foucault in view, it must nevertheless be said that he remained somewhat elusive about his precise reasons for accepting "Nietzsche's hypothesis." To be sure, he indicated that he applied it, basically, for an apparent lack of any better choice. Foucault in the opening lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended"* caricatured liberalism and Marxism as approaches that fail to comprehend power *non*-economically: in the former, power is a right transferred to constitute sovereignty in a manner analogous to commodity exchange; in the latter, it is a function of the reproduction of production relations. What Foucault called the "economism" of these alternatives drew him to embrace "Nietzsche's hypothesis" as a "tool" for understanding power.[50]

Yet, there must have been something more to his deployment of this hypothesis or else he could have continued to rest perfectly content with it. To glean more precisely his reasons for retaining "Nietzsche's hypothesis" without any obvious doubts throughout the early 1970s, we need to look very meticulously at his first effort to scrutinize this hypothesis.

## Nietzsche's hypothesis in question

Foucault in the opening lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended"* reasoned that if power consists of warlike force relations, then politics continues war by other means. He declared, "At this point we can invert Clausewitz's proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means."[51] Foucault effected this inversion in 1973 in *The Punitive Society*, as we know from above, but he now began to draw out its implications. He claimed that if politics is indeed war, then the state prolongs the effects of domination established through war; consequently, political struggles in civil society continue war; finally, only a "last battle" can logically end this surreptitious prolongation of war and usher in the reign of true peace.[52] That Foucault implicated the inversion he subscribed to in a transcendental politics hints at the intensely self-critical spirit of *"Society Must Be Defended."* He rendered this spirit stunningly unambiguous by the end of the opening lecture of the course.

> I think that the twin notions of "repression" and "war" have to be considerably modified and ultimately, perhaps, abandoned. At all events, we have to look very closely at these two notions of "repression" and "war"; if you like, we have to look a little more closely at the hypothesis that the mechanisms of power are

> essentially mechanisms of repression, and at the alternative hypothesis that what is rumbling away and what is at work beneath political power is essentially and above all a warlike relation.[53]

Given his previous criticisms of the notion of repression, Foucault shifted the focus of *"Society Must Be Defended"* to the notion of war. By the third lecture of the course, he more precisely formulated his doubts about war, defining them against the background of his overall goal of highlighting domination rather than sovereignty. Foucault questioned the adequacy of "Nietzsche's hypothesis" in realizing this goal.

> While it is true that we should be studying domination and not sovereignty, or rather that we should be studying domination and operators of domination, how can we pursue our analysis of relations of domination? *To what extent can a relationship of domination boil down to or be reduced to the notion of a relationship of force? To what extent and how can the relationship of force be reduced to a relationship of war*?
>
> That is, so to speak, the preliminary question I would like to look at a bit this year: *Can war really provide a valid analysis of power relations, and can it act as a matrix for techniques of domination?* You might say to me that we cannot, from the outset, confuse power relations with relations of war. Of course not. I am simply taking an extreme [case] to the extent that war can be regarded as the point of maximum tension, or as force-relations laid bare. Is the power relationship basically a relationship of confrontation, a struggle to the death, or a war? If we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority, beneath the calm order of subordinations, beneath the State and State apparatuses, beneath the laws, and so on, will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war (italics mine)?[54]

As a means of only beginning to get a handle on these questions, Foucault veered his inquiry in a historical direction, asking simply "How, when, and why was it noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war?"[55] If the war model implied an inversion of "Clausewitz's proposition," Foucault did not trace this inversion to a discourse that emerged *after* Clausewitz. To the contrary, he insisted that Clausewitz himself had inverted an already long-standing formulation about politics as a continuation of war.[56]

Nor did Foucault locate the emergence of this formulation in the rather familiar thought of his archrival in political theory, Hobbes. He implicitly modified his assertion from *The Punitive Society* that for the latter "it's only the civil order,

i.e. the apparition of a sovereign, which will cease the war of all against all," maintaining that this war of all against all persisted for Hobbes even *after* the establishment of sovereignty.[57] Foucault elaborated that it persisted in the forms of theft, savagery in the Americas, and in relations between states.[58] However, he stressed that the war of all against all was not really a war involving a clash of forces. The condition of equality in the state of nature meant that the war of all against all was, more properly, a "state of war" in which individuals attempt to induce each other to abandon all thoughts of war through an exchange of representations of the threat of war.[59]

Foucault added that for Hobbes even *real* wars had nothing to do with the foundation of sovereignty. The will to live sufficed for Hobbes to forge sovereignty. "The will to prefer life to death: that is what founds sovereignty, and it is as juridical and legitimate as the sovereignty that was established through the mode of institution and mutual agreement."[60] Foucault concluded that rather than identifying war as the basis of politics, Hobbes simply denied it.

> A large part of the discourse of *Leviathan* consists in saying: It doesn't matter whether you fought or did not fight, whether you were beaten or not; in any case, the mechanism that applies to you who have been defeated is the same mechanism that we find in the state of nature, in the constitution of a State, and that we also find, quite naturally, in the most tender and natural relationship of all: that between parents and children. Hobbes turns war, the fact of war and the relationship of force that is actually manifested in the battle, into something that has nothing to do with the constitution of sovereignty. The establishment of sovereignty has nothing to do with war. Basically, Hobbes's discourse is a certain "no" to war. It is not really war that gives birth to States, and it is not really war that is transcribed in relations of sovereignty or that reproduces within the civil power—and its inequalities—the earlier dissymmetries in the relationship of force that were revealed by the very fact of battle itself.[61]

Foucault suggested that in so resolutely denying war, Hobbes *implicitly* opposed the discourse according to which politics continues war. He traced the emergence of this discourse to paradoxical conditions in seventeenth-century Western Europe. Foucault specified that just as states began to monopolize the war practices traversing the social body under feudalism a "strange" discourse about a war in that body emerged under the pressures of popular and aristocratic challenges to monarchical power.[62] This discourse posited that *real* race wars constituted the state, and that in the aftermath of these foundational race wars,

the victorious race used the state to dominate the defeated race rather than suspend the consequences of war, effectively rendering sovereignty itself a chimera used simply to propagate the domination of the defeated race.

The central historical problem for Foucault in "*Society Must Be Defended*" was basically how sovereignty appropriated this vehemently anti-sovereign discourse, albeit not without profoundly modifying its contents. Specifically, he grappled with how the state transformed in this discourse from a mere means for the domination of *one* race by *another* race into the guarantor of *the* race against all the elements *within* this race which threaten its health, purity, and integrity. In other words, Foucault wrestled with how the discourse of the "war of races" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mutated into a "State racism" by the nineteenth century. He attributed this transformation to the redefinition of the nation by historians associated with the bourgeoisie and the emergence of biopolitics at the end of the eighteenth century.

## The transformation of the war of races into state racism

Foucault emphasized that the discourse of race war experienced two births, appearing for the first time in early seventeenth-century England and then in the latter half of the same century in France.[63] With regard to the appearance of this discourse in the former country, he devoted only about half a lecture. Foucault contended that royal absolutists, parliamentarians, and Levellers and Diggers in early seventeenth-century England easily coded their struggles against one another through a Norman/Saxon racial duality, owing to the Norman Conquest and the persistence of a whole series of practices stemming from the Conquest that reinforced this duality, such as legal proceedings conducted exclusively in the French language.[64] If we approach "race" as a matter of physical appearance, this argument may strike us as rather idiosyncratic, if not outright suspect. Yet, we must bear in mind that "race" emerged for Foucault (as well as Arendt) as an extremely elastic concept, one devoid of the biological connotations associated with modern racism.[65] The gist of his thinking seems to have been that "race" constituted a "coding" for differences in phenomena as different as language, kinship, social status, custom, and religion in some instances.[66] Indeed, we shall see that Foucault did not distinguish between "race" and "nation" in his account of the discourse of race war in the eighteenth century.

He located the introduction of this discourse in France in the reaction of the aristocracy to the weakening of its economic and political power under the absolutist regime of Louis XIV, focusing on an important instance of this reaction in an episode concerning the political education of the prince. When Louis XIV commissioned his administration to produce a lengthy report on the state of France for his grandson and future heir, the duc de Bourgogne, the duc's entourage, which included the core of the noble opposition to the regime of Louis XIV, entrusted Boulainvilliers, an aristocratic historian, with the tasks of interpreting and presenting the report.[67] Boulainvilliers used his presentation of the report as an opportunity to charge that the king's knowledge about his subjects had been "colonized" by administrative knowledge—"the State's knowledge about the State," which Foucault would later discuss as statistics in reason of state governmentality.[68]

Foucault stressed that at stake in this attack was a power-knowledge mechanism: the link between the absolutist state and administrative knowledge. Boulainvilliers and other aristocratic historians maintained that administrators had used their knowledge to strip the nobility of its rights and wealth. To counter this dispossession, they sought to re-acquire a neglected element: "the king's knowledge."

> What had to be regained and occupied was now the king's knowledge. It was the knowledge of the king, or a certain knowledge shared by king and nobility: an implicit law, a mutual commitment between the king and his aristocracy. What had to be done was to reawaken both the noble's memory, which had become carelessly forgetful, and the monarch's memories, which had been carefully—and perhaps wickedly—buried, so as to reconstitute the legitimate knowledge of the king, which would provide legitimate foundations for a legitimate government.[69]

To this end, noble historians configured a "counter-knowledge" in the form a new history opposed to administrative knowledge in its juridical and economic guises. At the very center of this history was a new subject-object.[70] The subject in this history was no longer the state recounting its own history. This subject was now the "nation" understood as an amorphous entity both distinct from the state and recounting the history of processes *beneath* the state.

> The nation is by no means something that is defined by its territorial unity, a definite political morphology, or its systematic subordination to some imperium. The nation has no frontiers, no definite system of power, and no state. The nation

> circulates behind frontiers and institutions. The nation, or rather "nations," or in other words the collections, societies, groupings of individuals who share a status, mores, customs, and a certain particular law—in the sense of regulatory statutes rather than Statist laws. History will be about this, about these elements. And it is those elements that will begin to speak: it is the nation that begins to speak. The nobility is one nation, as distinct from the many other nations that circulate within the State and come into conflict with one another.[71]

Given that Boulainvilliers occupied the important position of transcribing the administrative report on France for the duc, Foucault treated him as an exemplar of the nation-centered historiography developed by the noble historians.[72] Boulainvilliers put this historiography to work by attempting to demonstrate the progressive weakening of the nobility as a "nation" descended from Frankish hordes that invaded Gaul in the fifth century. This account, as interpreted in laborious detail by Foucault, took as its point of departure the *Roman* invasion of Gaul territory. When the Romans initially entered this territory, they disarmed the Gaulish warrior aristocracy and uplifted the common people through the idea of equality. The Romans then replaced this warrior aristocracy with a nobility trained in Roman right and the Roman language. With the disarmament of the Gaulish warrior aristocracy, the Romans found themselves forced to hire mercenaries to protect Gaul territory from the Franks, and the hiring of these armies led the country to economic ruin. The Frank invaders were a warrior aristocracy. They refused to submit to the Gallo-Romans simply because they were too free in the sense of greedy, egoistic, and ferocious. The Franks were so free that they refused to elect a king except to resolve disputes during times of peace. This freedom impelled them to seize Gaulish land on an individual basis. The Franks consolidated their power by confiscating weapons from the Gallo-Romans and setting up a whole feudal system in which the Gallo-Romans worked the land and paid taxes in exchange for security from the Franks. However, conditions of perpetual war in Gaul territory permitted a temporary king appointed as a warlord only during wartime, and elected only to resolve civil disputes, to crystallize into an absolute, hereditary monarch. As free a people, the Frankish nobility naturally revolted against the monarch, but he appealed to mercenaries in the Gaul population and allied himself with the disarmed Gaul warrior aristocracy, which had learned Latin and Roman law in the church, where it had taken refuge from the onslaught of Franks. The Frankish monarch allied himself with this Gaul warrior aristocracy turned priestly because it exercised a tremendous influence over the people and possessed skills to forge

laws in Latin. As the Franks did not know Latin, they remained completely ignorant of these laws. Moreover, the Gallo warrior aristocracy turned priestly educated Franks to focus on life hereafter, which led many Frank nobles to participate in the crusades. With these nobles abroad, the Frank king and Gaul warrior aristocracy turned priestly could construct laws that would dispossess the Frank nobility of its wealth and power. What Boulainvilliers demonstrated was a reversal of fortunes in which Gauls became strong *again* and the Franks became weak.[73]

Foucault discerned in all of these obscure details a generalization of war to three domains. He contended that Boulainvilliers first generalized war to the very foundations of right. Underneath "natural rights," lay conquest and its effects of violence. "Beneath the French, we find the Frankish invasion; beneath the Gallo-Romans, we find the Roman invasion."[74] Boulainvilliers maintained that even if natural rights ensuring freedom had in fact existed they would have been utterly devoid of use, for their basis was the natural freedom to deprive others of freedom. Moreover, as these rights were wholly abstract in character, they would have succumbed to the "historical force of a freedom that functions as nonequality."[75] Boulainvilliers also identified war as the very foundation of society. The circulation of weapons articulated society. "The characteristic feature of the regime of the Frankish Gaul was that it took the precaution of taking the Gauls' weapons from them and reserving them for the Germans."[76] Finally, Boulainvilliers discerned war in invasions and rebellions. He showed that these activities were reactivations of the war churning beneath the peace or basically so many efforts to reverse the relationships of force established during the last battle.[77]

Foucault insisted that this "threefold generalization of war" in Boulainvilliers led to the emergence of war as a "grid of intelligibility" for society. This "grid" did not at all denote the truth of history. Foucault stressed that Boulainvilliers's discourse fell outside the modern regime of truth and error. "In our terms, it is neither true nor false." He even speculated that one could apply war as a "grid of intelligibility" to Boulainvilliers's *own* discourse, revealing that it was "all wrong."[78] What mattered to him about this discourse was the assignment of a primacy to war in deciphering and rendering intelligible all kinds of relations, especially political relations.

Foucault stressed repeatedly that struggle itself underpinned this assignment of a primacy to war. Specifically, he emphasized that the struggle of a declining and nostalgic aristocracy under the regime of Louis XIV impelled

Boulainvilliers and other aristocratic historians to effectively *create* war as a "grid of intelligibility."

> I have not so much been trying to show you how the nobility used historical discourse to express either its demands or its misfortunes, as to show *how a certain instrument of struggle was actually forged in the struggles that took place around the workings of power—struggles within power and against power* (italics mine).[79]

Elsewhere, Foucault reiterated this strand of argument.

> I would not say that it was because it was decadent that the French aristocracy invented history. *It was precisely because it was waging a war that it was able to take war as an object, war being at once the starting point for the discourse, the condition of possibility for the emergence of the historical discourse, a frame of reference, and the object of that discourse* (italics mine).[80]

We will have occasion to return to this point. What is important for the moment is simply to note that struggle constituted a precondition for the creation of the discourse of race war.

Foucault implied that had this discourse remained tied exclusively to the nobility, it could have constituted the "ideology or ideological product" of this class.[81] Yet, by the end of the eighteenth century, the discourse of race war began to circulate between all kinds of political factions. "Historical discourse became a sort of discursive weapon that could be used by all the adversaries present within the political field."[82]

The circulation of this discourse transpired via a "filtering" of a key personage. Foucault stressed that Boulainvilliers discerned a "constituent point" or "constitution" of politics in a relation of force embodied by the personage of the barbarian rather than the savage. The barbarian constituted the inverse of the savage. Foucault noted that in the juridical and economic thought of the eighteenth century, the savage was a man of exchange, a man who exchanged his rights and goods to establish social and economic bodies. In this way, the savage anticipated civilization. The barbarian, on the other hand, existed only in relation to an already existing civilization. His sense of freedom impelled him to destroy this civilization and dominate others.[83]

Foucault suggested that eighteenth-century historians associated with political factions other than the nobility used the "historico-political" discourse by "filtering" this ferocious figure of the barbarian. They had to "filter" this figure

to some degree precisely because Boulainvilliers identified him with the nobles. Foucault outlined three "models" of this "filtering." The first model reflected the monarchical thesis, as elaborated by Jean-Baptiste Dubos and Jacob-Nicolas Moreau. This model effected a "tactical" reversal of Boulainvilliers's discourse, eviscerating the barbarian from history. It posited that the nobles did not descend from invading barbarian hordes simply because these hordes never existed. The Burgundians and Goths invaded Gaul, not the Franks. The Romans allied with the small population of Franks to defend Gaul because this population possessed military skills. The Franks were welcomed into Gaul, and they eventually dissipated into Gallo-Roman civilization, owing to their minute numbers. The second "filtering" model, as developed by Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Nicolas de Bonneville, and Jean-Paul Marat, reflected the *parlementaires* thesis. This model fully accepted that Frankish barbarians invaded Gaul, but it identified these barbarians as democrats, not as aristocrats. The avidity and egoism of these barbarian democrats allowed for the whole institutionalization of the aristocracy and absolute monarchy.[84] The third "filtering" model, as developed by Louis Georges Oudard Feudrix de Bréquiny and Jean François Chapsal, distinguished between two barbarisms. It maintained that the Romans permitted the Gauls and Celts to enjoy their primitive freedoms in the towns. The Franks and Germans destroyed these towns during the invasion, but the peasant origins of these invaders led them to settle in the countryside and neglect the towns. The Gauls and Celts subsequently reconstructed towns prosperous and free enough to resist the onslaughts of feudal lords in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The positive barbarism of the Gauls and Celts contrasted, as it were, with the negative barbarism of the Franks and Germans. Bourgeois historians embraced this model because it began to fashion the Third Estate as a product of its own energy, wealth, and trade rather than as a mere creation of royal concessions.[85]

Foucault elaborated all of these "filterings" of the barbarian to get at a broad methodological point. Paradoxically, what enabled the "historico-political" discourse to circulate as a "weapon" between groups with very different historical theses and political positions was the *regularity* of historical knowledge. If this discourse had been irregular, Foucault suggested, there would have been very little, if any, space for subjects to occupy adversarial positions.

> The fact that the epistemic web is so tightly woven certainly does not mean that everyone is thinking along the same lines. It is in fact a precondition for not

> thinking along the same lines or for thinking along different lines; and it is that which makes the differences politically pertinent. If different subjects are to be able to speak, to occupy different tactical positions, and if they are able to find themselves in mutually adversarial positions, there has to be a tight field, there has to be a very tightly woven network to regularize knowledge. As the field of knowledge becomes more regular, it becomes increasingly possible for the subjects who speak within it to be divided along strict lines of confrontation, and it becomes increasingly possible to make the contending discourses function as different tactical units within overall strategies (which are not simply a matter of discourse and truth, but also of power, status, and economic interests). The tactical reversibility of discourse is directly proportional to the homogeneity of the field in which it is formed. It is the regularity of the epistemological field, the homogeneity of the discourse's mode of formation, that allows it to be used in struggles that are extradiscursive.[86]

Foucault added that until the French revolution the bourgeoisie remained the least invested in deploying history as a weapon in such "extradiscursive" struggles precisely because it could not identify itself as a subject in history.[87]

Only the transformation of the notion of the nation allowed the bourgeoisie to use history, though not without radically altering its contents. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès exemplified this reconfiguration of the nation. Rather than defining the nation in monarchical terms as a relationship of subjects to the very body of the king or in aristocratic terms as a group of individuals bound together by customs and habits, Sieyès treated the nation, *formally*, as a juridical state consisting of a common law as well as legislature and, *substantively*, as "works" and "functions."[88] Employing this definition of the nation, Sieyès claimed that France lacked a nation because it failed to satisfy the formal criteria of a legislature and common law. He nonetheless argued that since the Third Estate performed "works" of agriculture, commerce, handicrafts, and the liberal arts and performed "functions" of the army, justice, church, and administration, it satisfied the substantive criteria for a nation.[89] In other words, Sieyès identified *a* nation in the Third Estate capable of becoming *the* nation.

Foucault stressed that this reworking of the nation and its identification with the Third Estate modified political discourse in two ways. First, it inverted the relationship between particularity and universality. Whereas the nobility only laid claim to a singular right, the Third Estate cast itself as the only nation capable of fulfilling the "totalizing function of the State." Second, whereas the nobility articulated its demands "in the name of a past right," the Third Estate articulated

its demands in the name of a future present *in the very present* because *a* nation already satisfies the "functions" requisite for "Statist universality."[90]

Indeed, Foucault emphasized that at the theoretical level, the kind of analysis exemplified by Sieyès meant that the nation was defined less in terms of its relation to other nations than in terms of its relationship to the state. What distinguished a nation was less its ability to dominate other nations than its ability to fulfill the role of statist functions. This concomitant orientation of the nation *away* from domination over other nations and *toward* the state implied a diminution in the element of war.

> The essential function and the historical role of a nation is not defined by its ability to exercise a relationship of domination over other nations. It is something else: its ability to administer itself, to manage, govern, and guarantee the constitution and workings of the figure of the State and of State power. *Not domination, but State control. The nation is therefore no longer a partner in barbarous and warlike relations of domination. The nation is the active, constituent core of the State. The nation is the State, or at least an outline State* (italics mine).[91]

The redefinition of the nation implied a similar movement in historical discourse. This discourse no longer recounted the history of nations beneath the state in opposition to the history of the state spoken by the state. History welcomed the state as the object of national potentials. History now traced the genesis between the "Statist potential" of a "national totality" and its actualization in the present.[92] This privilege of the state rather than domination implied a pacification of national struggles.

> We now have, in contrast, a history in which war—the war for domination—will be replaced by a struggle that is, so to speak, of a different substance: not an armed clash, but an effort, a rivalry, a striving toward the universality of the State. The State, and the universality of the State, become both what is at stake in the struggle, and the battlefield. This will therefore be an essentially civil struggle to the extent that domination is neither its goal nor its expression, and to the extent that the State is both its object and its space. It will take place essentially in and around the economy, institutions, production, and the administration. We will have a civil struggle, and the military struggle or bloody struggle will become no more than an exceptional moment, a crisis or an episode within it. Far from being the real content of every confrontation and every struggle, the civil war will in fact be no more than an episode, a critical phase in a struggle that now has to be seen not in terms of a war or domination, but in nonmilitary or civilian terms.[93]

In sum, the introduction by bourgeois historians of state universality as the means and end of national struggles pacified war as a "grid of intelligibility" in historical discourse during and after the French revolution.

All of these reflections took on a somewhat abrupt and altogether stunning turn in the final lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended,"* which is immensely famous for its introduction of the much-vaunted concept of biopolitics. Foucault attempted to show that biopolitics appeared at roughly the same time as the pacification of war transpired in historical discourse at the very end of the eighteenth century. This technique introduced a war waged by the state and other institutions against various biological threats *to* its population *from* its population rather than against enemies in the political sense. Unsurprisingly, Foucault broached this concept by distinguishing it from disciplinary power. He reminded his auditors that the latter was individualizing, concerning a multiplicity of humans spliced up into individual bodies, as we saw in the previous chapter. Biopolitics, on the other hand, was totalizing, concerning a multiplicity of humans as a population.

> Disciplines, for their part, dealt with individuals and their bodies in practical terms. What we are dealing with in this new technology of power is not exactly society (or at least the social body, as defined by the jurists), nor is it the individual-as-body. It is a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted. Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as biological problem and as power's problem.[94]

Characteristically, Foucault devoted less attention to the reasons for the rise of this new technique of power than to its actual workings and implications. He posited that biopolitics regulates the random or aleatory events in the biological processes of a population, such as deaths, births, and epidemics through a series of mechanisms, such as insurance, welfare, and public hygiene, which infuse stability and, hence, predictability into these processes. Biopolitics thus signaled the entry of life *into* politics and the care of politics *for* life, charging the state as well as other institutions with the tasks not only of reproducing but also of always improving the life of its population.

> This technology of power, this biopolitics, will introduce mechanisms with a certain number of functions that are very different from the functions of disciplinary mechanisms. The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include

> forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures. And their purpose is not to modify any given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given individual insofar as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are determined, to intervene at the level of their generality. The mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life expectancy has to be increased; the birth rate has to be stimulated. And most important of all, regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field. In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.[95]

In the next chapter, we will revisit this concept of population in much greater detail. The problem for Foucault was that the emergence of biopolitics, with its life-producing object and objective, obviously begged the question of why the state engages in killing, understood in the very general sense of exposure to the threat of death as well as direct murder.

> How will the power to kill and the function of murder operate in this technology of power, which takes life as both its object and its objective? How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings? How, under these conditions, is it possible for a political power to kill, and to expose not only its enemies but its own citizens to the risk of death?[96]

To these questions, Foucault replied, basically, that the state exercises its right to kill in a biopolitical regime precisely because the flipside of the biopolitically driven demand to sustain, extend, and improve the life of a population consists of racism against all of the bearers of biological threats to this life.[97] He submitted that racism rationalizes the killing of these bearers of biological threats on grounds that this killing improves the life of the population, species, or, more exactly, *the* race.

> In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable

> precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in a biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the state.[98]

In other words, racism for Foucault yielded to the paradoxical articulation of death with life or the death function of the state with the life function of biopolitics. Killing in this context became a means for the state to regenerate the race rather than to eliminate political enemies.

We should not, perhaps, be surprised that Foucault had the Nazi state in mind as a perfect expression of this killing by the state through a racism inextricably linked to biopolitics.[99] What is certainly more surprising is that he seems to have insisted in at least one instance that *all* modern states are racist to some degree, precisely because all modern states practice a biopolitics. "The modern state can scarcely function without becoming involved in racism at some point, within certain limits and subject to certain conditions."[100]

Obviously, this kind of argument applied to socialist as well as capitalist states, but Foucault made a point of not exempting the former from racism, thereby making an already provocative strand of argument all the more provocative. He speculated that the wholehearted appropriation of biopolitics by socialist states had driven them toward the exercise of the right to kill through racism.

> Socialism has made no critique of the theme of biopower, which developed at the end of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth; it has in fact taken it up, developed, reimplanted, and modified it in certain respects, but it has certainly not reexamined its basis or its modes of working. Ultimately, the idea that the essential function of society or the State, or whatever it is that must replace the State, is to take control of life, to manage it, to compensate for its aleatory nature, to explore and reduce biological accidents and possibilities . . . it seems to me that socialism takes this over wholesale. And the result is that we immediately find ourselves in a socialist State which must exercise the right to kill or the right to eliminate, or the right to disqualify. And so, quite naturally, we find that racism—not a truly ethnic racism, but racism of the evolutionist kind, biological racism—is fully operational in the way socialist States (of the Soviet Union type) deal with the mentally ill, criminals, political adversaries, and so on.[101]

In identifying socialist states with racism, Foucault was not simply embellishing an already dense argument. By singling out these states at the very end of the

penultimate lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended,"* he began to disclose the target of his message in the course.

Strictly speaking, his next move strayed quite a distance from his project of examining transformations of an analysis of the state in the West, but it also went one step further in unambiguously revealing the real target of his project. Foucault did not restrict his critical speculation to socialist *states*. He conjectured that even the socialist *movements* that stress the necessity of struggle over economic transformations tend toward the activation of racism, since racism offers the only rationale for the killing of enemies confronted in the struggle.

> Whenever, on the other hand, socialism has been forced to stress the problem of struggle, the struggle against the enemy, of the elimination of the enemy within capitalist society itself, and when, therefore, it has had to think about the physical confrontation with the class enemy in capitalist society, racism does raise its head, because it is the only way in which socialist thought, which is after all very much bound up with the themes of biopower, can rationalize the murder of its enemies. When it is simply a matter of eliminating the adversary in economic terms, or of taking away his privileges, there is no need for racism. Once it is a matter of coming to terms with the thought of a one-to-one encounter with the adversary, and with the need to fight him physically, to risk one's own life and to try to kill him, there is a need for racism.[102]

On the basis of this contention, Foucault in the very last paragraph of *"Society Must Be Defended"* engaged in a deeply provocative and incredibly problematic move. He listed the most racist forms of socialism as Blanquism, the Commune, and anarchism without going into any detail about how exactly these forms of socialism were the most racist. He qualified this stark indictment of socialist movements only by adding that they were more racist than social democracy, the Second International, and Marxism, and that by the end of the nineteenth century, racism among socialist movements had dissipated as a consequence of the reformism of social democracy and the Dreyfus affair.[103]

Foucault's sweeping treatment of socialist movements as racist posed an immense problem not only because it lacked elaboration but also because it grated against, if not clashed with, alternative historical accounts. Marx, for instance, provided something of a counterpoint to Foucault's identification of the short-lived Paris Commune as one of the most racist forms of socialism. In *The Civil War in France*, Marx praised the Communards for their internationalism, exemplified in the selection of a German—Leo Frankel—as the Minister of

Labor in the very midst of the Franco-Prussian War.[104] Marx here provided grounds for thinking that armed struggle in the case of the Paris Commune not only did not lead to racism but also cut fiercely against national and racial divisions. Of course, Foucault was hardly using racism in a conventional sense but he still fell drastically short of demonstrating how exactly the Communards as well as anarchists and Blanquists practiced racism in this unconventional sense.

Beyond matters of historical detail, however, Foucault finished *"Society Must Be Defended"* with a shockingly simple binary opposition: up until the end of the nineteenth century, *either* socialist movements focused on purely economic transformations *or* they engaged in armed struggle and ended up with racism. This apparent rendering of economism as the only means for socialist movements to avoid racism was paradoxical to say the least. As we saw earlier in this chapter, Foucault had subjected economism to a methodological critique. By the end of *"Society Must Be Defended,"* however, economism suddenly stood out as the only way for socialism to elide the scourge of racism in the nineteenth century.

We can deem these moves in the finale to *"Society Must Be Defended"* immensely frustrating. To his credit, Foucault acknowledged that in ascribing racism to socialist movements, he was speaking in painfully sweeping terms.[105] Still, Foucault's closing statement in *"Society Must Be Defended"* served the useful purpose of disclosing his target audience precisely because it deviated so obviously from his overall project of examining transformations in the analysis of the state in the West. This statement did not speak to any kind of socialists. It addressed inheritors of a revolutionary left with whom Foucault was rather familiar through his own political activities, as we saw in the previous chapter. Foucault communicated the caution to these inheritors that engaging in armed struggle risks affirming the racist practices of the modern state.

We can now summarize *"Society Must Be Defended"* more precisely than at the outset of our reading. Foucault made several broad points. First, the historical discourse of race war emerged owing to the reaction of the aristocracy to its disempowerment in the seventeenth century. Second, the regularization of this discourse dispersed it among contending political factions in the eighteenth century. Third, the redefinition of the "nation" by historians tied to the bourgeoisie at the end of the eighteenth century dissipated the bellicose dimension of the discourse of races. Finally, a biopolitics led the state to engage in racist struggles or struggles on behalf of *the* race against all the bearers of threats to it, effectively

signaling the mutation and reversal of what had emerged as an *anti*-sovereign discourse of the war of *races*.

Foucault concluded this dense argument on an aporetic note, leaving all of his questions about the adequacy of the war model from the third lecture of *"Society Must Be Defended"* open. These questions do not even appear to have stifled his use of the war model *in* the course itself. Foucault in the penultimate lecture suggested that this model underpinned his analysis of biopolitics by speaking of the latter modality of power as a means, again, of extracting and maximizing "forces."[106]

Nonetheless, by identifying the core of his thinking about power with a discourse of the war of races only to then demonstrate how the state absorbed certain elements of this discourse into an integral, biologically driven racism, Foucault made a very forceful point about the horizons of thought which framed the war model. He not only suggested that the revolutionary discourse of warlike struggle runs the acute danger of having itself taken over by the state. His point was far more precise: a discourse of warlike struggle *is* now a *state* discourse. Indeed, Foucault's point was that the original target of this whole discourse, the state, now enunciates it. Consequently, he implied that the application of war as a "grid" for political relations no longer amounts to the creative, revolutionary act it once was for Boulainvilliers and other eighteenth-century noble historians.

## Boulainvilliers as Foucault

What gave this argument an added dimension of complexity was its barely veiled personal inflection. James Miller writes: "it is impossible to not to hear, in Foucault's description of Coke, Lilburne, and Boulainvilliers, an even more vivid description of the author of *Discipline and Punish*."[107] Though Miller himself does not pursue this point at length, it is not difficult to cite passages that basically warrant it. Consider the following excerpt from Foucault's commentary on Boulainvillier's generalization of war:

> Until the seventeenth century, a war was essentially a war between one mass and another mass. Boulainvilliers makes the relationship of war part of every social relationship, subdivides it into thousands of different channels, and reveals war to be a sort of permanent state that exists between groups, fronts, and tactical units as they in some sense civilize one another, come into conflict with one another, or on the contrary form alliances. There are no more multiple and

> stable great masses, but there is a multiple war. In one sense, it is a war of every man against every man, but it is obviously not a war of every man against every man in the abstract and—I think—unreal sense in which Hobbes spoke of the war of every man against every man when he tried to demonstrate that it is not the war of every man against every man that is at work in the social body. With Boulainvilliers, in contrast, we have a generalized war that permeates the entire social body and the entire history of the social body; *it is obviously not the sort of war in which individuals fight individuals, but one in which groups fight groups* (italics mine).[108]

What is striking about this description of Boulainvilliers's conceptualization of war is that it virtually echoes Foucault's *own* conceptualization of it. As we know from above, Foucault in *The Punitive Society* insisted, *with Hobbes no less as his target*, that civil war encompasses group rather than individual dynamics.[109] Other passages provide even more evidence that he had himself in mind when crediting Boulainvilliers with insights. Take the following example:

> [Boulainvilliers] defined the principle of what might be called the relational character of power: power is not something to be possessed, and it is not a form of might; power is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay between the terms of the relationship. One cannot, therefore, write either the history of kings or the history of peoples; one can write the history of what constitutes those opposing terms, one of which is never infinity, and the other of which is never zero. By writing that history, by defining the relational character of power, and by analyzing it in history, Boulainvilliers was challenging—and this, I think, is the other side of what he was doing—the juridical model of sovereignty which had, until then, been the only way of thinking of the relationship between people and monarch, or between the people and those who govern. Boulainvilliers describes the phenomenon of power not in juridical terms of sovereignty but in historical terms of domination and the play of relations of force.[110]

In this instance, it is indeed difficult to see how exactly Foucault was *not* describing *himself*. The passage above contains the hallmarks of his approach to power throughout the 1970s: the hypothesis according to which power consists of relations of force rather than an object of possession, the corresponding focus on domination, and the critique of the sovereignty model. We could continue to adduce more passages that reveal the striking parallels between exponents of the discourse of race war and Foucault himself but the two above suffice to demonstrate that Foucault was not simply tracing the war model to an obscure

discourse that emerged over two centuries ago. His relationship to this discourse was much more immediate, much more intimate.

Foucault may well have discussed his own insights as breakthroughs under the pseudonym of Boulainvilliers to elide charges of outright immodesty but his reasons for this move concern us less than its implications. Given that he intertwined his voice with the voices of Boulainvilliers and other exponents of the discourse of race war, Foucault seems to have implicitly invited us to consider his analysis of this discourse from the perspective of his militant engagements or as, precisely, a subject of struggle. If we consider it from this perspective, we can finally find an answer to why he adhered to the war model *beyond* the effort to circumvent the economism of Marxism and contractarianism. This answer seems to reside in his insistence that political struggle itself underpinned the introduction of war as a "grid of intelligibility." In explaining that Boulainvilliers and other noble historians forged this "grid" owing to their involvement in political struggles, it seems that Foucault was actually hinting at one positive reason for his own adoption of the war model. He appears to have been suggesting in a retrospective and roundabout fashion that he *began* to embrace the war model in the early 1970s precisely because he *began* immerse himself in political struggles during this very same period, as noted above. His turn toward the war model was thus intimately bound up with his militancy in the early 1970s. Like Boulainvilliers, Foucault could readily and unequivocally affirm warlike struggle at an analytical level because of his engagement in political struggles. A purely analytical account of Foucault's introduction and retention of the war model therefore only gets us so far in understanding his affirmations and powerful evocations of this model.

## Foucault beyond the war model?

Some interpreters claim that Foucault discarded the war model after the delivery of *"Society Must Be Defended."* Alain Beaulieu remarks that by the time Foucault broached liberal governmentality in his Collège courses from the late 1970s, he had "*rejected* the 'war hypothesis'" (italics mine).[111] Similarly, Judith Revel suggests that Foucault outright "abandoned" the war model "in favor of a more complex model for the analysis of power relations, 'governmentality'."[112] But the textual evidence does not sufficiently corroborate these statements. It suggests that Foucault displaced rather than replaced the constituent elements of the war

model, layering them within his emergent frameworks of governmentality and techniques of the self.

Shortly after the delivery of *"Society Must Be Defended,"* Foucault returned to his concerns about the war model from the first and third lectures of the course, almost as if his overall analysis of the discourse of race war had led him nowhere. In an interview conducted in June 1976, he asked a series of basic questions about this model, many of which could have been taken straight out of *"Society Must Be Defended."*

> As soon as one endeavors to detach power with its techniques and procedures from the form of law within which it has been theoretically confined up to now, one is driven to ask this basic question: Isn't power simply a form of warlike domination? Shouldn't one therefore conceive of all problems in terms of relations of war? Isn't power a sort of generalized war that, at particular moments, assumes the forms of peace and the state? Peace would then be a form of war and the state a means of waging it.
>
> A whole range of problems emerge here. Who wages war against whom? Is it between two classes, or more? Is it a war of all against all? What is the role of the army and military institutions in this civil society where permanent war is waged? What is the relevance of the concepts of tactics and strategy for analyzing structures and political processes? What is the essence and mode of transformation of power relations? All these questions need to be explored. In any case, it's astonishing to see how easily and self-evidently people talk of warlike relations of power or of class struggle without ever making it clear whether some form of war is meant, and if so what form.[113]

Foucault posed some of these questions in an article published the following month in the journal *Hérodote*.[114]

The first volume of the *History of Sexuality*, published later in the same year, revealed an effort at some new thinking about the war model. Foucault reiterated that power consists of warlike force relations but he also attempted for the first time to detach this view from the conclusion that politics continues war. He projected politics and war as interchangeable "codes" implying different "strategies" for integrating unbound and formless force relations.

> Should we turn the expression around, then, and say that politics is war pursued by other means? If we still wish to maintain a separation between war and politics, perhaps we should postulate rather that this multiplicity of force relations can be coded—in part but never totally—either in the form of "war," or in the form of "politics"; this would imply two different strategies (but the

> one always liable to switch into the other) for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense force relations.[115]

Foucault did not go on to impart any sense of how exactly these "strategies" differ from one another but, in light of his previous identification of *military* struggles with the goal of domination and *civil* struggles with the goal of occupying the state, we may suspect that he attributed to "war" and "politics," respectively, the integration of force relations around the goal of domination and the integration of these relations around the goal of occupying the state.[116] However, if this highly schematic distinction was the direction of Foucault's new thinking about war and politics, it simply begged the (classically Leninist) question of why domination and occupation of the state should be seen as distinct. It also raised the question of why Foucault would venture a distinction that seemed to draw from his portrayal of Sieyès's pacification of the discourse of race war. What is clear is that Foucault *still* tilted in favor of the view that politics basically continues war by other means. Later in the same chapter containing the passage above, he confidently noted, "*in fact*, it is one of the *essential* traits of Western societies that the force relationships which for a long time had found expression in war, in *every* form of warfare, gradually became invested in the order of political power" (italics mine).[117]

This confidence did not remain unwavering. Foucault in an interview published in 1977 adopted an agnostic stance. For reasons left completely unspecified, he refused to determine whether politics consists of warlike force relations. "Is the relation between forces in the order of politics a warlike one? I don't personally feel prepared to answer this with a definite yes or no."[118] But this moment of vacillation appeared in a context marked by powerful evocations of the war model. In an unpublished discussion with members of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist League dated from early 1978, Foucault reiterated a basic point he had articulated as early as 1973: power inheres in a warlike struggle between forces rather than in possession.

> Power is neither on one side nor on the other. It is precisely *in* the conflict, with, to be sure, instruments that one possesses and arms that others have, etc. Arms on one side, the army on the other side, machine guns here. Good, but to say that the bourgeoisie *possesses* power because in effect it's the bourgeoisie that possesses weapons, to say that the bourgeoisie takes power because the state apparatus is controlled by it, is not a sufficiently precise, sufficiently exact formula. From the moment that one wishes to analyze *the ensemble* of

> relations of power in a social body, the state apparatus, the state apparatuses are the means, instruments and arms that the bourgeoisie gives itself in a class struggle in which all of the aspects constitute the relations of power which are immanent in a social body. In other words, it's the idea that the social body does not hold by the effect of a contract or consensus but by the effect of something else which is precisely the war, the struggle, the relations of force.[119]

This statement stands out because it coincided with a period in which Foucault began to flesh out another approach to power as well as object to war as a model for political communication.[120] This other approach pivoted around the emergent concept of governmentality to which we will devote greater attention in the next chapter. For the moment, it suffices to point out that Foucault continued to affirm elements of the war model even as he articulated governmentality. In the opening lecture of his Collège course from the academic year 1977 to 1978, *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault clarified that his analyses belonged to a "politics of truth" understood as a demonstration of "the knowledge effects produced by the struggles, confrontations, and battles that take place within our society, and by the tactics of power that are elements of this struggle." He went on to caution against the use of simple imperatives in theoretical analyses on grounds that imperatives "can only appear within a field of real forces, that is to say within a field of forces that cannot be created by the speaking subject alone and on the basis of his words." Foucault voiced his preference for conditional imperatives consisting of the following formulation: "if you want to struggle, here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here are some constrictions and blockages."[121] Quite apart from these references to "struggles," "battles," and "forces," however, Foucault designated the apparatus of police and the military-diplomatic apparatus as the means within reason of state governmentality of augmenting the forces of the state and balancing the forces between states, respectively.[122] Indeed, Foucault's inscription of a whole dynamic of forces with reason of state governmentality even reinforced his earlier suggestion that warlike discourse is now a state discourse.

His retention of elements of the war model during this period may come as little surprise. After all, Foucault was still working out his concept of governmentality. If, however, we turn to Foucault's courses, interviews, and books from the period of his life corresponding with his turn to practices of the self, we can also find ample support for the suggestion that Foucault retained crucial elements of the war model.

On 20–21, October 1980, Foucault delivered the Howison Lectures at the University of California at Berkeley. The lectures, entitled "Subjectivity and Truth" and "Christianity and Confession," delineated a genealogy of the modern subject, tracing the practice of discerning the truth of oneself and verbalizing this truth to others to the early Christian practice of confession. Foucault framed the lectures with self-critical statements about his focus on domination from the preceding years. But if we look carefully at these statements, we can find reasons to press forth with the case that he retained elements of the war model.

Foucault distinguished between techniques of domination, government, and techniques of the self and announced that his research would focus on government through techniques of the self rather than through techniques of domination. Yet, in so doing, Foucault did not *disavow* techniques of domination. He superimposed his emphasis on techniques of the self *onto* his long-standing and admittedly excessive emphasis on domination.

> I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, he has to take into account not only techniques of domination but *also* techniques of the self. Let's say: he has to take into account the interaction between those two types of techniques—techniques of domination and techniques of the self. He has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or domination. The contact point, where the individuals are driven [and known] by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves [and know themselves], is what we can call, I think, government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word [as they spoke of it in the sixteenth century, of governing children, or governing family, or governing souls] governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself. When I was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I insisted, I think, too much on the techniques of domination. What we can call discipline is something really important in these kinds of institutions, but it is only at one aspect of the art of governing people in our society. We must not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion. Power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-technologies and self-technologies. I think that we have to get rid of

> the more or less Freudian schema—you know it—the schema of interiorization of the law by the self. Fortunately, from a theoretical point of view, and maybe unfortunately from a practical point of view, things are much more complicated than that. *In short, having studied the field of government by taking as my point of departure techniques of domination, I would like in years to come to study government—especially in the field of sexuality—starting from the techniques of the self* (italics mine).[123]

Nothing in this lengthy statement indicated anything as abrupt and definitive as an abandonment of the focus on domination so central to the war model. Foucault suggested a different point of departure for the study of government. His reasons for the shift were made exceptionally clear in a conversation with philosophers from Berkeley 2 days later. Foucault submitted that government entails much more than a dissymmetry of forces. He insisted that it implies "a structure inside people who are governed [which] makes them governable by others," and he sought to address this "structure" by focusing precisely on techniques of the self.[124]

Foucault in his essay "The Subject and Power," published in 1982, no doubt struck a more definitive chord about the war model. He affirmed power as relationship of government rather than struggle and he explicitly opposed government to warlike relations.

> The relationship proper to power would therefore be sought, *not* on the side of violence *or* of *struggle*, nor on that of voluntary contracts (all of which can, at best only be the instruments of power) but, rather, in the area of that singular mode of action, *neither warlike* nor juridical, which is government (italics mine).[125]

Foucault in this passage provided the closest thing to a declaration of an abandonment of the war model. In one sentence, he seems to have obtained what would have been utterly inconsistent with his thinking about power in 1970s, a disqualification of warlike struggle as a matrix for power relations. Yet, the statement above must be taken in the context of the essay as well as the larger context of statements concerning elements of the war model. Foucault in the following paragraphs of the essay emphasized that government *should* be thought in terms of struggle.

> At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an

> "agonism"—of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.[126]

In other words, government presupposed an agonistic relationship to the will and freedom and therefore implied struggle. Foucault retained the element of struggle *within* power relations just as he attempted to recast these relations in governmental rather than in bellicose terms. Foucault thus gestured toward a distinction between struggle, on the one hand, and *warlike* struggle, on the other hand. But the basis of this distinction was not clear and elaborate enough to be compelling. Agonism implied struggle coupled with "mutual incitement," whereas antagonism involved a struggle resulting in a defeat on one side and victory on the other. Agonism consequently pointed to the perpetuity of struggles rather than the perpetuity of dominations. But agonistic relations themselves involved combat, and it is unclear why these relations could not belong to warlike relations or, more precisely, why "mutual incitement" could not belong to a struggle resulting in victory on one side and defeat on the other.

Foucault in his Collège course from the academic year 1982 to 1983, *The Government of Self and Others*, explicitly brought elements of the war model to bear on his interpretation of Plato's account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy in Book VIII of the *Republic* and its implications for the problematization of courageous truth-telling or *parrhesia*. Foucault insisted that for Plato democratic equality does not derive from legislation so much as a war of the poor against oligarchs carried *into* the democratic form of government. As he explained, "After their victory and having exiled the oligarchs, those who remain share out the spoils, so to speak, that is to say, government and public offices. *Equality, consequently, rests on this war and relation of forces*" (italics mine).[127] Foucault certainly did not dwell on this point but it does seem to have been rich with implications for his overall approach to the relationship between politics and warfare. Strikingly, Foucault suggested that the view of politics as a continuation of warfare went all the way back to Plato. He thus pointed to the political thought of antiquity rather than discourses of race war in early modern thought as a locus for possible answers to his manifold questions about how politics came to be understood as a continuation of warfare.

Just as significantly, Foucault in an interview conducted in April 1983 indicated his own retention of a crucial component of the war model through a commentary on Arendt's rendering of power as a capacity to act in concert and

her dissociation of power from domination in particular. When asked about this dissociation, Foucault offered the following revealing response:

> Here I think you are entirely right to bring up the problem of the relation of domination because in fact it seems to me that in many of the analyses that have been made by Arendt, or in any case from her perspective, the relation of domination has been constantly dissociated from the relation of power. Yet I wonder whether this distinction is not something of a verbal one; for we can recognize that certain power relations function in such a way as to constitute, globally, an effect of domination, but the network constituted by the power relations hardly allows for a decisive distinction.[128]

Far from eschewing the effect of domination so central to the war model, Foucault in this commentary, which appears to have been his only one on Arendt, constructed his whole point around the sheer difficulty, if not impossibility, of neatly divorcing the exercise of power from effects of domination.[129] This move was especially telling, given that right around this time Foucault continued to be quite critical of treating domination as *the* ineluctable, general effect of power.[130]

Toward the very end of his life, Foucault even moved toward a position that would appear to have been much closer to Arendt's. In an interview conducted on 20 January 1984, Foucault articulated *his own* distinction between power and domination by putting the accent on the difference between the mobility and immobility of power relations.

> The analyses I am trying to make bear essentially on relations of power. *By this I mean something different from states of domination*. The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters what may be called situations or states of domination in which power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination (italics mine).[131]

But what is clear here is that even as Foucault formulated a distinction between power and domination, he did not at all expunge the latter from the former. States of domination arose *from* power relations and the immobility of power relations in particular. Foucault acknowledged domination as a *potential*

*consequence* of power relations even as he refused to flatten power relations *into* domination.

Foucault in *The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self*, both published in May 1984, placed core elements of the war model at the very center of his analysis of the constitution of sexual activity as an ethical domain in Greco-Roman thought. He insisted that in classical Greek thought this ethical domain took the form of *aphrodisia* understood, basically, in terms of force relations. More specifically, Foucault depicted *aphrodisia* as pleasurable acts belonging to a play of forces dictated by nature but susceptible to excess.[132] It was this susceptibility to excess in *aphrodisia* that for the classical Greeks necessitated *enkrateia* or a combative relationship to oneself resulting in a domination over one's desires and pleasures. As Foucault elaborated, "*enkrateia* is characterized more by an active form of self-mastery, which enables one to resist or struggle, and to achieve domination in the area of desires and pleasures."[133] Foucault claimed that the Roman medical and philosophical thought of the first and second centuries CE did not abandon this understanding of sexual activity as an ethical domain so much as modify it, and he once again invoked force relations and combat to make his point. "Sexual pleasure as an ethical substance continues to be governed by relations of force—the force against which one must struggle and over which the subject is expected to establish his domination."[134]

Through all of these heterogeneous moments in this survey of the analyses of the "final Foucault," we can see that Foucault's relationship to the war model was more ambiguous than purported by some of his interpreters. Foucault could not simply abandon the war model because for all of its shortcomings, problems, and political dangers in particular it still captured the possibility of domination. To give up on the war model would ultimately mean giving up on domination and Foucault was not ready to take this step, even though he had gone a very long way in rendering the war model problematic. Indeed, to get rid of the war model would have actually implied a *diminution* in the complexity of his analyses of power to the extent that it would have limited the range of possible effects generated through the exercise of power.[135] Power, in other words, was not a completely open-ended game, even if it was one involving manifold relations, fluid dynamics, and all kinds of reversals.

Two implications flow from our analysis. One concerns the political dangers of the war model. Foucault's most damning critique of this model was more historical and political than methodological. He traced warlike thinking

about power to the revolutionary discourse of the war of races only to show how this discourse transformed into its opposite, state racism. This critique raised questions about the political efficacy of warlike thinking about power and whether it had been compromised to the point of obsolescence. Foucault's retention of core elements of the war model suggests that he had answered these questions in the negative. The second implication concerns the relationship between the war model and the experience of struggle. If it is true that Foucault's introduction of the war model was intimately bound up with his experiences of militancy, then it stands to reason that his continued militancy must have nourished his affirmations of this model. In the succeeding chapters, we shall see that Foucault found occasions to return to his militant self up to the final years of his life.

## Notes

1 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews,* ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1977), 148–9.
2 Ibid., 150.
3 Ibid., 150–1.
4 Michel Foucault, "L'article 15," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, vol. 1, *1954–1975* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001a), 1066–7.
5 David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 296–7; Michel Foucault, "Rapports de la commission d'information sur l'affaire Jaubert," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Defert and Ewald, vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1067–71.
6 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 306–8.
7 Michel Foucault, "Le discours de Toul," in *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons: Archives d'une lutte 1970–1972*, eds Philippe Artières, Laurent Quéro and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel (Paris: Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003b), 168.
8 Michel Foucault, "Pour échapper à leur prison . . .," in Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 152–3.
9 Michel Foucault, "Tehran: Faith against the Shah," in *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005g), 202.
10 Daniel Defert, "Chronologie," *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, by Foucault, eds Defert and Ewald, vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 57.

11 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *Marx: Later Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Terrell Carver (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11.
12 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 412.
13 V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in *Collected Works*, vol. 22, *December 1915–July 1916*, ed. George Hanna, trans. Yuri Sdobnikov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 194.
14 V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar," in *Revolution at the Gates: A Selection of Writings from February to October 1917*, ed. Slavoj Žižek (New York: Verso, 2002), 17.
15 Michel Foucault, "La société punitive," 1972–1973, 22, TS by Jacques Lagrange, Bureau de Mme Marie Renée-Cazaban, Service des Bibliothèques et Archives, Site Cardinal Lemoine, Collège de France, Paris, France.
16 Ibid., 23.
17 Ibid.
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, ed. and trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 21.
19 Foucault, "Société punitive," 25–8.
20 Ibid., 27–8.
21 Ibid., 29–33.
22 Ibid., 32.
23 Ibid., 33.
24 For this formulation, see Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapoport (New York: Penguin Classics, 1968), 119.
25 Foucault, "Société punitive," 33.
26 Ibid., 195–7.
27 Michel Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at Collège de France, 1973–1974*, ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006b), 10–11.
28 Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975*, eds Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003a), 211–13.
29 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 26.
30 Michel Foucault, "*Society Must Be Defended*": *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976*, eds Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003f), 16.
31 Ibid., 16–17.
32 Ibid., 17.
33 Foucault, "Société punitive," 188.

34 Ibid.
35 Foucault, *Abnormal*, 42–52, 236–7.
36 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 23, 194.
37 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 17–18.
38 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 138.
39 Ibid., 50.
40 Ibid., 3–6, 32–69.
41 Mark Philp, "Foucault on Power: A Problem in Radical Translation?" *Political Theory* 11, no. 1 (February 1983): 34, 49.
42 Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 52.
43 Jeffrey T. Nealon, *Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications since 1984* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 36, 103.
44 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 23, 25–6, 32–3.
45 Ibid., 42.
46 Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: A Harvest Book, 1969), 45.
47 Ibid.
48 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 26.
49 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 14.
50 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 13–14.
51 Ibid., 15.
52 Ibid., 15–16.
53 Ibid., 17.
54 Ibid., 46–7.
55 Ibid., 47.
56 Ibid., 48, 165.
57 Foucault, "Société punitive," 26.
58 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 89–90.
59 Ibid., 92–3.
60 Ibid., 95.
61 Ibid., 97.
62 Ibid., 48–9.
63 Ibid., 59.
64 Ibid., 99–101.
65 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: A Harvest Book, 1985), 158–84.
66 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 77, 101.
67 Ibid., 127–8.
68 Ibid., 128.

69 Ibid., 130.
70 Ibid., 133–4, 143.
71 Ibid., 133–4.
72 Ibid., 144.
73 Ibid., 144–54.
74 Ibid., 156.
75 Ibid., 157.
76 Ibid., 158.
77 Ibid., 160–2.
78 Ibid., 164.
79 Ibid., 135.
80 Ibid., 165.
81 Ibid., 189–90.
82 Ibid., 189.
83 Ibid., 194–7.
84 Ibid, 202–4.
85 Ibid., 204–6.
86 Ibid., 208.
87 Ibid., 208–9.
88 Ibid., 217–19.
89 Ibid., 221.
90 Ibid., 222.
91 Ibid., 223.
92 Ibid., 224.
93 Ibid., 225.
94 Ibid., 245.
95 Ibid., 246.
96 Ibid., 254.
97 For this particular strand of argument as the starting point for an analysis of contemporaneous forms of racism and, in particular, the shift toward a politico-cultural racism (albeit one still rooted in a biological foundation) after the end of the World War II, see Mark Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 184–214.
98 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 256.
99 Ibid., 259–60.
100 Ibid., 254.
101 Ibid., 261–2.
102 Ibid., 262.
103 Ibid., 262–3.

104 Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in *Marx: Later Political Writings*, ed. Carver, 191.
105 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 261.
106 Ibid., 246.
107 James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Anchor Books, 1993), 289.
108 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 162–3.
109 Foucault, "Société punitive," 27.
110 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 168–9.
111 Alain Beaulieu, "Towards a liberal Utopia: The connection between Foucault's reporting on the Iranian Revolution and the ethical turn," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 36, no. 7 (September 2010): 807.
112 Judith Revel, *Dictionnaire Foucault* (Paris: Ellipses, 2007), 70.
113 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 3, *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 2000d), 123–4.
114 Michel Foucault, "Des questions de Michel Foucault à 'Hérodote'," in *Dits et écrits: 1954–1988*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, vol. 2, *1976–1988* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001f), 94.
115 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990a), 93.
116 Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 225.
117 Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 102.
118 Michel Foucault, "The Eye of Power," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980a), 164.
119 Michel Foucault, "[Discussion avec la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire destinée au journal *Rouge*]," Early 1978, C 82, Audio Cassette, Fonds Foucault, Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.
120 Michel Foucault in an interview conducted in late 1978 turned his attention to political discussions modeled on "war," discussions which involve the identification of a person with different ideas as a "class enemy who must be fought until a final victory is won." Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," in *Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Rabinow, vol. 3, *Power*, ed. Faubion, 297. He explained that such seemingly innocuous identifications of the other as enemy risk producing real oppression precisely because society always remains susceptible to the outbreak of actual warfare.
121 Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007c), 3.
122 Ibid., 296.

123 Michel Foucault, "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth," *Political Theory* 21, no. 2 (May 1993): 203–4, 224.

124 Michel Foucault, "Discussion with philosophers," 23 October 1980, C16, Audio Disc, Fonds Foucault, Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.

125 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Rabinow, vol. 3, *Power*, ed. Faubion, 341.

126 Ibid., 342.

127 Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983*, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 198.

128 Michel Foucault, "Politics and Ethics: An Interview" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984b), 378.

129 Discussions of the affinities or lack thereof between Foucault and Arendt have proliferated thanks in large part to the provocative reading of Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 4, 119. Clearly, previous sections of this chapter use Arendt to clarify the specificity and novelty of Foucault's analyses. For my own contribution to discussions of Arendt and Foucault, see Marcelo Hoffman, "Containments of the Unpredictable in Arendt and Foucault," *Telos* 154 (Spring 2011): 141–62.

130 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 42.

131 Michel Foucault, "The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 1, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 1997a), 283.

132 Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990b), 50–1, 91, 137, 250.

133 Ibid., 64.

134 Michel Foucault, *The Care of the Self: Volume 3 of The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 67.

135 From this perspective, the claim that Foucault's analyses pointed to the open-endedness of power relations rather than domination seems overstated. For an affirmation of this claim in a diagnosis of the effects of international power in the post-Cold War era, see Laura Zanotti, *Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 142, 144.

4

# People versus Population: Foucault on the Iranian Revolution

The last chapter introduced Michel Foucault's concept of biopolitics and offered a glimpse into his emergent framework of governmentality at the end of the 1970s. This chapter focuses on Foucault's shift from biopolitics to governmentality. While both of these concepts clearly signaled an emphasis on the exercise of power at the aggregate level of population, a consensus appears to be somewhat lacking on the extent to which Foucault's concepts of biopolitics and biopower carried over into his subsequent work on governmentality. Colin Gordon observes, "Foucault reintroduced this theme of biopower or biopolitics in his 1978 lectures, in a way linking it intimately with his approach to the theme of government."[1] Antonio Negri suggests that Foucault retained the concept of biopolitics but changed its signification from a police technique to "*a political economy of life in general*" (italics in the original).[2] Michel Senellart offers a rather different gloss on this matter, submitting that the "center of gravity" shifted for Foucault from "the question of biopower to that of government, to such an extent that in the end the latter almost entirely eclipses the former."[3] Notably, however, what all of these statements have in common is the view that Foucault held on to biopolitics, however tangentially, as his research pivoted increasingly around governmentality.

This chapter suggests that Foucault's relationship to the concept of biopolitics experienced something far more radical, something belonging to the order of a rupture or break rather than of a shift or displacement. A stark limitation to this concept arose from its reference to a population as a mere object of biopolitical regulations rather than as a subject-object of these regulations. This rendering of population posed a major, if unstated, problem because it implied that biopolitics fell radically short of the acute sense of the *self*-direction of behavior that distinguished Foucault's thinking about power in general and disciplinary power in particular. He rectified this problem by treating population as a subject-object

of what he began to call security techniques correlative to liberal governmentality. Foucault established an opposition between the concept of population implied by these techniques and the more familiar concept of the people as a collective subject. But the cost of Foucault's rectification of thinking about population was nothing short of his abandonment of the concept of biopolitics.

The shift in his thinking about population also seems to have yielded effects well beyond his presentation of a modality of power entailing a greater sense of self-direction at the collective level. On the heels of his articulation of population as a subject-object, Foucault traveled to Iran twice to report on the revolution there for the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera*. His reflections on the Iranian revolution appeared in the form of a series of articles and interviews in *Corriere della Sera* as well as French and Persian publications from September 1978 to May 1979.[4] These articles and interviews are widely regarded as deeply problematic for the simple reason that they expressed an enthusiasm for a revolution that resulted in the establishment of a highly oppressive theocratic regime. This enthusiasm is considered especially puzzling in light of Foucault's general reputation as a skeptic of revolutionary claims to liberation. In the only book-length exposition of his analyses of the Iranian revolution, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson even go so far as to castigate these analyses not only as an error in political judgment, but also as a symptom of an Orientalist worldview that privileged tradition over modernity.[5] Yet, one glaring problem with their argument is that tradition simply did not figure as a pertinent (or prominent) category for Foucault, and Afary and Anderson go no distance whatsoever in unpacking this category and revealing its utility for comprehending his analyses. If we are to find some relationship between Foucault's theories and his account of the Iranian revolution, we must therefore begin to look elsewhere.

A mere sampling of the extensive and burgeoning literature on Foucault's account of the Iranian revolution reveals a range of explanations for his enthusiasm over the Iranian revolution. Rosemarie Scullion claims that Foucault's enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution derived from an Orientalism that effectively disrupted his commitment to archaeology.[6] Fuyuki Kurasawa contends that Foucault's seemingly pervasive search for an exotic, non-Western outside as a counterpoint to a West exhausted by its own modernity sustained his enthusiasm for the revolution.[7] Ian Almond suggests that Foucault's analyses of the Iranian revolution reflected an affirmative rather than derogatory use of

Western stereotypes about Islam inherited directly from his reading of Friedrich Nietzsche and configured through his experiences in Tunisia in the late 1960s.[8] James Bernauer maintains that Foucault displayed a far from uncritical sensitivity toward the religious dynamics of the Iranian revolution and that these dynamics arose from his personal-political experiences in Poland and Brazil rather than from an overarching theoretical outlook.[9] Bonnie Honig claims that Foucault's enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution sprang from its promise of an alternative modernity attentive to the role of spirituality.[10]

While these responses are no doubt elucidating and useful to varying degrees they tend to overlook Foucault's immediate theoretical concerns building up to his engagement with the Iranian revolution. There is, in other words, a loss of the specificity of the remarkably rich analytical context leading to Foucault's reporting on Iran, an analytical context marked by major conceptual innovations, such as security, governmentality, pastoral power, and, most significantly for purposes, population. This chapter sets out to recover the specificity of that context in the hope of further illuminating Foucault's perplexing and immensely controversial engagement with the Iranian revolution. It suggests that Foucault's analyses of the Iranian revolution can be more adequately understood against the background of his extensive rethinking of population in particular. Even more precisely, this chapter contends that what fueled Foucault's enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution was the spectacle of the formation of a collective subject altogether irreducible to population as a subject-object, namely, the people. The specification of the appearance of a people distinguished by a collective will in Foucault's analyses has the further advantage of refracting back on his theoretical trajectory in the late 1970s, highlighting his progressive, if overlooked, shift toward a conception of population as a subject-object.

## Population as object

To appreciate the novelty of Foucault's turn to biopolitics, it helps to recall the broader trajectory of his thought in the mid- to late 1970s. As we saw in the previous chapter, Foucault placed the concept of population at the center of his presentation of biopolitics in the final lecture of his Collège de France course from the academic year 1975 to 1976, *"Society Must Be Defended."* However, it would be misleading to suggest that this concept had no precedent in his analyses prior to this course. We can certainly find various references to population in

Foucault's elaboration of disciplinary power *before* his turn to biopolitics, and these references suggest that he at least attempted to accommodate the concept of population within a disciplinary framework. Foucault in the final paragraphs of a lecture delivered at the State University of Rio de Janeiro in October 1974 entitled "The Incorporation of the Hospital into Modern Technology" made this attempt manifest, submitting that disciplinary observation and writing in individual hospitals in the late eighteenth century allowed the comparison of medical records across hospitals and, consequently, the constitution of a knowledge of illnesses within the population as a whole. As he remarked:

> Through the same system of disciplined hospital space, one can observe a great number of individuals. The records obtained daily, when compared among hospitals and in diverse regions, permit the study of pathological phenomena common to the whole population.
>
> Thanks to hospital technology, the individual and the population present themselves at the same time as objects of knowledge and medical intervention. The redistribution of those two medicines will be a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. The medicine that is formed in the course of the eighteenth century is simultaneously a medicine of the individual and the population.[11]

Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*, published in February 1975, similarly touched on population from the perspective of disciplinary power. He contended that disciplinary writing in the examination made it possible not only to track the development of individuals in the disciplinary world but also to establish collective categories and trends within population;[12] that increases in population signaled by the "accumulation of men" were bound up with the generalization of disciplinary power;[13] and that the production of delinquency within the prison facilitated "the perpetual surveillance of the population."[14] Yet, these references to population remained disparate and it is unclear that population in these instances denoted anything more than an aggregate of individuals or "a great number of individuals" as Foucault put it in his lecture from Rio de Janeiro. More to the point, population clearly did not obtain the status of an object of a technique of power distinct from disciplinary power. It figured more as a constituted element within the exercise of a power first and foremost concerned with the production of subjected individuals.

The same can be said about Foucault's references to population in his Collège course from 1974 to 1975, *Abnormal*. In this course, Foucault replicated the distinction from *Discipline and Punish* between the leprosy and plague models

for the control of individuals, albeit with one noteworthy modification.[15] He identified the leprosy model with the exclusion of lepers for the purpose of purifying the community and the plague model with the quarantine of the inhabitants of a plague stricken town for the purpose of constituting a "healthy population."[16] What was novel about this rendering of the distinction between the leprosy and plague models was the specific mention of a "healthy population" as the upshot of the plague model whereas previously Foucault had put the accent on the "disciplined society" as the "dream" of this model.[17] Still, population in this strand of argument did not receive anything other than a highly cursory treatment. Moreover, as in the case of his earlier analyses, Foucault depicted the health of population as an effect of a model that exemplified the exercise of disciplinary power rather than as an object corresponding to an alternative technique of power.

He offered a far more robust account of population in his essay "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," published in 1976. Population in this essay appeared as the very target of the emergence of what Foucault dubbed a "noso-politics" or politics of disease. This noso-politics concerned "the problem of the health of all as a priority for all, the state of health of a population as a general objective of policy."[18] Foucault cast the realization of this objective as a novel function of what he had introduced in *Discipline and Punish* as the "apparatus" responsible for bringing disciplinary power to bear on the whole of society, namely, police.[19] Yet, Foucault expanded his account of police, describing it less as a single apparatus engaged in the supervision of the fine details of individual behavior for the sake of public order than as an "ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channelled growth of wealth and the condition of preservation of health in general."[20] The policing of the health of population took place against the general backdrop not only of the need to preserve the labor-force but also of the need to integrate a growing population into production apparatuses.[21] This backdrop forced "'population' with its numerical variables of space and chronology, longevity and health, to emerge not only as a problem but as an object of surveillance, analysis, intervention, modification, etc."[22] Notably, population in this context appeared as a body consisting of "biological traits" susceptible to varying degrees of docility and utility rather than as a mere aggregate of individuals. Foucault explained, "The biological traits of a population become relevant factors for economic management, and it becomes necessary to organize around them an apparatus which will ensure not only their subjection but

the constant increase in their utility."[23] What is noteworthy here is that even as Foucault portrayed population as the object of a noso-politics subtended by police, he *still* depicted this noso-politics in eminently disciplinary terms, as evidenced from his reference to the imperative to increase the utility and docility of population.

Perhaps for this very reason, Foucault in the final lecture of "*Society Must Be Defended*" set about more carefully delineating the singularity of the technique of power proper to population. However, in a terminological twist, he identified this technique as biopolitics rather than as noso-politics. Indeed, his exposition of this technique lacked any mention of noso-politics, even though the neologism appeared in an essay published in the same year as the delivery of the final lecture of "*Society Must Be Defended*." Foucault did not explain this shift but it seems that he may have deemed noso-politics with its connotation of a politics of disease too narrow and negative to encapsulate the scope of the workings of a technique of power proper to population. He made it clear that biopolitics concerned not so much the prevention of disease as the mitigation, if not elimination, of *all* collective phenomena that jeopardize the life of a population, such as sudden changes in birth and mortality rates as well as industrial accidents and environmental problems.

In a marked departure from his previous discussion, Foucault emphatically distinguished the technique proper to population from disciplinary power. Clearly, at a schematic level, this distinction was not difficult to draw, even if it eluded him up to a certain point. Biopolitics differed from disciplinary power in its concern for the population rather than the individual body. What gave this distinction a degree of force, however, was his depiction of population as a body that possesses its own specificity, comprising of all kinds of collective, biological events described variably as "unpredictable," "aleatory," and "random."[24] The general character of these events necessitated the deployment of instruments distinct from disciplinary instruments. If disciplinary power sought to *train* individual bodies to constitute them as docile and productive forces, biopolitics sought to *regularize* aleatory events within the population for the sake of defending its life and maximizing its forces. "Regularization" denoted a control of aleatory events that established a balance within the life of a population. Foucault repeatedly invoked the physiological term "homeostasis," with its suggestion of a tendency toward the maintenance of an internal stability through adjustments to changes in the environment, to capture this process. As he stipulated, "This is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training

individuals, but by achieving, an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers."[25] Concretely, Foucault contended that regularization involved the anticipation, if not prediction, of aleatory events through "forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures," and that these mechanisms provided the basis for interventions in the biological processes of the population to modify them in accordance with the goal of equilibrium.[26] Of course, disciplinary power in its own way entailed the anticipation and preemption of random events. As Foucault remarked, "disciplinary power always tends to intervene beforehand, before the act itself if possible."[27] However, disciplinary power, once again, concerned the anticipation of the behavior of individuals rather than that of the population, and it sought to train the individual body to preempt this behavior rather than act on overall variables. Foucault gave precise illustrations of the singular character of biopolitical interventions through the following succinct imperatives: "The mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life expectancy has to be increased; the birth rate has to be stimulated."[28]

In view of Foucault's exposition of biopolitics, it becomes clear why he could not continue to accommodate the concept of population within his carefully elaborated disciplinary framework. The reason is that this concept underwent profound modifications, transforming from a mere quantity of individuals to the site of biological processes on a collective scale. As such, population could no longer be a pure and simple derivative of the individualizing effects of the exercise of disciplinary power. It necessitated forms of control at its own collective level. These forms of control were certainly not disconnected from the exercise of disciplinary power. Points of articulation between disciplinary power and biopolitics appeared in working-class estates, sexuality, and the norm. Indeed, Foucault depicted these techniques as two poles of a "biopower" or control over life spanning from the fine details of the individual body to the gross details of the population body. Nevertheless, it was the heterogeneity of the individual body and population body that provided the basis for the articulation of disciplinary power and biopolitics. As Foucault reasoned, "These two mechanisms—one disciplinary and the other regulatory—do not exist at the same level. Which means of course that they are not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other."[29]

Yet, for all of his emphasis on a more complex notion of population as the correlative to a technique irreducible to disciplinary power, Foucault did not impart any pronounced sense of the constitution of population as a subject of the manifold regulations imposed on it. Certainly, aleatory events within population

called forth these regulations. However, Foucault did not distill any sense that these events provided the basis for population to participate in the regulation of *its own* processes. Population consequently appeared as a kind of inert, passive object of manipulations in the form of adjustments to its statistically recorded births, deaths, and other biological processes. Foucault's elaboration of disciplinary power only accentuated this point. Of course, disciplinary power constituted the individual by attaching a subject-function to a somatic singularity through its well-known armory of mechanisms involving peculiar spatial arrangements and the play of visibility represented in panoptic architectural arrangements.[30] It was precisely because the disciplined individual embodied this subject-function that she transmitted disciplinary power to herself, thereby imbuing the exercise of this power with a natural and spontaneous semblance. Foucault repeatedly conveyed this crucial point in *Discipline and Punish*.[31] By contrast, he portrayed biopolitics as a technique that seemed to constitute population without any analogous ascription of a subject-function, without any analogous transmission of its effects to population from population. By not constituting population as a subject, biopolitics fell radically short of the pronounced sense of self-direction in his account of disciplinary power. It is as if Foucault could not conceive of this self-direction beyond the microphysical level of individual bodies, with the effect that he lapsed into the static, if not negative, conception of power he sought to challenge in his analyses of disciplinary power.

Foucault's succeeding discussions of population in 1976 echoed his argument about biopolitics and population from *"Society Must Be Defended,"* albeit with some noteworthy clarifications and modifications. In a lecture delivered at the University of Bahia in November 1976 entitled "The Meshes of Power," Foucault implicitly distanced himself from his earlier view of population as a mere quantity of individuals, positing that population "does not simply mean to say a numerous group of humans, but living beings, traversed, commanded, ruled by processes and biological laws."[32] In the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, published in the following month, Foucault reiterated many of his points about population from *"Society Must Be Defended."* But he also introduced several important innovations into his account of population. First of all, Foucault gestured beyond his one-sided conception of population by briefly acknowledging that life was not simply an object of control but also the very language of resistance to this control in the nineteenth century. "Life," Foucault noted, "as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system bent on controlling it."[33] This turning of life *against* biopolitics was manifest in appeals

to rights in political struggles and especially in affirmations of "the 'right' to 'life', to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, beyond all the oppressions and 'alienations,' the 'right' to discover what one is and all that one can be."[34] Second, Foucault introduced a distinction between "population" and "people" that would loom large in his succeeding analyses.

> One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. *Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with a "population,"* with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation (italics mine).[35]

Foucault merely mentioned this distinction between "people" and "population" in the context of his larger claim that the appearance of the latter rendered sexual activity an object of intense analysis and intervention. But we shall see that the distinction portended a strand of argument with enormous implications for his reading of the Iranian revolution. From this perspective, Foucault's first volume of *The History of Sexuality* clearly amounted to a transitional point in his elaboration of population.

## Population as subject-object

Foucault's increasing preoccupation with population became rather manifest in the title of his Collège course from 1977 to 1978, *Security, Territory, Population*. In this course, Foucault set about resolving how political sovereignty in the West became concerned with the fine details of the life of population. The seemingly self-evident concern of political sovereignty with population posed a vexing problem for Foucault because he could not find any compelling evidence for the view that the government of human beings served as an ideal in ancient Greek political life. He identified the government of human beings in the broad sense of conduct over conduct with the exercise of pastoral power in pre-Christian Mediterranean cultures, above all in Hebraic culture, rather than in Greek culture, which tilted in his view first and foremost toward the government of a political institution, namely, the city-state. To condense a long and complicated

narrative with a historical scope spanning millennia, Foucault submitted that police within reason of state governmentality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries inscribed the government of human beings *in* political sovereignty by introducing the life of population as an object of regulations for the purpose of amplifying forces of the state.

Within the context of this sweeping argument, Foucault introduced several striking changes to his conceptualization of population. First of all, he ceased to refer to biopolitics (and biopower) in *Security, Territory, Population* after the first lecture of the course. Instead of referring to biopolitics as *the* technique of power corresponding to population, Foucault offered a far more nuanced analysis. He identified two distinct but interrelated techniques of power corresponding to population, one police correlative to reason of state governmentality and the other security correlative to the emergence of a liberal governmentality. Second, Foucault demonstrated that the conception of population as a mere object of regulations corresponded to police specifically. The implications of this demonstration were nothing short of stunning. Foucault effectively suggested that his earlier biopolitical conceptualization of population remained trapped within a kind of police reasoning. Third, Foucault showed the limitations of the police conception of population by insisting that population had been constructed as a subject-object of mechanisms of security rather than as a mere object of mechanisms of regulation (or regularization). He thus remedied a major shortcoming of his previous analyses. Foucault made this remedy explicit from the opening lecture of *Security, Territory, Population*, telling his auditors that he sought to grapple with "the correlation between the technique of security and population as both the object and subject of these mechanisms of security."[36] This sudden re-orientation in his approach to population clearly derived from his newfound engagement with liberalism. What Foucault learned from this engagement was that population as delineated by late-eighteenth-century political economists and the Physiocrats in particular could *not* simply be manipulated to obtain certain effects and that it could *not* simply be regulated because it possessed an intrinsic naturalness that necessitated security techniques.

The term "security" was not entirely new to Foucault's vocabulary. He had introduced "security mechanisms" in his discussion of biopolitics in the last lecture of "*Society Must Be Defended*."[37] However, security in that course was synonymous with regularization and what was being secured was the life of a

population. Foucault in the first three lectures of *Security, Territory, Population* offered a somewhat different gloss on security mechanisms. These mechanisms also secured the life of a population but they undertook this process by relying on the reality of aleatory phenomena to modify, if not nullify, these phenomena rather than on the regulations of a preventative character. As Foucault specified, "These mechanisms do not tend to a nullification of phenomena in the form of the prohibition, 'you will not do this,' nor even, 'this will not happen,' but in the form of a progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves."[38]

Foucault illustrated this process by dwelling on the Physiocratic approach to scarcity. He explained that what distinguished scarcity in the late eighteenth century was a self-propagating process whereby a shortage of food supplies would induce a rise in the price of grain with the immediate consequence of provoking the hoarding of grain, which in turn would further elevate the price of grain and result in a failure to meet the subsistence needs of the population.[39] In response to this problem, which ran the acute risk of precipitating urban revolts, Foucault observed that a system was set up along juridical and disciplinary lines consisting of the attempt to prevent scarcity by fixing a low price on grains, prohibiting their hoarding, and restricting their exportation. This system failed in his estimation on account of lowering profits for peasants and thereby diminishing their incentives to sow, with the effect of further constraining food supplies and exposing these supplies to the slightest vicissitudes of the weather.[40] Drawing from Louis-Paul Abeille's *Lettre d'un négociant sur la nature du commerce des grains*, published 1763, Foucault suggested that in light of the failure of this system, the Physiocrats proposed to deal with scarcity in a categorically opposed manner, namely, by allowing the price of grain to elevate through the suppression of prohibitions on hoarding and the elimination of limitations on exports. This rise in the price of grain had the consequence within Physiocratic reasoning of raising the profits of peasants and, consequently, giving them the incentive to sow and cultivate more extensively. With more fields sown and cultivated, more grain would appear on the market with the next harvest and the increase in the price of grain would slow down, if not halt. If the following year did not yield a bountiful harvest, the high price of grain would still attract foreign exports, leading to a lowering of the price of grain.[41] In other words, the very rise in prices would precipitate a set of processes that would eventually result in the lowering of prices. The use of the reality of the

phenomena of scarcity and dearness of grain would be used to nullify this reality. The Physiocratic problematization of scarcity thus exemplified for Foucault the workings of security mechanisms.

What is perhaps less clear is how exactly population figured as the correlative to these security mechanisms. That is because Foucault once again treated population in radically different terms. Population appeared not so much as a body consisting of biological phenomena but as a body consisting of *natural* phenomena, and this subtle shift in emphasis from the biological to the natural had important implications for Foucault's articulation of the workings of the modality of power appropriate for population. Like so many other aspects of *Security, Territory, Population*, the sudden emphasis on naturalness was not entirely without precedent. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault identified the constitution of a "natural body" as the upshot of the technique for prescribing highly regulated movements within the exercise of disciplinary power.[42] This body was "natural" in the sense that it began to engage in these movements all on its own, without any apparent instigation in the form of a prescription, verbalized or otherwise. "Natural" here acquired the sense of a kind of spontaneous physical rhythm that was not at all given but meticulously produced through disciplinary practices.

"Naturalness" certainly retained something of this sense of self-regulation in *Security, Territory, Population* but it also appeared in a markedly different and even opposed guise. First of all, "naturalness" pertained to population and civil society rather than the individual body. As Foucault remarked with reference to the perspective of eighteenth-century Political Economy, "[Population] will be considered a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes."[43] Toward the very end of *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault elaborated this perspective, adding civil society as a domain of naturalness opposed and simultaneously indexed to the artificiality of reason of state governmentality and its police technique. In his words, "Society as a specific field of naturalness peculiar to man, and which will be called civil society, emerges as the vis-à-vis of the state."[44]

More specifically, however, the "naturalness" of population in Foucault's frustratingly schematic exposition referred to a density variables seemingly removed from population, such as climate, custom, law, monetary flow, and imports and exports. These variables rendered straightforward sovereign (and disciplinary) commands ineffectual. "If one says to a population 'do this,' there is not only no guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply no

guarantee that it can do it."[45] The sheer thickness of variables within population raised the question of whether it could behave in a prescribed manner, and this question could only be answered by acting on these variables through the careful mediation of the knowledge of Political Economy. As Foucault explained:

> If one wants to encourage population, or achieve the right relationship between the population and the state's resources and possibilities, then one must act on a range of factors and elements that seem far removed from the population itself and its immediate behavior, fecundity, and desire to reproduce.[46]

Foucault went on to identify such "factors and elements" as currency flows as well as import and exports. "Naturalness" thus implied government at a distance afforded precisely through Political Economy or, more simply, government mediated through economic expertise. The "naturalness" of population further signified the generation of universal benefits accrued through the free play of desire understood as the pursuit of self-interest. "The production of the collective interest through the play of desire is what distinguishes both the naturalness of population and the possible artificiality of the means one adopts to manage it."[47] Finally, the "naturalness" of population designated statistically established constants within seemingly irregular phenomena. As examples of such constants, Foucault pointed to mortality and birth rates.[48]

Though "naturalness" in this exposition clearly encompassed a number of somewhat disparate traits, the last of which even echoed Foucault's discussion of the irregular events targeted through biopolitics, what figured centrally in his depiction of "naturalness" was clearly spontaneous self-regulation, especially the spontaneous self-regulation of the market. As Foucault noted in his very brief juxtaposition of this "naturalness" with the "naturalness" of the cosmological-theological order opposed by reason of state governmentality:

> But now naturalness re-appears with the *économistes*, but it is a different naturalness. It is the naturalness of those mechanisms that ensure that, when prices rise, if one allows this to happen, then they will stop by rising themselves. It is the naturalness that ensures that the population is attracted by high wages, until a certain point at which wages stabilize and as a result the population no longer increases.[49]

In identifying the affirmation of "naturalness" in this sense of a self-regulating market with Political Economy, Foucault was hardly making an original historical point. Karl Polanyi, among others, had famously stressed that late-eighteenth-century Political Economy centered on the view of the self-regulating market as

an outcome of the natural propensity of humans to truck, barter, and exchange. Unlike Polanyi, however, Foucault did not posit the "naturalness" of society's efforts to *regulate* the market against the artifice of market *self*-regulation.[50] His larger point seems to have been that the "naturalness" subtending the very conduct of human beings belonging to population had been constructed on the basis of the practices of liberal governmentality, and the general implication of his point was that this "naturalness" now framed the articulation of *alternative* practices to conducting the conduct of human beings.

More importantly for our purposes, however, Foucault's acknowledgment of Political Economy's ascription of spontaneous self-regulation to population had important consequences for his own treatment of population, stretching it well beyond the police reasoning that informed his previous articulation of the concept. Foucault now formulated the view that security techniques constituted population as a subject precisely by *allowing* its naturalness to flourish. The implication of this view was that security techniques ultimately produced population as a collective subject of a kind of freedom. He thus undermined any sense of an opposition between freedom and security and spelled out this freedom as precisely circulation.[51]

> An apparatus of security, in any case the one I have spoken about, cannot operate well except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense [the word] acquires in the eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things. I think it is this freedom of circulation, in the broad sense of the term, it is in terms of this option of circulation, that we should understand the word freedom, and understand it as one of the facets, aspects, or dimensions of the deployment of apparatuses of security.[52]

The catch for Foucault was that population *only* appeared as a subject of this freedom to the extent that it conducted its own conduct in a highly specific way. He teased out of Abeille's *Lettre* the intriguing view that population only qualified *as* a population to the extent that it respected its own propensity to spontaneous self-regulation. The moment that members of a population failed to respect this naturalness through revolts or monopolizations based on poor calculations they degenerated into members of the collective figure of the people.

> The people comprise those who conduct themselves in relation to the management of the population, at the level of population, as if they were not part of

> the population as a collective subject-object, as if they put themselves outside of it, and consequently the people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system.[53]

The figure of the people thus disclosed the very limits of population through a collective subject unwilling to exercise the freedom prescribed to it by economic expertise.[54]

What is important for our purposes about Foucault's identification of the necessity that population conduct itself according to its own naturalness is its disclosure of his shift toward technique of power at the *collective* level that depends crucially on *self*-direction. Mechanisms of security and the knowledge of Political Economy bound up with them did not simply operate through interventions in the form of regulations *on* population. These mechanisms and this knowledge were premised on population acting as a subject, conducting its own conduct in accordance with the principle of its own intrinsic naturalness. In this way, mechanisms of security as well as the knowledge of Political Economy bound up with them revealed their own immense breadth. At the risk of indulging in a somewhat sweeping statement, we could therefore say that if Foucault's account of population in his exposition of biopolitics detracted from his larger project of conceptualizing power in self-directing terms, his account of population under security finally returned to this project.

Where did this return leave the concept of biopolitics? Perhaps the most we can say is that Foucault retained the semblance of this concept in his account of police. After all, police construed population as a mere object of controls. The very terms of Foucault's depiction of police even echoed the terms of his account of biopolitics. For instance, he specified the "domain" of police as the life of population or, more precisely, everything ranging from "living to more than just living" exemplified by the concern with the subsistence, health, education, training, and circulation of population.[55] Still, for all of these similarities, police was irreducible to biopolitics primarily because it corresponded to a highly specific governmental rationality, reason of state. What is more, Foucault underscored the acute limitations of police through his articulation of security. Indeed, *Security, Territory, Population* opened *and* closed with the suggestion that police provided crucial but limited means of understanding the complexities of the operations of power at the level of population. Foucault thus disrupted the unity of biopolitics as well as the unity of population to which it referred and this disruption inflicted a mortal wound on the concept.

## Adieu biopolitics

The suggestion that Foucault inflicted a mortal wound on biopolitics may appear far too definitive to many of his readers for a couple of very general reasons: first, Foucault tended to cast the changes in his own research orientation in terms of "shifts" rather than "breaks" or "ruptures";[56] second, his research stressed complex articulations and intensifications between heterogeneous modalities of power rather than the effacement of one modality through the emergence of another, as in a zero-sum game.[57] In short, the claim that Foucault abandoned the concept of biopolitics seems to fly in the face of his general proclamations about the direction of his research as well as his general manner of conceptualizing power. There is one further sticking point: Foucault's Collège course from the academic year 1978 to 1979 bore the title *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Assuredly, this title, if nothing else, must have signaled his continuing affirmation of the concept of biopolitics.

Unfortunately (or rather fortunately), things are not so simple. One would be incredibly hard-pressed to find in *The Birth of Biopolitics* anything remotely akin to a sustained analysis of biopolitics. Foucault no doubt set out to devote the bulk of the course to liberalism as "the general framework of biopolitics."[58] Yet, his analysis tilted unequivocally toward the frameworks of liberalism and neoliberalism *rather* than biopolitics. Indeed, Foucault did not explicitly dwell on biopolitics at all, in spite of expressing the hope of doing so after addressing the neoliberal problematizations of law and order and civil society.[59] By the beginning of his eighth lecture, he even apologized to his auditors for this remarkable elision, telling them that, "in spite of everything I really did intend to talk about biopolitics."[60] Beyond these telling proclamations, however, the strongest indication of Foucault's elision of biopolitics consisted in the near absence of any discussion of population, especially since he once again affirmed that biopolitics pertained to population.

This elision was not for lack of occasion. Foucault's effort to "grasp" the "singularity" of neoliberalism allowed for several opportunities to return to biopolitics.[61] Foucault insisted that neoliberalism set about aggressively creating conditions for the existence of the market through steadfast interventions in the social domain. These interventions, which fell under the rubric of what German neoliberals or "Ordoliberals" dubbed a "policy of society" (*Gesellschaftspolitik)* involved actions *on* the *conditions* of the market rather than interventions *in* the market itself. Drawing from Walter Eucken's *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*,

published in 1952, Foucault briefly identified population as one such object of actions alongside technology, training, education, law, land, and climate.[62] Clearly, then, if one reads the fine details of Foucault's discussion carefully enough, it is possible to tease out the view that neoliberal programs of the German variety continued the concern with population. What is more, the objective of protecting population against risks to its livelihood did not exactly disappear within these programs. Foucault recounted that neoliberal social policy qualified the need for assistance only in terms of a threat to the subsistence of individuals in a state of under-consumption owing to a "permanent disability or unforeseen event."[63] It sought merely to guarantee the livelihood of these individuals through a transfer of a part of the incomes of individuals in a state of over-consumption. Otherwise, to be sure, protection against risks took on an individualized rather than socialized character. It was up to individuals to procure enough income to protect themselves against risks, meaning for Foucault that it was ultimately economic growth itself that provided the basis for protection against risks.[64]

Crucial elements of biopolitics were manifest in this discussion of the German variety of neoliberalism. Foucault addressed population as an object of intervention as well as the recalibration of risk and protection. His reference to the "permanent disabilities and unforeseen events" could have been taken almost verbatim out of his description of aleatory events in his initial exposition of biopolitics in *"Society Must Be Defended."* If ever there was a moment in *The Birth of Biopolitics* for Foucault to remind his auditors of his retention of biopolitics, it was precisely in his discussion of the German variety of neoliberalism. But Foucault did not use this discussion as an opportunity to even mention biopolitics, much less expound on its articulation within neoliberal programs. Just as tellingly, Foucault himself evidently did not believe that his analysis of German neoliberalism sufficed as an elaboration of biopolitics because his apology to his auditors for omitting biopolitics came *after* his lectures on the elements above in German neoliberalism. It is as if he had come briefly but intimately close to the concept of biopolitics only to suddenly back away from it.

In light of our discussion in the previous section, it seems that Foucault's distancing from biopolitics was not at all accidental. Foucault had implicitly highlighted the limitations to the concept of population in biopolitics through his articulation of population as a subject-object of security techniques. Returning to this concept therefore meant relapsing into a concept of population as a mere

object. The steep cost of this relapse was ultimately nothing less than a static, if not altogether negative, conception of power, owing precisely to the absence of any pronounced sense of self-direction by population.

## Iran: People versus population

Foucault was not exactly unaware of the political situation in Iran before his visits there. He had a number of contacts among opponents of the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in Paris.[65] Foucault along with other prominent French intellectuals had also signed a petition published in *Le Monde* in February 1976 expressing regret over the "silence of the French authorities" about "'flagrant human rights violations in Iran.'"[66] But the impetus for his reporting on the Iranian revolution came in the form of an invitation from the editorial board of *Corriere della Sera* to write regular articles for the newspaper. Foucault's writings on Iran were based on two short visits there, one in late September and the other in early November 1978.

In an unpublished portion of an interview with Duccio Trombardori conducted shortly after his visits to Iran Foucault straightforwardly explained his reasons for wanting to go to there. He observed that debates in France were heavily informed by events abroad and that therefore it was important to be as informed as possible about these events by actually witnessing them. As in Foucault's previous (and future) political engagements, the gathering of information played a central role. Strikingly for our purposes, Foucault even established a connection between his reasons for going to Iran and his previous activities concerning prisons.

> After all, I did nothing differently when it occurred to me that rather than speak of madness in general it would be better to go and see what was really happening in psychiatric hospitals, or that rather than speak of the law it would be better to get a glimpse of what prisons actually were. It was in this spirit that I was in Iran.[67]

Foucault explained that what drew him to Iran was not only the spontaneous and genuinely popular character of the revolt pitting the "whole nation against a sovereign" but also the conflict between this revolt and broader geopolitical dynamics. Iran was a "third world country" dominated by the United States and

therefore caught up in the Cold War but its vast natural resources also rendered it politically and economically significant to *all* Western industrialized states. Indeed, Foucault noted that he was absolutely fascinated by the conflict between these great powers and the "little religious man" with "little political experience" from the countryside, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, transmitting the demands of his people from a position of exile in Paris. Foucault also expressed his intrigue with the complex and rather unique religious dynamics of the popular revolt. This revolt belonged to an "Islamic renewal" but it also sprang from the very particular form of Islam, namely, Shi'ism.[68]

Upon his arrival in Tehran several months before, Foucault had even gone a bit further in explaining his intrigue with the Iranian revolution. In an interview with Baqir Parham conducted in September 1978, Foucault cast the Iranian revolution against the sweeping background of two "painful experiences" in the West.[69] The first one was the experience of Enlightenment principles of a good society that ended up facilitating the rise of industrial capitalism as "the harshest, most savage, most selfish, most dishonest, oppressive society that one could possibly imagine." The second one was the experience of Marxist principles of objectivity and rationality that facilitated the establishment of "political systems, social organizations, and economic mechanisms that today are condemned and ought to be discarded."[70] These experiences led Foucault to insist upon the necessity of a new beginning and express his hope that in abandoning Western forms of thought participants in the Iranian revolution would afford a whole new political thought and practice, one that did not lead to oppressive societies.

> We ought to have the courage to begin anew. We have to abandon every dogmatic principle and question one by one the validity of all the principles that have been the sources of oppression. From the point of view of political thought, we are, so to speak, at point zero. We have to construct another political thought, another political imagination, and teach anew the vision of a future. I am saying this so that you know that any Westerner, any Western intellectual with some integrity, cannot be indifferent to what she or he hears about Iran, a nation that has reached a number of social, political, and so forth, dead ends. At the same time, there are those who struggle to present a different way of thinking about social and political organization, one that takes nothing from Western philosophy, from its juridical and revolutionary foundations. In other words, they try to present an alternative based on Islamic teachings.

Foucault thus located the possibility of a new beginning in the Iranian revolutionary experience and, more specifically, in the attempt to re-envision political thought and practice from the perspective of Islamic teachings.[71]

Driven by his fascination with the peculiar dynamics of the revolution as well as his hope for its construction of a new beginning, Foucault wrote prolifically about developments in Iran over the course of nearly 2 years. His analyses of the Iranian revolution began to appear a few months after the delivery of *Security, Territory, Population* and continued to appear until roughly a month after the delivery of *The Birth of Biopolitics*. His analyses of the revolution thus took place against the immediate background of his rethinking of population in his "history of 'governmentality'" from pastoral power in pre-Christian Mediterranean cultures all the way up to American neoliberalism in the post-War era.[72] This background rather than a commitment to a completely unspecified category of "tradition" therefore seems like an appropriate starting point for elucidating his enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution, which no doubt led him to flatly erroneous political judgments, such as his prediction that "There will not be a Khomeini party; there will not be a Khomeini government."[73]

One of the recurrent, if not overriding, themes in the more than dozen articles and interviews that Foucault devoted to the Iranian revolution was the appearance of a people bound together by a collective will with the immediate objective of overthrowing the dictatorship of the Shah and the larger aspiration of inducing a thoroughgoing transformation in its subjectivity. Foucault was certainly no stranger to the concepts of the people and collective will. He addressed the collective will at the time of his writings on Iran as the very foundation of the law in the "revolutionary path" to the limitation of the exercise of public power in liberal governmentality, suggesting that it engendered a whole politics of human rights.[74] Yet, on his own admission, Foucault did not anticipate *witnessing* a collective will, owing to his view of it as a juridical-philosophical abstraction.

> Among the things that characterize this revolutionary event, there is the fact that it has brought out—and few peoples in history have had this—an absolutely collective will. The collective will is a political myth which jurists and philosophers try to analyze or to justify institutions, etc. It's a theoretical tool: nobody has ever seen the "collective will" and, personally, I thought that the collective will was like God, like the soul, something one would never encounter. I don't know if you agree with me, but we met, in Tehran and throughout Iran, the collective will of a people.[75]

Foucault went on to note that if the collective will in Western juridical and philosophical traditions was always general, its counterpart in Iran was particular, aiming *only* at the departure of the Shah. In a dialectical twist, however, this seemingly particular goal contained far more general aspirations. As Foucault clarified:

> But for the Iranian people, this unique thing means *everything*. This political will yearns for the end of dependency, the disappearance of the police, the redistribution of oil revenue, an attack on corruption, the reactivation of Islam, another way of life, new relations with the West, with Arab countries, with Asia, and so forth.[76]

Shi'ite Islam played a central role in this context, providing the Iranian people with a powerful resource to change their subjectivity through its emphasis on a "profound spiritual life" over "mere external obedience to the code."[77] The possibility of a radical transformation in subjectivity through a reliance on religion thus distinguished the collective will of the Iranian people from the more familiar version of this will in Western juridical and philosophical traditions. We can see here that what excited Foucault about the Iranian revolution was not at all Shi'ism per se as the *use* of Shi'ism to *enable* the Iranian people to mark a rupture with its present and propel itself into another destiny. In this regard, it seems that Foucault exhibited something of a very loose affinity with Frantz Fanon, who also identified the liberating potential in the revolutionary uses of long-standing practices and institutions in the struggle against French colonialism in Algeria, albeit without any kind of pronounced emphasis on religion.[78]

The appearance of a collective subject bearing the possibilities of self-emancipation gave Foucault's enthusiasm over the Iranian revolution a heightened degree of intensity, and his reflections on population and the people fueled the sheer intensity of his fascination with this subject. Though Foucault did not explicitly invoke the liberal conception of population in his analyses of the Iranian revolution, he demonstrated how the Iranians clashed against the naturalness at the core of this conception. If we recall Foucault's discussion of Abeille's *Lettre*, the very fact that the Iranians were revolting signaled their transformation into a people *opposed* to population. More specifically, however, Iranian individuals and groups opted to form a collective will rather than pursue their own interests, thereby undermining one of the key elements of the naturalness of population, the realization of collective benefits

through the pursuit of self-interest. Indeed, the play of interests that Foucault identified with the normal, everyday workings of politics simply ceased to be operative.

> What we witnessed was not the result of an alliance, for example, between social classes that, in the end, each giving into the other on this or that, came to an agreement to claim this or that thing. Not at all. Something quite different has happened. A phenomenon has traversed the entire people and will one day stop. At that moment, all that will remain are the different political calculations that each individual had had in his head the whole time. Let's take the activist in some political group: he had his political calculation, which was this or that, and at the same time he was an individual caught up in that revolutionary movement, or rather that Iranian who had risen up against his king. And the two things did not come into contact, he did not rise up against his king because his party had made this or that calculation.[79]

The play of economic and political interests was effectively suspended through the collective will such that the latter could *not* be reduced to the mere sum of the former. Foucault powerfully imparted the scope of this suspension through a comparison of striking workers in the Iranian oil and airline industries. He observed that an Iran Air crew, with whom he had met under conditions of secrecy in Tehran due to censorship, enjoyed the material comforts of "an elegant apartment, teak furniture, and American magazines." And even as Foucault dismissed the notion that these airline workers were "privileged" strikers, he acknowledged that the pilots of Iran Air in particular could not "complain about their salaries." By contrast, Foucault noted that the oil workers he met from the home of "the biggest refinery in the world" in Abadan lived in conditions of "misery." What nevertheless united these workers from very different industries and social worlds for Foucault was a determination to demonstrate their solidarity with the Iranian people rather than succumb to the play of economic and political interests. The striking airline workers refused to allow comparatively high salaries to serve as an impediment to their participation in the strike and even rationalized the strike as a way of looking out for the "*safety*" (italics in the original) of the nation. Similarly, the oil workers in Abadan refused to allow repeated wage increases, bonuses, and even lunch vouchers to entice them to break the strike. Foucault reported that the work at the refinery that *did* take place during the strike was rationalized *solely* on grounds of meeting domestic consumption as opposed to foreign

demand.[80] In short, the Iranian strikers depicted by Foucault behaved much like members of the people so maligned by Abeille precisely in refusing to work and, consequently, suspending the pursuit of interests prescribed by economic expertise.

This irreducibility of the collective will of the people to the naturalness of population meant that the Iranians simply could *not* be governed in the manner envisioned by the Physiocrats, namely, through the exercise of political sovereignty indexed to economic expertise. To the contrary, the formation of an Iranian people bound together by a collective will put into question the very form of political sovereignty and concomitantly opened the space for *alternative* conducts.

As Foucault further specified the underpinnings of this collective will, however, he revealed something altogether troubling. He acknowledged that the collective will "can only be based on traditions, institutions that carry a charge of chauvinism, nationalism, [exclusion], which have a very powerful attraction for individuals" (translation modified).[81] In other words, "only" affirmations of identity based on the triad of "chauvinism, nationalism, [exclusion]" were powerful enough to provide Iranians with a sense of belonging necessary to forge a collective will with disruptive consequences for the figure of population and, more obviously, the regime of the Shah.

Yet, this strand of Foucault's argument simply did not sit easily with his hopes for the thoroughgoing transformation of Iranian society. If the collective will of the Iranian people drew energy from "chauvinism, nationalism, [exclusion]," how could it hold out the possibility of instantiating a radically different kind of society? Fanon confronted a similar problem in his own analyses of the anticolonial revolutions of his time. Like Foucault, he acknowledged a reactive or reactionary moment in these revolutions. Fanon even went so far as to write of "antiracist racism" as the reason that the colonized join the struggle against colonialism.[82] He regarded the existence of this "antiracist racism" as understandable, given that it had been nurtured by the dynamics arising from the Manichaean structures of colonial societies. But where Fanon differed sharply from Foucault was in cautioning that the reactive moment in the revolution needed to be dialectically overcome in order to maintain the momentum of the anticolonial struggles and, ultimately, establish a new humanity. Fanon even located the basis for this overcoming of "anti-racist racism" among the colonized in the organization and leadership offered by exiled nationalist party members to peasant masses in the countryside. Though afflicted with a bit of romanticism about the relations

between urban party militants and peasants, Fanon's argument at least pointed to a way of out of the reactive moment in anticolonial revolutions.

By contrast, Foucault did not have anything to say about how a new beginning might still emerge from the triad of "chauvinism, nationalism, [exclusion]" that subtended the collective will of the Iranian people. He thus vacillated on the whole question of whether this will actually marked a novel political beginning and his vacillation opened the space for the extrapolation of a variation on an all too familiar and unsavory opposition aptly described as the liberal-democratic blackmail by Slavoj Žižek[83]: *either* revolutionary movements resign themselves to being members of "population" *or* they aspire to another form of collective subjectivity *only* to end up with "chauvinism, nationalism, [exclusion]." Foucault no doubt wanted to preserve a sharp distinction between the political spirituality of the Iranian people and the theocracy established in its aftermath, declaring that "the spirituality of those who were going to their deaths has no similarity whatsoever with the bloody government of a fundamentalist clergy."[84] Yet, in view of his claim that the collective will of the Iranian people drew energy from "chauvinism, nationalism, [exclusion]," we may ask how he could have so emphatically maintained this dissociation. In sum, it seems that even as Foucault courageously discerned in the tumultuous events of the Iranian revolution a way out of population as a figure of a collective subject, he ultimately got caught up in intractable and dangerous contradictions.

Several implications flow from our analysis. To begin, we should approach the very concept of biopolitics with a great deal of caution, especially at a time when a whole gamut of thinkers from Giorgio Agamben to Michael Hardt and Negri invokes this concept, albeit in ways that may bear only a distant relationship to anything Foucault actually formulated about it.[85] As long as we use biopolitics without this scrutiny, we risk reproducing a concept of population in comparatively narrow terms as a mere object of regulations. Security, on the other hand, is shorn of this stark limitation. We may therefore be better served by adopting security in lieu of the well-worn concept of biopolitics or at least reframing biopolitics in terms of security. If we accept the broader perspective opened up by security, we are further reminded of the historically contingent and therefore malleable character of population as a collective subject-object. Herein lies the more general importance of Foucault's analyses of the Iranian revolution. Foucault offered an ultimately problematic reminder that population is far from the only figure of a collective subject available.

## Notes

1 Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality; With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault,* eds Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 5.
2 Antonio Negri, *The Porcelain Workshop: For a New Grammar of Politics* (Los Angeles: Sexmiotext(e), 2008), 31.
3 Michel Senellart, "Course Context," in *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, by Michel Foucault, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 370.
4 Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 181.
5 Ibid., 3, 8–9, 135.
6 Rosemarie Scullion, "Michel Foucault the Orientalist: On Revolutionary Iran and the 'Spirit of Islam'," *South Central Review* 12, no. 2 (1995): 16–40.
7 Fuyuki Kurasawa. "The Exotic Effect: Foucault and the Question of Cultural Alterity," *European Journal of Social Theory* 2, no. 2 (May 1999): 147–65.
8 Ian Almond, "'The Madness of Islam': Foucault's Occident and the Revolution in Iran," *Radical Philosophy* 128 (November/December 2004): 12–22.
9 James Bernauer, "An uncritical Foucault? Foucault and the Iranian Revolution," review of *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 32, no. 6 (September 2006): 781–6.
10 Bonnie Honig, "What Foucault Saw at the Revolution: on the Use and Abuse of Theology for Politics," review of *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, *Political Theory* 36, no. 2 (April 2008): 301–12.
11 Michel Foucault, "The Incorporation of the Hospital into Modern Technology," in *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, eds Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007a), 151.
12 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 190.
13 Ibid., 218–21.
14 Ibid., 281.
15 Ibid., 195–200.
16 Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975*, eds Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003a), 46.

17 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 198.
18 Michel Foucault, "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980c), 168.
19 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 213.
20 Foucault, "Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," 170.
21 Ibid., 171.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 172.
24 Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976*, eds Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003f), 246.
25 Ibid., 249.
26 Ibid., 246.
27 Michel Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–1974*, ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006b), 51.
28 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 246.
29 Ibid., 250.
30 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 55.
31 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 201–3, 217.
32 Michel Foucault, "The Meshes of Power," in Crampton and Elden, *Space, Knowledge and Power*, 161.
33 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990a), 145.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 25.
36 Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007c), 11.
37 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, 246, 249.
38 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 66.
39 Ibid., 30.
40 Ibid., 32–3.
41 Ibid., 35–40.
42 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 155–6.
43 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 70.
44 Ibid., 349.

45 Ibid., 71.
46 Ibid., 72.
47 Ibid., 73.
48 Ibid., 74.
49 Ibid., 349.
50 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 147.
51 For an analysis heavily inspired by this strand of argument, see Mark Neocleous, *Critique of Security* (Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 11–38. Like Foucault, Neocleous identifies techniques of security as the very heart of the liberal project. Unlike Foucault, Neocleous traces the prioritization of security back to John Locke's conception of prerogative and insists that this prioritization of security ultimately springs from fears about the insecurity of property.
52 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 48.
53 Ibid., 43–4.
54 For a more recent articulation of the distinction between people and population, see Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, trans. Steve Corcoran (New York: Verso, 2006), 49.
55 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 326.
56 For references to the theoretical shifts in his research, see Michel Foucault *The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990b), 6.
57 On the intensification of sovereign power through disciplines, see Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 80. On the intensification of juridico-legal and disciplinary mechanisms through security, see Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 7. On the intensification of the thematic of power in the late Foucault, Jeffrey T. Nealon, *Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications Since 1984* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
58 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 22n.
59 Ibid., 78.
60 Ibid., 185.
61 Ibid., 130.
62 Ibid., 140–1.
63 Ibid., 143.
64 Ibid., 143–5.
65 Afary and Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, 69.

66 "Plusiers personnalités regrettent 'le silence des autorités françaises'," *Le Monde*, February 4, 1976.
67 Michel Foucault, "Entretiens Trombadori – Foucault (s.l.n.d.)," December 1978, D 227: 2, TS, Fonds Foucault, Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.
68 Ibid., 2–3.
69 Michel Foucault, "Dialogue Between Michel Foucault and Baqir Parham," in *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, by Afary and Anderson, 184.
70 Ibid., 185.
71 Ibid., 185–6.
72 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 108.
73 Michel Foucault, "The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt," in *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, by Afary and Anderson, 222.
74 Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, 41–2.
75 Michel Foucault, "Iran: the Spirit of a World Without Spirit," in *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, by Afary and Anderson, 252–3.
76 Michel Foucault, "The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt," in *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, by Afary and Anderson, 221.
77 Foucault, "Iran," 255.
78 Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1965).
79 Foucault, "Iran," 256.
80 Michel Foucault, "The Revolt in Iran Spreads on Cassette Tapes," *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, by Afary and Anderson, 216–18.
81 Foucault, "Iran," 260; Michel Foucault, "L'esprit d'un monde sans esprit," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1958*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, vol. 2, *1976–1988* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001c), 754.
82 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 89.
83 Slavoj Žižek, *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce* (New York: Verso, 2009), 8.
84 Michel Foucault, "Is It Useless to Revolt?" in *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, by Afary and Anderson, 265.
85 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 57. Agamben strips biopolitics of its historical specificity in Foucault's analyses, tracing the concept all the way back to the exercise of sovereign power in antiquity. By contrast, Hardt and Negri identify biopower with control *over* life and biopolitics with the resistance *of*

life to this control. Strictly speaking, however, their treatment of biopolitics as a form of immanent resistance to biopower grates in no small way against Foucault's suggestion that biopolitics *belongs* to biopower. A more elaborate engagement with these deployments of biopolitics is beyond the scope of this analysis.

5

# Foucault, Poland, and *Parrhesia*

In the foregoing chapters, we delineated a dialectical interplay between Michel Foucault's political practices and his militancy in particular, on the one hand, and his developing analyses of power, on the other hand. According to a fairly commonplace reading, however, Foucault distanced himself from, if not jettisoned, the thematic of power with his turn to practices of the self and his exploration of these practices in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity in the 1980s. Eric Paras in *Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge* offers a lucid and sophisticated iteration of this reading owing to his extensive, if lopsided, use of Foucault's published and unpublished Collège de France courses as well as his attentiveness to the larger intellectual and political currents through which Foucault elaborated his analyses. As the subtitle of his book suggests, Paras contends that Foucault moved "beyond" power in the sense of ultimately, if implicitly, affirming the free individual subject *outside* of power relations and, consequently, eschewing power as one of his long-standing axes of research. Paras formulates his argument in clear and definitive terms. The late Foucault, he tells us, "*abandoned* his sharp focus on the societal functioning of power" (italics mine).[1] "Foucault," Paras clarifies in somewhat more qualified terms, "would continue to address questions of power and knowledge *but they had ceased to be the axis around which his work revolved*" (italics mine).[2] Paras submits that Foucault's affirmation of the free subject underpinning his abandonment of power arose from a confluence of developments at the end of the 1970s, including his exchanges with formerly Maoist and suddenly liberal *nouveaux philosophes*, his newfound interest in liberal and neoliberal governmentalities, and his engagement with the Iranian revolution. All of these developments had for Paras their common denominator in pushing Foucault toward an appreciation of the individual no longer as an effect of power relations but as a subject preexisting these relations. Politically, the upshot of these developments was, professes Paras, an eminently liberal Foucault who defended the individual, freedom, and rights.

This chapter challenges Paras's core claim that Foucault moved "beyond" power. It suggests that the dialectical interplay between Foucault's militant political practices and his analyses of power not only remained fully intact but also reached whole new heights during the 1980s, pushing his analyses of power in entirely new directions while provoking a set of reflections on practices of modern political militancy. Far from succumbing to political quietism after his last public statement on the Iranian revolution until his death in 1984, Foucault threw himself back into the kinds of militant political experiences that characterized his life at the outset of the 1970s. His major political engagement during this period was on behalf the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland. Foucault immersed himself in activities on behalf of Solidarity for a period of nearly a year from roughly late 1981 until late 1982. The catalyst for his sudden and strident support of Solidarity was the new French government's hands-off reaction to the coup d'état in Poland in 1981, which sought to crush Solidarity through the imposition of a regime of martial law.

This moment had repercussions for Foucault's theoretical trajectory. As we shall see in much greater detail, Foucault's critical response to the French government's position on the coup d'état in Poland anticipated, if not instigated, his subsequent study of *parrhesia* or courageous truth-telling in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity throughout the final years of his life. Foucault's stinging criticisms of the French government's position as well as the hostile response of the government to these criticisms even staged a parrhesiastic scene *before* his turn to *parrhesia*. Foucault's turn to *parrhesia*, for its part, robustly maintained, carried forward, and enriched his long-standing thematic of power. He explicitly framed his inquiry into *parrhesia* as an inquiry into power and its interplay in the relations between the subject and truth. Less explicitly, Foucault pushed the limits of his voluminous analyses of disciplinary power by exploring (rather than proposing) a *categorical* alternative to disciplinary life in Cynic *parrhesia* in particular. The Cynic appeared in his analyses of *parrhesia* as a militant figure entirely at odds with the disciplined subject. Foucault even projected conceptions of modern political militancy *back* onto Cynics just as he discerned inheritances of Cynic life *in* modern political militancy. He insisted that like Cynic life modern political militancy contains a form of life in manifest rupture with habits, social conventions, common opinions, rules, laws, and the like and thereby points to another life as a true life. His observations about the strong affinities between Cynicism and modern political militancy suggest not only that Foucault was going back to antiquity to address his present but also

that he was returning to antiquity to reflect more precisely on the very practice of militancy which had punctuated his own life. From a bird's eye viewpoint, Foucault's final experience of political militancy thus opened whole new and general theoretical vistas on modern political militancy.

The identification and elucidation of this dialectical interplay between Foucault's practical politics and theoretical reflections matters in the first instance because it fiercely undercuts the view that he moved "beyond" power during his final years. It discloses that, if anything, Foucault's militant political practices facilitated his move *toward* power with ever-greater intensity *and* that his accelerated move toward power yielded theoretical reflections on militant political practices during these years, albeit through what he playfully referred to as his "long Greco-Latin '*trip*'" (italics in the original).[3] The delineation of Foucault's movement toward power through militant political practices and toward analyses of militant political practices through power shows in its turn that he was *still* grappling, perhaps more intensely and aggressively than ever, with potential and real sources of resistance to the modes of conduct constituted through power relations. From this perspective, the concerns animating the "final Foucault" did not look so radically different from the concerns animating the Foucault of earlier years depicted in the preceding chapters.

One aspect of the argument in this chapter is not entirely without precedent. Michael Hardt also affirms that Foucault was exploring an alternative in Cynic *parrhesia*, albeit an alternative to "traditional modes of political thought and action" rather than disciplinary power per se.[4] Hardt construes this alternative through his peculiar and long-standing distinction between biopower as a control *over* life and biopolitics as the freedom *of* life. On the basis of this distinction, Hardt suggests that the Cynics expressed a biopolitical life of militancy *against* biopower.[5] But the *opposition* between biopower and biopolitics is absolutely nowhere to be found in Foucault's analyses, and the identification of Cynic life as a biopolitical life simply ends up depleting the concept of biopolitics of its historical specificity. Moreover, Hardt seems to approximate Paras's larger argument in his sweeping declaration that the final Foucault "*no longer*" focuses "on the functioning of power or its apparatuses of discipline and control, but rather explores political thought and action as a realm of freedom, oriented toward changing not only ourselves but also the world" (italics mine).[6]

Beyond these salient differences with Hardt's argument, this chapter goes into largely uncharted waters. The literature on Foucault's political activities

concerning Poland is shockingly sparse. Foucault's biographies contain rich and illuminating chapters devoted to his activities on behalf of Solidarity but there appears to be no sustained analysis of these activities outside of his biographies.[7] And Foucault's biographies certainly do not dwell on the theoretical implications of his political practices concerning Poland. More surprisingly, even interpreters of Foucault largely attuned to his manifold political engagements such as Paras and Hardt fail to even mention his stance on French foreign policy toward Poland and his general support for Solidarity. This silence is not without implications. It attests to (and reinforces) the strength of the general impression that Foucault entered a phase of political quietism after his last public statement on the Iranian revolution.

## Double bonds of *Parrhesia*

Foucault introduced *parrhesia* in his Collège course from the academic year 1981 to 1982, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, but it was only after his initial foray into *parrhesia* in this course that his analyses of the concept really took off, consuming the bulk of his research during the final years of his life. Foucault devoted his last two Collège courses, *The Government of Self and Others* and *The Courage of Truth* from 1982 to 1983 and 1983 to 1984, respectively, to *parrhesia* and its problematizations. In the interval between these courses, Foucault also delivered a series of lectures on the topic of *parrhesia* at the University of California at Berkeley. These lectures were posthumously published as *Fearless Speech*.

What follows is a synopsis of *parrhesia* based on Foucault's overviews of the concept in these analyses from his final years. The purpose of this synopsis is to enable us to detect the presence of a parrhesiastic moment *in* Foucault's political practices immediately *before* his turn to the concept of *parrhesia* in his Collège courses. Through an identification of this moment, we will be in a position look more deeply into Foucault's analyses of *parrhesia* and trace the rich dialectic between his political engagements and theoretical analyses throughout his final years.

Foucault offered a view of the usages and problematizations of *parrhesia* over the course of roughly a millennium, from its appearance in a political form in classical antiquity all the way up to its fragmentation in early Christianity. And he provided deeply stimulating commentaries on the manifold inheritances of

*parrhesia* long after this period and all the way up into his present. Within this sweeping historical framework, *parrhesia* appears as a concept accommodating positive and negative values.

*Parrhesia* in its positive sense is basically a form of courageous truth-telling. Foucault used the language of double "bonds" and the tense interplay between different "bonds" to elaborate the specificity of the conditions for this form of truth-telling. He insisted that *parrhesia* first of all entails a bond between the speaker and his spoken truth. This truth is spoken in its entirety, without any concealment, and, crucially, this truth also necessarily corresponds precisely to what the speaker actually *believes* is true.[8] For this reason, Foucault referred to *parrhesia* as the "affirmation of the affirmation" of truth.[9] He also insisted that in this regard *parrhesia* contrasts rather sharply with the art of rhetoric, which does *not* imply a bond between the truth spoken and the convictions of the speaker because its purpose is to equip the speaker to persuade his audience to believe what he says.[10] As Foucault noted, "rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his audience (*regardless* of the rhetorician's own opinion concerning what he says)" (italics in the original).[11]

But Foucault was quick to add that the bond between the speaker and his spoken truth or this element of frankness in speech hardly exhausts the positive sense of *parrhesia*. *Parrhesia* is set further apart from other modalities of truth-telling through the element of risk or through the opening up of risk to the speaker. The spoken truth in *parrhesia* may be unpleasant, irritating, and hurtful and, consequently, may not only expose the relationship between the speaker and his interlocutor to a breakdown, but it may also expose the speaker to violence and even death.[12] Foucault went so far as to consider this dimension of risk taking "absolutely unique" to the exercise of *parrhesia*.[13] He thus rendered *parrhesia* as a "bond" between the spoken truth and the convictions of the speaker that jeopardizes the "bond" between the speaker and his interlocutor. As Foucault put it, "*Parrhesia* therefore establishes a strong, necessary, and constitutive bond between the person speaking and what he says, but it exposes to risk the bond between the person speaking and the person to whom he speaks."[14] The manifest affirmation of the former "bond" endangers the latter "bond," thereby necessitating courage from the speaker *as well as* courage from the interlocutor. The courage of the speaker consists in uttering a truth that may even lead to his death and the courage of the interlocutor consists in "agreeing to hear the hurtful truth that he hears."[15]

This double courage forms what Foucault called the "parrhesiastic pact" in which a "parrhesiastic game" unfolds. In this game, the interlocutor accepts or rejects the truth expressed by the speaker with all of the attendant consequences. Rejection may lead to the punishment and death of the speaker and acceptance may lead to a process of reconciliation. But as there is no guarantee of an outcome in advance,[16] risk-taking *pervades* this entire game, meaning that even reconciliation arises "*only after*" opening up "an essential, fundamental, and structurally necessary moment of the possibility of hatred and rupture" (italics mine).[17] Foucault certainly addressed situations wherein the *interlocutor* offers noninstitutionalized guarantees of protection to the speaker to facilitate his truth-telling. He called such offers pacts as well as contracts. But even these pacts or contracts do not efface the element of risk-taking precisely because the guarantees of protection from the interlocutor remain nothing more than a moral obligation.[18]

The speaker engages in this risky and courageous truth-telling out of a care for others as well as a care for the self. Through his truth-telling, the speaker points out the faults of the interlocutor (or himself) and urges the interlocutor (or himself) to adopt a different way of thinking and acting. And this criticism is rooted for the speaker in a "duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself)."[19] *Parrhesia* is thus intimately bound up with care of the self and others.

In historical terms, Foucault contended that *parrhesia* in this very general and positive sense appeared for the first time in the ancient Greek literature, specifically in the plays of Euripides from the fifth-century BCE. In the very broad sweep of his analyses, Foucault traced several shifts in the usages of *parrhesia*: the shift from a political *parrhesia* addressed to the assembly or king to an ethical or Socratic *parrhesia* involving more interpersonal encounters followed by the shift from this ethical or Socratic *parrhesia* to a Cynic *parrhesia* distinguished by scandalous forms of life, and, finally, the shift from this Cynic *parrhesia* to a Christian *parrhesia* entailing an immediate, face-to-face relationship with God.

Foucault suggested that throughout the millennium-long period encapsulating all of these shifts *parrhesia* acquired the pejorative connotation of imprudent speech in addition to the positive connotation of courageous truth-telling. Critiques of Athenian democracy in the fourth-century BCE retained the positive sense of *parrhesia* but rendered it incompatible with democracy *and* introduced a pejorative sense of *parrhesia* as freedom of everyone and anyone to

say anything in a democracy to the detriment of the good of the city.[20] Christian ascetic texts of the first centuries CE engaged in a loosely similar move. They inflected their own positive version of *parrhesia* with a negative value to the point of inducing a "reversal" of the positive value of *parrhesia*.[21] *Parrhesia* in the positive sense of a trust or confidence in God began to appear increasingly suspect and arrogant owing to the increasing importance of obedience and structures of authority in the Christian experience.[22]

We can see from this mere overview that Foucault portrayed *parrhesia* as a practice with a long and dense history of inflections and reversals, crystallizing into a set of positive and negative valorizations. With this overview of his analyses of *parrhesia* before us we are now in a position to identify a parrhesiastic moment in Foucault's political practices.

## *Parrhesia* in practice: Foucault on Poland

Foucault is correctly regarded as having been somewhat less politically active or vocal in the year and a half following his last public statement on the Iranian revolution.[23] The tragedy of the revolution had no doubt disappointed him. But Foucault was *never* politically indifferent or disengaged during this period. He delivered a famous statement appealing to the rights of the governed at a United Nations congress on piracy in Geneva.[24] Foucault also greeted the victory of Socialist François Mitterrand in the presidential elections in May 1981 with a cautious optimism.[25] David Macey suggests that Foucault's tempered hopefulness was warranted by the actions of the Socialist government, which included the abolition of the death penalty, the closure of high security wings in prisons, and the elimination of the anti-wreckers' law.[26] Foucault's optimism, however, came to an abrupt end with General Wojciech Jaruzelski's coup d'état in Poland on 13 December 1981.[27] The coup introduced a regime of martial law to defeat the growing Solidarity trade union movement. The immediate reaction of the newly elected Socialist government to the coup d'état soured Foucault's relationship with the government beyond repair and served as the catalyst for his sudden return to what Didier Eribon aptly describes as his final period of "militant fervor."[28]

This reaction consisted in deeming the coup d'état in Poland an exclusively internal affair requiring noninterference.[29] Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson articulated this position on the radio channel *Europe I* on the very day of the coup

d'état. Foucault's response to Cheysson was swift and sharp. The morning after Cheysson's declaration Foucault received and accepted an invitation from the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to produce a statement critical of the government's handling of the coup d'état.[30]

Their coauthored statement appeared shortly thereafter under the heading "Missed Appointments," a reference to the lost opportunities of previous Socialist governments to pursue foreign policies more in keeping with their principles. "Missed Appointments" opened with the following declaration: "The French government must not, like Moscow and Washington, allow it to be believed that the establishment of a military dictatorship in Poland is an internal matter which will allow Poles to decide their destiny themselves." The statement went on challenge the notion of a national Polish army as an outright "lie," pointing out that the Polish national army is subservient to the Polish Communist Party, which itself serves as the conduit for the Soviet subjection of Poland. The statement also suggested that the position of the French government implied a privileging of its domestic alliances over assistance and, in particular, a privileging of relations with the French Communist Party over "the crushing of a labor movement under the boots of the military." The statement finished not by encouraging intervention but by urging the Socialist government to take a more principled stance than past Socialist governments faced with similar circumstances. In its words: "We remind the government that it promised that the obligations of international morality would prevail over *Realpolitik*."[31]

"Missed Appointments" garnered signatures from a wide range of luminaries, including the actor Yves Montand and the actress Simone Signoret. It also received extensive circulation in the media. *Libération* published it on December 16 and Montand read the statement on a program on *Europe I* the following day. *Libération* reprinted the statement the next day with new signatories.[32] *Le Monde* also published excerpts of it on December 18.[33]

Montand's reading of "Missed Appointments" on *Europe I* was followed by an interview in which Foucault challenged Cheysson's suggestion that the coup d'état in Poland amounted to an internal affair.

> It is inadmissible that a member of government comes to tell us now that the Polish affair is an internal affair. Who is the socialist, but I would say who is the European who would accept to say today that the Commune of Paris in 1871 was nothing but an internal French affair? I believe that for one century now

> we know that a worker put in prison for a strike, that a prohibited union, that an army that occupies a city are *never* an internal affair of a country. And we should let our government know that it is unacceptable that one of its own did or would say that.[34]

In Chapter 3, we saw that Foucault had problematically used the experience of the Commune to implicate socialist movements in racism. In the statement above, however, Foucault spoke of the experience of the Commune to remind the governing Socialist Party of the necessarily international dimension of the problem in Poland and, consequently, its obligation to take a more active stance. Moreover, Foucault left absolutely no room for ambiguity in the follow-up to his statement. When his interviewer observed that Foucault was obviously condemning Cheysson Foucault interjected with a taut affirmation. "Totally," he said.[35]

Given the publicity surrounding "Missed Appointments," the Socialist government found itself compelled to clarify and defend its position. What followed, however, was a harsh attack on the signatories of the statement. The First Secretary of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin, condemned the statement as "intellectually crazy."[36] The Minister of Culture Jack Lang referred to the "clowns" behind the statement and their "dishonesty" and even charged Foucault and Montand in particular with "bawling without thinking."[37]

Eribon and Macey stress that these attacks concealed a more nuanced position on the part of the Socialist government. The government had paid careful attention to the criticisms leveled against it in "Missed Appointments." The Elysée had even sent a courier to pick up a cassette recording of the interview with Montand and Foucault on *Europe 1*.[38] Moreover, as Macey points out, the Socialist government had taken a critical stance over the situation in Poland by protesting the coup d'état, providing relief aid to the Poles in the midst of martial law and cancelling a visit to Warsaw by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy.[39]

Foucault later acknowledged this more critical and active stance of the Socialist government up to a point, conceding that "France's position was the firmest with respect to what happened on December 13" among European states.[40] Even after the attacks, Foucault suggested that the problem for intellectuals was how they could "maintain" a "dialogue" and "begin work" with the new government rather than simply take orders from it or oppose it.[41] But the attacks from Jospin and Lang coupled with the initial declarations about the Polish coup d'état from Cheysson inflicted serious damage. In the aftermath of the attacks, Foucault

broke off relations with the government and even boasted privately of calling Lang an idiot during a meeting with him.[42] Publicly, Foucault struck a more solemn posture but he did not hide his anger toward the new government. Foucault deferred an invitation from *Libération* to offer an elaborate reply to Jospin on grounds that he had experienced too many difficulties expressing his "indignation" about matters concerning Poland in "the press and media."[43] And, in fact, an elaborate, direct response to Jospin never materialized.

Foucault's outrage over events in Poland and the response of the Socialist government to these events in particular compelled him to remain firmly involved in activities on behalf of Solidarity for much of the following year. He spearheaded an initiative to work with the French Democratic Confederation of Labor to support Solidarity. One outgrowth of this initiative was a campaign to display support for Solidarity through the sale of badges with the Solidarity logo. Foucault donned his badge "for months," according to Macey. Foucault also participated in the everyday activities of a Polish-led Solidarity committee in Paris.[44] His support for Solidarity culminated in his participation in a humanitarian caravan to Warsaw in September 1982. The convoy was organized by Doctors of the World and funded by the French government as well as the European Community.[45]

In some respects, the circumstances behind Foucault's propulsion back into the life of a political militant were quite different from his previous political engagements. Foucault was dealing with a popular movement and a coup d'état in a Soviet-dominated socialist country in Eastern Europe rather than a revolution in an American-dominated country in the Middle East or general political agitation in the confines of prisons mainly in France.

Nonetheless, there were strong affinities between Foucault's activities on behalf of Solidarity and his previous political engagements. First, as in the case of his involvement in the GIP, Foucault transformed himself into nothing short of a militant, exhibiting a high level of commitment to activities on behalf of Solidarity. In addition to his numerous public declarations on the situation in Poland, Foucault became heavily involved the daily activities of the Polish-led Solidarity committee in Paris. The head of the committee, Seweryn Blumsztajn, even expressed surprise at the intensity of Foucault's involvement, noting that he "devoted hours on end to helping with the most bureaucratic and repetitive tasks."[46] Second, as in the case of his work in the GIP, Foucault placed a premium on information gathering in response to conditions of silencing. He declared, "The first problem is one of information. The voice of Solidarity must not be

stifled."[47] Foucault considered this task all the more pressing precisely because he deemed the efforts of the military government to block information flowing out of Poland quite successful.[48] Third, as in his engagements with the prisoner support movement and the Iranian revolution, Foucault stressed the importance of actually gathering information in situ. Upon his return from Poland, he explained that he went there because "The Poles need us to talk about them and to go to them."[49] Fourth, Foucault used a vocabulary that echoed his vocabulary about French prisons. He described the political form in Poland and Eastern Europe as "utterly intolerable" and sought to heighten intolerance toward this form.[50] Fifth, as in the case of his engagement with the Iranian revolution and prison revolts in France, Foucault stressed collective activity as the basis for a new beginning. In his reading, Solidarity crystallized individual hatreds for the Soviet-dominated regime in a collective form, thereby presenting an opportunity for the "creation of something new and shared in common."[51] Finally, as in the case of his analyses of the Iranian revolution, Foucault emphasized the vast scale of oppositional activity to the government, which went well beyond the confines of Solidarity itself.[52] Owing to this scale, Foucault went so far as to declare that he had never seen "such a big disconnect between a government and its people" as in Poland.[53]

Beyond these affinities, however, Foucault's activities on behalf of Solidarity had a palpable theoretical import. The attacks and counter-attacks between Foucault and members of the Socialist government and Party over the coup d'état in Poland reflected a parrhesiastic scene that anticipated, if not facilitated, his sharp and sustained turn to *parrhesia* in the succeeding years. They disclosed, once again, the contours of the dialectical interplay between Foucault's political engagements and his analyses of power.

How exactly did Foucault's exchange with the Socialist government reflect a parrhesiastic scene? First of all, Foucault expressed a bond with the words he uttered about Poland, and the proof of this bond consisted not only in his own expressions of sincerity and affective orientation but also in his subsequent actions on behalf of Solidarity. Foucault was clearly not stating a truth about Poland *regardless* of his own views and therefore for purely rhetorical effect. He *believed* his views and committed himself to them through a whole series of statements and actions. Second, as indicated above, Foucault had a relationship with the Socialist government that was critically sympathetic. The government had introduced policies that Foucault considered largely favorable and he held out the prospect of working with the government. Foucault thus had a bond

with the government that served as the very condition of possibility for his parrhesiastic dialogue with it. Third, Foucault jeopardized this bond (rather than his physical well-being or life) through the expression of his own views about the direction of French foreign policy toward Poland. Foucault engaged in a form of truth-telling that involved a risk to his relationship with the government and therefore necessitated some modicum of courage. Finally, Foucault was willing to jeopardize this relationship to prevent the government from committing the same errors as its Socialist predecessors faced with similar circumstances of popular repression abroad. A care for the new government thus animated his stance.

It is also clear that Foucault and the government played the parrhesiastic game only up to a rather limited and premature point. As we saw, the government was not deaf to criticisms of its handling of the coup d'état in Poland. It took the critical statements of Foucault seriously enough to send a courier to pick up a recording of them on a radio program. In this sense, it agreed to play the parrhesiastic game. But prominent government and Socialist Party officials also served as poor interlocutors in this game staged by Foucault and others. "Missed Appointments" elicited attacks from these officials on the words and person of Foucault. And, unsurprisingly, these attacks provoked him to abruptly end his potentially productive relationship with the new government. *Parrhesia* in this instance led to rupture rather than introspection and reconciliation.

From the standpoint of Foucault's subsequent analyses, the timing of this parrhesiastic scene was rather telling. Indeed, it is as if his own implicitly parrhesiastic engagement with the French government provoked him to plunge headlong into a sustained set of reflections on *parrhesia* for the remaining years of his life. Within less than a month and a half after his exchange with the French government over its foreign policy toward Poland, Foucault broached *parrhesia*, introducing the concept in a broader discussion of the other as a mediator for practices of the self in late Greco-Roman antiquity.[54] His Collège course from the following year, *The Government of Self and Others*, was devoted entirely to *parrhesia* first in its political form in Euripides and Thucydides and then in its philosophical form and relationship to politics in Plato and Socrates as well as in modern philosophy, especially in Immanuel Kant. This course seemed to contain numerous traces, if not inflections and offshoots, of Foucault's political engagement over Poland. He found the time in the middle of a rather dense and lengthy analysis of *parrhesia* in Euripides's *Ion* to recall to "the time of the

events in Poland" during the previous year and invite his auditors to attend a lecture by a Polish professor on Polish nationalism.[55] More generally, some of the key theoretical developments in Foucault's analysis of *parrhesia* seemed to grow out of his experiences of *parrhesia* with the French government. Only a little more than a year after the attacks spurred by his parrhesiastic statements, Foucault theorized the paradoxical relations between democracy and *parrhesia*, suggesting that if democracy facilitates *parrhesia* through the equality of speech, it also threatens *parrhesia* by allowing for demagogic flattery.[56] Against the backdrop of his vexed relationship with the French government, Foucault also dwelled at great length on the relationship between philosophical activity and political power, construing it through a unique reading of Plato's *Letters*. He suggested that this relationship consists of a coincidence in the mode of being of the philosophizing subject and the practicing political subject rather than of a subordination of political power to the imperatives of a philosophical knowledge. In other words, the task of philosophy that Foucault gleaned from Plato's *Letters* was to identify what the politician must *be* in order to engage in a government of others rather than to tell politics what it must *do*.[57]

If Foucault's sustained turn to *parrhesia* seemed to contain all of these theoretical effects stimulated from his experiences of political militancy concerning Poland, his turn to *parrhesia* culminated in *The Courage of Truth* in a deep exploration of one particular form of *parrhesia* that pertained in no small way to modern political militancy and offered a very strong counterpoint to disciplinary power. Let us turn to that form of *parrhesia* through a critique of Paras's argument.

## Provocations of the militant lives of Cynics

As a crucial part of his larger interpretive enterprise concerning Foucault's move "beyond" power, Paras claims specifically that from 1979 onward Foucault "*turned away* from modern forms of power and discourse in order to focus on religious and ethical practices in the ancient world" (italics mine).[58] He asserts that this change in thematic focus was even bound up with a change in Foucault's manner of presentation. A "mood of placidity" suddenly "pervaded" his Collège courses.[59] Foucault mellowed out, as it were.

The problems with this reading are manifold. We should therefore consider them one at a time. It is certainly not difficult to find straightforward textual

evidence to dispel Paras's overarching claim that Foucault abandoned power as an axis of research in the 1980s. In fact, Foucault said exactly *the opposite* in his opening remarks to *The Courage of Truth*, a course that goes *entirely* unmentioned in Paras's book. Foucault told his auditors that through his study of *parrhesia* he "*drew a bit closer* to a theme which, after all, has *always* been present in my analysis of the relations between the subject and truth: that of relations of power and their role in the interplay between the subject and truth" (italics mine). Lest there be any misunderstanding, Foucault declared that "Connecting together modes of veridiction, techniques of governmentality, and practices of the self is basically what I have *always* been trying to do" (italics mine).[60]

Even apart from any consideration of these telling methodological proclamations, it is quite clear that the concept of *parrhesia* made absolutely no sense to Foucault *without* a reference to power understood as government in the general sense of conduct over conduct. The whole point of this form of risky and therefore courageous truth-telling was precisely to constitute *another* conduct on the part of the interlocutor. As Foucault pointed out, *parrhesia* consists in "the courage of telling the truth to others *in order to conduct them in their own conduct*" (italics mine).[61] *Parrhesia* thus necessarily intertwined with power relations and drew its impetus from them.

Of course, in a rather narrow and strictly literal sense, Paras's far more specific claim that Foucault "turned away" from "modern forms of power" *is* true. Foucault did not devote his Collège courses during his final years to an elaboration of modern forms of power that had so preoccupied him during the 1970s. One can find only one passing mention of disciplinary power in *The Government of Self and Others*,[62] and there is simply no mention of this technique of power in *The Courage of Truth*.

But a close examination of the contents of these courses suggests that neither Paras's claim that Foucault turned away from modern forms of power nor his accompanying claim about the placidity of Foucault's presentation are sustainable. Far from simply turning away from modern forms of power, Foucault explored a categorical alternative to disciplinary power through his account of Cynic *parrhesia* in particular. Moreover, this account was hardly placid. Foucault conjured up bellicose images, depicting Diogenes, Crates, and other Cynics as militant figures provoking nothing short of warfare from others through their utterly scandalous modes of life.[63] And he identified the resonances of Cynic

*parrhesia* in the militant practices of his present. Let us look carefully at his account of this form of *parrhesia*.

Foucault distinguished Cynic *parrhesia* as a manifestation of truth through a *form of life* rather than simply through speech or even speech in harmony with life, as in Socratic *parrhesia*. He explained, "Cynicism makes life, existence, *bios*, what could be called an alethurgy, a manifestation of truth."[64] Accordingly, it is not only truth-telling that endangers one in the practice of Cynic *parrhesia* but also a *form of existence* that manifests truth. "One risks one's life," Foucault said of the Cynic, "not just by telling the truth and in order to tell it, *but by the very way in which one lives*" (italics mine).[65]

Cynicism rendered life a bearer of truth through peculiar and highly recognizable modes of bodily and material comportment. The stereotypical Cynic was, as Foucault recalled, a roaming beggar living on the very margins of society.[66] He described the Cynic as "the man with the staff, the beggar's pouch, the cloak, the man in sandals or bare feet, the man with the long beard, the dirty man."[67] These physical and material attributes of the Cynic were not haphazard or inconsequential, according to Foucault. They performed the very precise function of revealing that a life stripped of attachments and social conventions, a life of material and physical bareness amounts to an independent life and, consequently, what life "ought to be," or, quite simply, *the* true life.[68]

Echoes of Foucault's elaboration of modern techniques of power reverberated in his overviews of *parrhesia*. Foucault, for instance, characterized *parrhesia* as a preference for a "risk of death" over "life and security."[69] If "security" is taken in his precise and technical sense of a technique of power correlative to liberal governmentality, it is tempting to suggest that Foucault gestured toward an antagonism between *parrhesia* and liberal governmentality. But we can detect a number of other features even in his preliminary sketch of Cynic life that place it in stark, if not diametrical, opposition to disciplinary life in particular. First, Foucault portrayed the Cynic as a figure in perpetual movement to the point of eluding spatial or institutional capture. The Cynic was, as he told his auditors, "the man who roams, who is not integrated into society, has no household, family, hearth, or country" and, consequently, the man who lives in the open.[70] By contrast, disciplinary life arises from some form of spatial enclosure. The disciplined subject is not only enclosed within an institutional space that serves as a preliminary condition for the production of disciplinary behavior but this space is also subdivided and correlated to functional imperatives and rank, as

we saw in Chapter 2. Movement takes place within enclosed space rather than in the open, and this movement is itself subdivided and controlled right down to the finest gesture.

Second, Foucault depicted the body of the figure of the Cynic as bare in the sense of impoverished as well as naked. Using a term popularized by Giorgio Agamben in recent years, Foucault elsewhere in the same analysis even spoke of Cynics as bearers of "bare life" and stressed that they actively and aggressively aspired to ever-greater degrees of bareness to demonstrate their independence.[71] By contrast, the disciplined body is a locus of ever-greater degrees of *utility*. It is not a bare body so much as a *productive* body.

Finally, Foucault introduced Cynicism as a form of truth-telling that "pushes courage and boldness to the point that it becomes intolerable insolence."[72] He went on in other parts of his analysis to describe insolence itself as a crucial feature of Cynic life, reflected vividly in the bold assertion by the Cynic that *he* is king.[73] Quite obviously, disciplinary life stands in *total* contrast to this aspect of Cynic life by endeavoring to produce and reproduce a docile, obedient subject.

We can glean other sharp, categorical differences between Cynic life and disciplinary life in Foucault's lively elaboration of the Cynic "transvaluation" or "alteration" of the traditional principles of the true life in philosophy. He identified these traditional principles as the unconcealed, the unalloyed, the straight, and the sovereign. Unconcealed life referred to a life that hides nothing because there is nothing shameful about it.[74] Unalloyed life designated a life without mixture or dependence.[75] Straight life was a life conformable to nature and human laws.[76] Sovereign life specified a mastery over oneself that ensured the enjoyment of the self and enabled one to assist others.[77]

The novelty of Cynicism resided for Foucault in a fifth principle of true life in philosophy. He deemed this principle absolutely unique to the Cynics. It consisted in the motto "change the value of the currency," which was Apollo's advice to Diogenes at Delphi.[78] Foucault dwelled on this motto at some length, playing on the etymological affinities between currency (*nomisma*) and law (*nomos*) to suggest that the motto "change the value of the currency" was widely understood as an injunction to break up "rules, habits, conventions, and laws."[79] He also stressed that the motto "change the value of the currency" did not amount to an injunction to devalue a coin so much as erase its effigy and replace it with another effigy so that its *true* value circulates.[80] The composite sense of the Cynic motto thus translated as applying the traditional philosophical principles of the true life to life itself rather than just logos but in so doing rendering these principles

altogether scandalous and, consequently, revealing *the* true philosophical life as a radically *other* life.[81]

Foucault discussed how exactly the Cynics effected this alteration in each principle of the true life. The Cynics, he pointed out, accepted the theme of the unconcealed life but interpreted it in an everyday, material sense. To be unconcealed for the Cynics meant, Foucault stressed, subjection to the greatest possible public gaze. What rendered this interpretation of the unconcealed life altogether scandalous was the Cynic view that since nature itself is not evil all acts in accordance with nature should be unconcealed. For the Cynics, these acts included eating, masturbating, and sex, all of which they performed in full public view *against* social convention. The radicalization of the principle of the unconcealed life into a shameless, brazen life thus showed that this principle actually harbored a code of propriety.[82]

Similarly, as Foucault elaborated, the Cynics dramatized the principle of the unalloyed life through a "real, active and indefinite" poverty rather than merely an attitude of virtual detachment toward wealth common among philosophers in antiquity.[83] Cynic poverty was a material deprivation involving a voluntary stripping of possessions. It was also active in the sense of serving to elaborate the self. As Foucault explained, "Cynic poverty must be an operation one carries out on oneself in order to obtain positive results of courage, resistance, and endurance."[84] Finally, Cynic poverty was indefinite in the sense of striving for *ever-greater* states of deprivation.[85] But this radicalization of the unalloyed life in the form of Cynic poverty led to the opposite of the unalloyed life, namely, dependence and humiliation. The Cynics *positively* accepted begging, slavery, and dishonor, all of which were considered ignominious conditions by the ancient Greeks and Romans. These situations were sought after because they offered tests of endurance.[86] Humiliation wrought by dishonor, for instance, "trained the Cynic in resistance to everything to do with opinions, beliefs, and conventions."[87]

Foucault also demonstrated how the Cynics performed a similar reversal with regard to the principle of the straight life understood as a life in accordance with nature. The Cynics not only accepted this principle but also applied it so radically that they transformed it into a life of animality. As Foucault noted, "No convention, no human prescription may be accepted in the Cynic life if it does not conform exactly to what is found in nature and in nature alone." This reasoning led the Cynics, as Foucault pointed out, to reject marriage, the family, taboos on food consumption, and even the ban on incest.[88] In marked contrast

to social convention, Cynics even gave an entirely positive value to animality, seeing it as an opportunity to discard superfluities in human life and thereby elide a condition of inferiority to animals. But, like Cynic poverty, animality implied a work of the self on the self through exercise and tests of endurance.[89]

Turning finally to the principle of sovereign life, Foucault emphasized that the Cynics accepted this principle but pushed it to such extremes that it transformed into its opposite, namely, what he called a "militant life" understood as a combative relationship to oneself and others as well as for oneself and others. The Cynic embraced the principle of the sovereign life through his "utterly insolent assertion" that he is king and that, consequently, real monarchs are simply false monarchs.[90] Foucault dwelled on Dio Chrysostom's account of the most likely mythical encounter between Diogenes and Alexander to illustrate the Cynic assertion of kingship. He showed that Diogenes asserted himself as the true king on the basis of a combination of independence and intrinsic qualities altogether lacking in Alexander.[91] But Foucault added that Cynic kingship remained hidden owing to the Cynic condition of destitution as well as the Cynic work of the self on the self, which, in the case of Diogenes, involved rolling in the burning sand during the summer and rolling in the snow during the winter.[92] What is more, the Cynics for Foucault accepted service to others in the principle of sovereign life but they practiced it in a warlike form rather than in the forms of an exemplary life or advice to others.[93] The Cynics attacked not only the vices of individuals but also the vices of humanity, and they construed these vices precisely in terms of "customs, conventions, institutions, laws, and a whole condition of humanity."[94] Notably for Foucault, the purpose of these attacks was not to so much to "train and teach" others so much as to "shake them up and convert them, abruptly."[95] The Cynics thus induced a thoroughgoing reversal of the principle of the sovereign life, rendering it as a "militant life, the life of battle and struggle against and for self, against and for others."[96]

How exactly are the Cynic themes of the shameless life, destitute life, animal life, and militant life in stark, if not diametrical, opposition to disciplinary life? Let us look at each of these themes one turn at a time. Like disciplinary life, shameless life refers quite explicitly to a gaze but this gaze takes place in the open rather than in closed institutional spaces, and its purpose is not to normalize behavior but to scandalize society through the most visible subversion of convention. Like disciplinary life, destitute life encompasses a whole self-subjection of the body. However, the point of this self-subjection through poverty, begging, slavery, and humiliation is to foster an indifference to common opinions and thereby realize

self-mastery rather than yield effects of docility and utility. If disciplinary life shares anything in common with animal life, it is, perhaps, an abandonment of the superfluities in human existence. But, quite obviously, animal life seeks to discard these superfluities in order to become more animal-like rather than render the human more machine-like, as in the exercise of disciplinary power. Finally, militant life stands in marked contrast to disciplinary life. The former is about combative relations with oneself and others, whereas the latter is about the constitution of a docile subject.

The point of teasing out all of these striking oppositions is not to suggest that Foucault went so far as to glorify Cynic life as the long-lost solution to the problems posed by disciplinary power in our present. In fact, Foucault balked at the suggestion that Greek antiquity in general offered *any* kind of solution to contemporary problems, observing in a famous interview conducted with Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus in April 1983 that "you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people."[97] In the same interview, Foucault bluntly described "the Greek ethics of pleasure" with its links to "a virile society, to dissymmetry, exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of being dispossessed of your own energy" as "quite disgusting."[98] Moreover, during roughly this same period, he brought this point about the intensely hierarchical character of ancient Greek society to bear on *parrhesia* in particular, clarifying to his American audiences that although *parrhesia* presupposed a position of inferiority by the speaker, it was not generally available to women and others occupying the lower rungs of ancient Greek society.[99]

At the same time, it would be a gross error to suggest that Foucault's analyses of Cynic life had no bearing on his present or lessons for his present. Quite the contrary, as Hardt correctly suggests, Foucault spoke precisely to contemporary problems through an exploration of *parrhesia* in general.[100] Indeed, Foucault framed his whole inquiry into *parrhesia* during the last 2 years of his life through Kant's exploration of what distinguishes the present and he construed modern philosophy as a return to the themes and problems of *parrhesia*.[101] At certain junctures, Foucault even brought the experience of political *parrhesia* in classical antiquity to bear on his present by encouraging his auditors to consider contemporary democracy, for instance, from the standpoint of its paradoxical relationship with *parrhesia* rather than simply "in terms of the distribution of power, of the autonomy of each in the exercise of power, in terms of transparency and opacity, and of the relation between civil society and the State."[102]

In keeping with this concern for the present, Foucault opened *The Courage of Truth* with the declaration that he sought to "return" to "contemporary problems" through his "Greco-Latin '*trip*'" (italics in the original).[103] In truth, however, Foucault did not wait to get back to these problems. The present was bursting through the seams of his rich journey into Greco-Roman antiquity, perhaps above all in his reading of Cynic *parrhesia*. Foucault spoke rather uncharacteristically of a "trans-historical Cynicism,"[104] and of "the *permanent* existence across *all* European culture of something which may appear as Cynicism itself" (italics mine).[105] He went on to broach Cynic *parrhesia* from the perspective of its multiple inheritances in the modern and contemporary world.

Most notably for our purposes, Foucault identified one inheritance as "militantism" understood as a form of life devoted to revolutionary activity (the other inheritance is modern art). Foucault discerned three forms of militantism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: secret societies, organizations in the forms of parties and unions and, finally, styles of existence. Styles of existence in particular inherited elements of the Cynic experience in so far as they entailed manifest ruptures with the "conventions, habits, and values of a society" that revealed "the concrete possibility and the evident value of an *other* life, which is true life."[106] Through a highly schematic exposition, Foucault insisted that the styles of existence that dominated nineteenth-century anarchism, nihilism, and terrorism also remained central to twentieth-century leftist movements. Speaking grandiosely, he observed:

> The resurgence of leftism as a permanent tendency within European revolutionary thought and projects has always taken place *not by basing itself on the organizational dimension*, but on the dimension of militantism comprising secret sociality or style of life, and sometimes the paradox of a secret sociality which manifests itself and makes itself visible in scandalous forms of life (italics mine).[107]

This dismissal of the import of organization for leftism is somewhat problematic. Foucault here seemed to have difficulties conceptualizing organization *outside* of the spheres of the party and trade union, as if the latter were the *only* forms of organization available for leftism. These difficulties are especially surprising in light of his own rich political experiences *outside* of the party and trade union. Contra Foucault, it may therefore help to recall Alain Badiou's general observation that a "politics without party" does not "mean 'unorganized politics'" and his contention that "all politics is collective, and so organized one way or another."[108]

Be that as it may, Foucault embellished his analysis, adding that even communist and socialist parties testify in an inverted way to the significance of styles of existence in so far as they encourage, if not enjoin, members to conform to perfectly conventional behavior.[109]

Foucault's observations about the inheritances of Cynic life in modern political militancy are no doubt frustratingly schematic. Foucault did *not* offer a lot of terribly elaborate insights about what exactly we should take from the Cynics for understanding our present before his death only two months after the delivery of *The Courage of Truth*. We are thus left in the unfortunate position of only being able to speculate about how he might have mobilized his reading of the Cynics in his explicitly projected return to analyses of modern and contemporary problems.

This chapter provides one way in which we can bring Foucault's presentation of the Cynics to bear on techniques of power in our present. It suggests that Cynic life implicitly stands in *diametrical* opposition to disciplinary life. The point of teasing out the sharp opposition between Cynic life and disciplinary life is not only to get us to more readily recognize and reflect on the limits of our own disciplinary subjectivity, and thereby render it strange, but also to suggest that the resources for subverting this subjectivity reside *within* our very present, thanks in part to the persistent Cynic elements in modern political militancy. The Foucault who re-embraced a life of political militancy in response to the French government's mishandling of the coup d'état in Poland ended up pointing toward political militancy as a resource for resistance to techniques of power in our present. Throughout this dialectical movement, there was an unrelenting and strident move further *toward* rather than "beyond" power, and this movement shows the extent to which questions of power and resistance continued to weigh heavily for the "final Foucault."

## Notes

1 Eric Paras, *Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge* (New York: Other Press, 2006), 101.

2 Ibid., 114.

3 Michel Foucault, *The Courage of Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984*, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 2.

4 Michael Hardt, "Militant Life," review of *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, Cours au Collège de France, 1982–1983* and *Le courage de la vérité: Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II, Cours au Collège de France, 1983–1984*, by Michel Foucault, *New Left Review* 64, (July/August 2010): 151.
5 Ibid., 159.
6 Ibid., 160.
7 Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 296–308; David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 436–56.
8 Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983*, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 64–7; Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 8–9.
9 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 64.
10 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 13.
11 Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), 12.
12 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 63; Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, 16–17; Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 11–13, 24–5.
13 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 65.
14 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 13.
15 Ibid.
16 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 62.
17 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 25.
18 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 162–3, 203; Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, 32–3.
19 Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, 19.
20 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 36.
21 Ibid., 336.
22 Ibid., 333–4.
23 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 291, 297.
24 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 437–8. Mark Duffield uses this statement to appeal to a solidarity of the governed against the politics of containing non-insured surplus life in *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007), 232–4.
25 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 436–7.
26 Ibid., 437.
27 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 297.
28 Ibid., 305.
29 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 439.
30 Ibid; Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 297–8.

31 Claude Mauriac, *Le Temps immobile 9. Mauriac et fils*, (Paris: Grasset, 1986), 355, quoted in Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 440.
32 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 299.
33 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 339–40.
34 Michel Foucault, "Émission radiophonique sur la situation en Pologne," 16 December 1981, C 154, Audio Cassette, Fonds Foucault, Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.
35 Ibid.
36 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 441.
37 *Le Matin*, December 21, 1981, quoted in Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 441.
38 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 301; Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 440.
39 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 441.
40 Michel Foucault, "The Moral and Social Experience of the Poles Can No Longer Be Obliterated," in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 3, *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 2000b), 468.
41 Michel Foucault, "Le premier pas de la colonisation de l'Occident," in *Dits et écrits: 1954–1988*, eds Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, vol. 2, *1976–1988* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001e), 1086.
42 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 301–2.
43 Michel Foucault, "Les réponses de Pierre Vidal-Naquet et de Michel Foucault," in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Defert and Ewald, vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 1029.
44 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 444.
45 Ibid., 446; Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 303–4.
46 Seweryn Blumsztajn in *Michel Foucault, une histoire de la vérité*, ed. Confédération Française des Travailleurs Démocratique (CFDT) (Paris: Syros, 1985), 98, quoted in Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 303.
47 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 303.
48 Foucault, "Premier pas," 1085.
49 Michel Foucault, "'En abandonnant les Polonais, nous renonçons à une part de nous-mêmes,'" in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, eds Defert and Ewald, vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 1160.
50 Foucault, "Moral and Social Experience of the Poles Can No Longer Be Obliterated," 469.
51 Ibid., 468.
52 Foucault, "Premier pas," 1080.
53 Foucault, "'En abandonnant les Polonais," 1162.
54 Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982*, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005b), 137.

55 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 93n.
56 Ibid., 181–4.
57 Ibid., 295.
58 Paras, *Foucault 2.0*, 12.
59 Ibid., 13.
60 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 8.
61 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 346.
62 Ibid., 4.
63 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 233, 279, 299.
64 Ibid., 172.
65 Ibid., 234.
66 Ibid., 170, 201.
67 Ibid., 170.
68 Ibid., 171.
69 Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, 20.
70 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 170.
71 Ibid., 260, 297.
72 Ibid., 165.
73 Ibid., 274–5.
74 Ibid., 251–3.
75 Ibid., 255–6.
76 Ibid., 262–3.
77 Ibid., 270–3.
78 Ibid., 226.
79 Ibid., 242.
80 Ibid., 227.
81 Ibid., 227, 244.
82 Ibid., 253–5.
83 Ibid., 257.
84 Ibid., 258.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 259–61.
87 Ibid., 261.
88 Ibid., 263.
89 Ibid., 265.
90 Ibid., 274–5.
91 Ibid., 275–8.
92 Ibid., 278.
93 Ibid., 279.
94 Ibid., 280.

95 Ibid., 284.
96 Ibid., 283.
97 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress," in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 1, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press, 1997b), 256.
98 Ibid., 258.
99 Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, 12n, 18. Foucault dealt at great length with one rather glaring exception to this exclusion of women from *parrhesia* in Greek antiquity. He construed Creusa's imprecation to Apollo in Euripides's *Ion* as a form of *parrhesia* that helped found Ion's long sought right to *parrhesia*. Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 135.
100 Hardt, "Militant Life," 151, 153, 155.
101 Foucault, *Government of Self and Others*, 7–39, 350.
102 Ibid., 184.
103 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 2.
104 Ibid., 174.
105 Ibid., 180.
106 Ibid., 184.
107 Ibid., 185.
108 Alain Badiou, "Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou," in *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward (New York: Verso, 2001b), 95–6.
109 Foucault, *Courage of Truth*, 185–6.

# 6

# Conclusion

The preceding chapters have provided an account of Michel Foucault's famous analyses of power that is highly attentive to the historical and political contexts in which these analyses appeared and developed. The chapters have suggested that there is much to be gained by exploring the details of the relationship between Foucault's major political engagements and the overall development of his thinking about power. They have even gone so far as to suggest that one simply *cannot* obtain an adequate or comprehensive enough understanding of the latter *without* addressing, if not carefully probing, the former. Foucault's political engagements pushed his thinking about power in ways that are hard to see, much less appreciate, from a purely theoretical lens. A broad and detailed consideration of Foucault's political practices and their dialectical interplay with his analyses of power, on the other hand, has enabled us to examine his thinking about power as well as his political engagements in an illuminating and productive way.

In identifying a *dialectical* interplay between Foucault's political practices and analyses of power, this study has not at all entertained the view that Foucault understood *his* political practices and reflections on power in dialectical terms or, more grandiosely, affirmed a dialectical approach to theory and practice in a strong and elaborate sense. No matter how much Foucault journeyed with Maoists in the early 1970s, a dialectical appreciation of theory and practice does not seem to have rubbed off on him in any obvious, long-lasting, or substantive way. But Foucault's political experiences and practices invariably informed, stimulated, and structured his thinking about power and his reflections on power invariably carried over into his political practices, even if they were not "applied" in any strict or rigid sense. The reference to a dialectical interplay between Foucault's political practices and his reflections on power therefore has been eminently appropriate. It has captured the dynamic and immanent movement between Foucault's political engagements and analyses of power.

What specifically have we obtained from a consideration of the dialectical interplay between Foucault's political engagements and reflections on power? We have understood the extent to which Foucault's political engagements simply mattered in shaping the long trajectory of his thinking about power. Obtaining this understanding is in itself a modest but important step forward for research on Foucault. The absence of a sustained study of the relationship between Foucault's major political engagements and thinking about power may speak to doubts about whether these engagements even mattered for his analyses of power in the first place. Foucault's theoretical presentations also lend themselves to these doubts, as indicated back in the introduction. He rarely even alluded to his political engagements in his books and courses, and his few allusions to these engagements were rather vague, even if they were emphatically worded. The foregoing chapters have demonstrated that Foucault's political engagements nonetheless configured the fine and gross details of his thinking about power even (and perhaps especially) when they appeared to not matter much at all in his theoretical presentations. Foucault's silence about his political engagements in these contexts reflected the oblique but stimulating presence of the effects of his political engagements rather than their pure and simple absence.

By focusing so extensively on Foucault's major political episodes as well as on some minor ones for the period of roughly a decade, this study has offered a more complete understanding of the continuities and discontinuities in his political practices. In the preceding chapter in particular, we were able to finally pinpoint some underlying continuities in Foucault's political practices. Strikingly, in spite of the obvious differences between agitating on behalf of prisoners in France, reporting enthusiastically on a revolution in Iran and agitating on behalf of a popular movement in Poland, Foucault stressed the importance of gathering information in situ and collective activity as the basis for a new beginning in *all* of these contexts.

By teasing out the political and militant underpinnings of Foucault's engagement with the question of power, this study has also provided us with a more refined and discriminate understanding of the continuities and discontinuities in his reflections on power for a period of well over a decade. Foucault's political practices not only stimulated his account of disciplinary power but also fed into and reinforced his embrace of a bellicose understanding of power relations, which did not simply dissipate with his subsequent articulation of governmentality. Foucault's analyses of the Iranian revolution highlighted his preceding shift toward a concept of population as a subject-object of techniques

of security and articulation of an opposition between population in this sense and the collective figure of the people. Finally, Foucault's political militancy over the situation in Poland provoked him to enrich his thematic of power in the form of an inquiry into *parrhesia*.

In identifying these political and theoretical continuities and discontinuities, we have been able to read Foucault in a new way that gets away from all kinds of deeply entrenched critiques, interpretations, and general impressions of him. We have seen that far from marking yet another contribution to "dystopian" narratives about modernity Foucault's masterpiece *Discipline and Punish* was thoroughly suffused with the dynamics of mass and collective resistance to disciplinary power. We have seen that far from abandoning power in favor of ethics, Foucault went so far as to enrich the thematic of power toward the end of his life. Similarly, we have seen that far from expressing an enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution on the basis of a privileging of tradition over modernity, Foucault's enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution was rooted in the far more specific conceptual opposition between the collective figures of the people and population correlative to his turn to biopolitics and governmentality in the late 1970s.

Perhaps most significantly, however, the emphasis in the preceding chapters on the dialectical relationship between Foucault's political practices and his reflections on power enables us to respond to a charge shared by Foucault's critics as well as some of his most sympathetic interpreters. Generally stated, this is the long-standing charge that while Foucault provides an incisive analysis of contemporary techniques of power he falls short of offering coordinates, normative or otherwise, for resisting these techniques and envisioning a form of life beyond them. Julian Reid in his masterful *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror* subtly articulates a version of this charge against the backdrop of an inquiry into what life is and what it may become in the context of the war on terror unleashed in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. Reid submits that while Foucault offers an acute analysis of the disciplinary subjugation of bodies and the biopolitical subjugation of populations in liberal societies, he does not go nearly far enough in providing us with the tools to answer the question of what life may still become *beyond* these forms of subjugation.[1] In his words:

> The question of how life can escape its disqualification from the biopolitical body is, however, a very difficult question to answer for Foucault. The depictions

> of the sordid logistical life of docile bodies and the tawdry biopolitical life of populations to be found in Foucault's works would suggest that there is an alternative integrity to life different to the degraded and cheapened forms it is subject to when it enters into power relations. But Foucault's strategy of suggestion helps us little in fleshing out the actuality of its distinctions from a life subject to power; nor do they explain for us the specificities of the ways in which life comes to resist the limitations imposed upon it by liberal regimes of power. The question of why life comes to resist the logistical strategies of liberal regimes in ways that it does, how it articulates and defines its desires and interests against those regimes in the terms that it does, is something which Foucault's discussion of life does little to resolve.[2]

In light of this criticism, it is perhaps unsurprising that Reid repeatedly refers to a "dystopian" quality in Foucault's narrative about modernity.[3] Owing to the sharp limitations of this narrative, Reid finds himself compelled to critically engage a heterogeneous group of theorists inspired by Foucault in search of the tools for an answer to the question of what life may become beyond its disciplinary and biopolitical subjugation. He engages Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's conception of nomadic life, Jean Baudrillard's notion of terror as a defiant life, Paul Virilio's articulation of circulatory life and, lastly, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's account of the biopolitical life of the multitude. Reid discerns in the all of these diverse thinkers a "counter-ontology of strategy and war" that seeks to mobilize "a war conducted not simply in defense of an alternative account of life, but a war which embodies that alternative account of what life is."[4]

The problem for Reid is that in suborning life to war this "counter-ontology" runs its own risk of regimenting life in a manner insufficiently dissimilar from the subjugation of life in liberal societies. As Reid explains, "In attempting to valorize the temporality of war as a precondition for the salvation of life from its subjection to the biopolitical imperium, Foucauldian thought runs the risk of subjecting life to that same slavish imperium of biopolitics."[5]

Reid thus takes us to an impasse in trying to answer the question of what life may still become. This impasse leads him, somewhat paradoxically, to revisit Foucault's call for a problematization of the relations between war and life. Through such a problematization, Reid holds out the prospect of still articulating "other ways of constructing the life of human beings."[6]

The emphasis in this book on the dialectical interplay between Foucault's reflections on power and his political practices compels us to scrutinize the very

premise driving Reid's immensely productive engagement with thinkers in the Foucauldian tradition. The previous chapters suggest that we need not even delve into this tradition to find the resources to stimulate our thinking about an answer to the question of what life may become beyond its disciplinary and biopolitical subjugation because the efforts to answer this question were *already immanent* to Foucault's analyses in more than a merely suggestive form. Indeed, these efforts come into full view against the backdrop of a detailed consideration of his political practices.

Foucault did not have to articulate a distinct non-disciplinary life precisely because the collective striving for this form of life was *already presupposed* by his analysis of disciplinary power in *Discipline and Punish*. Indeed, this account not only sprang in some fundamental sense from the experiences of collective striving for a *non*-disciplinary life but also bore the effects of this striving in all kinds of ways. Foucault also attempted to delineate a life beyond the subjugation of population. He pointed toward the collective figure of the people *in opposition* to the collective figure of the population, above all in his reading of liberalism. Foucault mobilized this opposition in his reflections on the Iranian revolution, depicting the revolution as a struggle between a people organized by a collective will against a population indexed to the play of economic interests. Finally, Foucault depicted Cynic life as a militant form of life in *categorical opposition* to disciplinary life toward the near end of his life. In all of these instances, Foucault was not merely hinting elusively or enigmatically at an alternative form of life beyond modern techniques of power. He was deeply and actively grappling with these alternatives through the instigation of manifold political events in his present, from hunger strikes among prisoners in France to a revolution in Iran and a coup d'état in Poland.

Foucault's articulation of these alternatives no doubt harbored its own set of unresolved problems. Perhaps most glaringly, he did not reconcile his hope for a thoroughgoing transformation of Iranian society through the collective will of its people with his admission that this will drew consistency and energy from reactionary appeals. Foucault's account of the inheritance of Cynic life in modern political militancy and especially in twentieth-century leftist movements was excessively simplified in it its disqualification of the import of organization for these movements. In spite of Foucault's own rich history of involvement in organizational endeavors on the left outside of the spheres of the party and trade union, he somehow fell short of conceptualizing organization outside of these spheres.

Foucault nevertheless provided tools of varying degrees of elaboration for provoking us into thinking *beyond* the limits of a world configured through the demands of disciplines and security and their interlacing subjugations of individuals and populations, respectively. In the context of a world in which these techniques have arguably developed to unprecedented degrees *and* in which various calls for *other* forms of life have arguably acquired a much greater resonance, Foucault's provocations to envision *another life* remain, with all of their problems, as pertinent as ever and arguably *more* pertinent than ever.

## Notes

1 Julian Reid, *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity, and the Defence of Logistical Societies* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 44, 70, 112, 126.
2 Ibid., 44.
3 Ibid., 112, 116, 118.
4 Ibid., 127.
5 Ibid., 128.
6 Ibid., 129.

# Appendix

## *Investigation in 20 Prisons* by the Information Group on Prisons

### Introductory note

The Information Group on Prisons (GIP) compiled reports about prison life as a way of heightening public intolerance toward the prison system. It produced four reports throughout its short existence from 1971 to 1972. Champ Libre published the first report, *Investigation in 20 Prisons*, in May 1971. More than any other report, *Investigation in 20 Prisons* bears the strong imprint of Michel Foucault's influence. Foucault collected the materials for *Investigation in 20 Prisons* at La Santé prison in Paris, edited its contents, and authored the preface. *Investigation in 20 Prisons* is thus crucial for understanding not only the GIP but also the depth of Foucault's involvement in the prisoner support movement and the intricate connection between this movement and his analysis of disciplinary power and the prison.

The following translation of *Investigation in 20 Prisons* is based on the original pamphlet. The whole pamphlet consists of four parts: a preface written by Foucault, the reproduction of two filled out questionnaires, two narratives about prison life, and a compilation of typical answers to questions about prison life from prisoners in various prisons throughout France.

### Introduction

The courts, prisons, hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, occupational health systems, universities, press, and information outlets: through all of these institutions and under different masks an oppression is exercised which is at its roots a political oppression.

The exploited class always knew how to recognize this oppression; it never stopped resisting it, but it was constrained to subject itself to it. Now, suddenly,

the oppression is becoming intolerable to new social strata—intellectuals, technicians, lawyers, doctors, journalists, etc. It claims to exercise itself through them, with their aid or complicity, but from this moment without taking into account their interests or, above all, their ideology. Those who are charged with administering justice, health, knowledge, and information feel, in what they do themselves, the oppression of a political power. This new intolerance meets up with the fights and struggles led by the proletariat for a longtime. And these two joined intolerances rediscover the instruments that the proletariat in the nineteenth century had formed: in the first place, the investigations made on the conditions of the working class by the workers themselves. Thus are situated the *intolerance-investigations* that we undertake now.

1. These investigations are not intended to improve, soften or render more bearable an oppressive power. They are intended to attack it where it is exercised under a different name—that of justice, technique, knowledge, objectivity. Each should therefore be a *political act*.
2. They aim at precise targets, institutions which have a name and place, administrators, officials, and leaders—which also create victims and incite revolts, even among those in charge of them. Each one should therefore be *the first episode of a struggle*.
3. They unify around targets diverse strata that the ruling class kept apart through the game of social hierarchies and divergent economic interests. The investigations should bring down these indispensable barriers to power, bring together prisoners, lawyers, and judges or even doctors, patients and hospital personnel. Each one should, at each strategically important point, constitute a *front*, and *an attack front*.
4. These investigations are not conducted on the outside by a group of experts: the investigators here are the investigated themselves. It is up to them to speak, bring down divisions, formulate what is intolerable, and no longer tolerate it. *It is up to them to take charge of the struggle that will put an end to oppression being exercised.*

The prisons are the first targets. Why?

Since May '68, the judicial apparatus—a relatively silent and docile instrument up to then—has been "over-utilized" to repress French workers and immigrants, to repress the students, to repress shopkeepers and peasants. Vans of the CRS,[1] raids in the streets, batons and teargas, police custody, blatant lies, preventive detentions, police brutality, judgments on a case by case basis (that is to say, by

class, public opinion, and skin color), arbitrary releases—all of this has rendered class justice intolerable. But this one begins to no longer support itself in the institutions and persons that it chose itself. A good many lawyers, a good many judges and employees of the penitentiary no longer tolerate the job that we make them do. There is even more: State power no longer supports its own judges. It decrees them *cowardly*.

In staging a hunger strike last winter, imprisoned political militants gave a new form to what was but a muted disquiet. They unified many prisoners around their action. They provoked a movement against prison conditions on the outside. They allowed for the unification inside and outside of the prison walls of those wanting to struggle against the same intolerable: a justice that serves the dominant class. It's here that the investigation into prisons takes place.

This brochure is not a balance sheet: it is an integral part of the progress of the investigation. It is about giving the prisoners from different prisons the means to speak at the same time about conditions of detention, incarceration, release.

It is also about penetrating the prisons and revealing what goes on there right now—physical cruelty, suicides, hunger strikes, agitation, revolts.

The questionnaire was written with former prisoners and modified on the basis of the first responses. At present, nearly a thousand questionnaires are in circulation.

It has allowed for the constitution of investigation groups gathering together around a number of prisons former prisoners, families of prisoners, various penitentiary employees outraged by their work, lawyers, magistrates, students, intellectuals.

It was distributed by groups at the doors of the prisons, in the waiting lines of visitors. In spite of the censorship of the visiting rooms, certain families transformed themselves into investigators, thereby making known on the inside the action engaged on the outside.

To redistribute information as rapidly as possible, we composed this brochure from the first questionnaires.

1. As examples two filled out questionnaires were reproduced in their entirety.
2. Two narratives that follow the order of posed questions were also re-transcribed.
3. The most typical responses were also gathered together under the rubric of the questionnaire.

From these documents and others to be published, different campaigns will be organized to denounce the appalling conditions of detention and the whole judiciary system that reproduces and sustains them. Among the immediate demands of prisoners and their family, the abolition of criminal records figures foremost.

1. Criminal records outright disqualify the hypocritical claim of passing off the prison as a place of re-education.
2. In prohibiting access of the civil service to the keepers of criminal records, the State judges the value of its own penitentiary system every day.
3. The judiciary system contradicts the right to work: it condemns former prisoners to homelessness, to the arbitrariness of employers, to the most exploited work.
4. With criminal records, there is no liberation. There is but a reprieve. The abolition of criminal records will be the theme of our next campaign.

The GIP

## I Questionnaires

### 1 La Santé

VISITS

**Question**: *Do you have visits?*
**Answer**: Yes
**Q.**: *How many on average?*
**A.**: Eight.
**Q.**: *How long is the wait in the line outside?*
**A.**: Varied. Sometimes 45 minutes, sometimes only 10 minutes.
**Q.**: *Does that make your family lose work hours?*
**A.**: My wife was obligated to take poorly paid work but it leaves her with visiting days; a relative freedom to come to the visiting room for the majority of prisoners since work prevents visits.
**Q.**: *The exact duration of a visit?*
**A.**: Thirty minutes.
**Q**. *Can you describe the conditions of a visit (what appears to you to be the most intolerable)?*
**A.**: No. You cannot describe the conditions of a visit. They must be lived. You can nevertheless mention the noise, the filth of the visiting rooms and above

all the constant tension created by waiting for the 30th minute that concludes the visit. The line outside is also traumatizing for the families. For those who love one another there is also the torture of being together and nevertheless being conscious of living in two different universes.

**Q**.: *Does your lawyer come to the prison?*

**A**.: It occurs to him.

LETTERS

**Q**.: *Do you receive all of the letters addressed to you?*

**A**.: In theory.

**Q**.: *Do all of the letters that you send arrive?*

**A**.: No. Some were confiscated by the examining Magistrate.

**Q**.: *Can you recount examples of the censorship of your mail to your family and your friends?*

**A**.: All of the letters are censored. Sometimes the mail does not reach me until 46 days after it leaves. My wife received letters with a same delay. Eleven days is the minimum delay. At the same time, I did not have the right to go to the visiting room. Such conditions render all correspondence absolutely ridiculous!!!

**Q**.: *With your lawyer?*

**A**.: Yes. Certain letters from my lawyer were opened several times "in error." The high number of these "errors" shows that it's about consciously established censorship.

**Q**.: *With the judge?*

**A**.: I do not write to the judge.

YOUR RIGHTS

**Q**.: *Do you know the prison rules?*

**A**.: The ones that are posted as a rule inside cells. It is noteworthy that prisoners do not pay attention to them. The guards often do not know them better. One time, in confinement, a prisoner drawing on the rules succeeded in changing the meal system. Honest guards have never interpreted one of the articles of the rules of punishment about meals in a strict sense.

**Q**.: *Did they tell you what your rights were in prison?*

**A**.: Never! They spoke to me only of my duties. To the contrary, they hid themselves behind a kind of occult rule to oppose all of my demands, at least most of my demands.

**Q.**: *Do you have observations concerning the rules?*

**A.**: A good deal. On the manuscript I am sending you I elaborate with greater clarity on precise examples.

**Q.**: *Did preventive detention deprive you of the means of preparing your defense?*

**A.**: Of course. If only for the money I could not win.

**Q.**: *Did you choose your lawyer?*

**A.**: Yes.

**Q.**: *Was he court appointed?*

**A.**: No. But the result is nearly the same.

**Q.**: *If your lawyer has never come and has not presented himself at hearings, do you know that you can write to the President of the Bar?*

**A.**: Yes. But I also know that it is rarely recommended. The bar mafia harbors a tenacious grudge.

**Q.**: *And do you know if that has an effect?*

**A.**: None. I saw examples. On the other hand, there is a not inconsiderable "return to sender" effect.

CELL

**Q.**: *Are you in a cell?*

**A.**: Yes.

**Q.**: *Are there still hen coops?*

**A.**: Yes. Poissy for example.

**Q.**: *Toilets?*

**A.**: Yes.

**Q.**: *Wash bowel in the cell?*

**A.**: Yes.

**Q.**: *How many showers can you take per week?*

**A.**: One.

**Q.**: *Are there bugs?*

**A.**: A matchbox full per week.

**Q.**: *How often are the cells disinfected?*

**A.**: On demand, but that changes nothing: there is just a reprieve of a few days. All of the cells are not infected.

**Q.**: *How often is your laundry changed?*

**A.**: The sheets, monthly. For those who receive underwear—those who are in penal—this laundry is changed weekly. The underwear service is good.

**Q**.: *Do you know how much the laundering of your personal laundry costs your family (tips to intermediaries, etc.)?*

**A**.: My laundry is cleaned by my family. The tip for a sack of laundry deposited at the café is 5 francs on top of the orders.

*WALKS*

**Q**.: *How are the walks?*

**A**.: One hour of walking in the morning. 60 boys in the vicinity of a space of 300–400 square meters. In the high security quarters, twelve to fifteen guys in a courtyard of 4 m × 8 m.

FOOD

**Q**.: *How many times a week do you eat meat?*

**A**.: Four times, and fish two times.

**Q**.: *Fruits?*

**A**.: 3 times. An apple or orange, pear, banana, according to the season.

**Q**.: *Quantity?*

**A**.: About 100 grams of meat, an average whiting or a 100- to 150-gram cut or slice of a fat codling fish.

**Q**.: *Quality of the food you receive?*

**A**.: Good for the meat in general. Bad for the vegetables, pasta or starchy foods. Above all, the vegetables are poorly prepared.

**Q**.: *Do you have illnesses due to the food (hair loss, tooth decay, stomach aches, intestinal troubles, etc.)?*

**A**.: Yes. Hair loss and ailing eyes.

CANTEEN

**Q**.: *Do you have the means to buy items at the canteen?*

**A**.: Yes, but reduced.

**Q**.: *How much does it cost you per month?*

**A**.: 100 Francs.

**Q**.: *What do you buy at the canteen?*

**A**.: Fruits, butter, stamps, toiletries, books.

**Q**.: *What non-food items do you find at the canteen, and can you give us some prices?*

**A**.: I believe that these prices are nearly the same as those on the outside.

LEISURE TIME

**Q.**: *How do you spend your time outside of work?*

**A.**: Reading. Studying permitted at La Santé. It's not the same in all of the prisons. Assistants and the CNTE[2] are to be thanked.

**Q.**: *Can you engage in sports regularly?*

**A.**: Absolutely not. Outside of the physical training done on one's own.

**Q.**: *Can you hear the radio?*

**A.**: No.

**Q.**: *TV?*

**A.**: Nice joke! The shilly-shallying of the Minister and different wardens indicate rather a will not to give in to the demands of prisoners only for the real desire to ban the radio!!!

**Q.**: *Do you have film showings?*

**A.**: No. There are lectures given by various persons with slides. These distractions are extremely recent. Only about a hundred prisoners watch them out of two thousand.

**Q.**: *What newspapers do you have the right to read?*

**A.**: No daily newspapers: *Paris-Match*, *Jours de France* and the magazines of this sort. *La Chasseur français* is, I believe, the most sophisticated magazine. *L'Express* in the prison universe is considered explosive. As for Marx or any Marxist, they don't exist!!! They purely and simply deny them. The current warden seems to be more liberal in matters of reading, without however affecting core beliefs. With the exception of detective series, paperbacks are sold at the canteen.

**Q.**: *Have you seen a teacher or a tutor?*

**A.**: Yes, both of them.

**Q.**: *Did they bring help to you?*

**A.**: No. I know, however, that the teachers are full of good will and that they provide enormous services to certain students. The tutor is put into orbit by the warden from the moment of his arrival and seems to have taken the proper trajectory.

**Q.**: *Do you know how many tutors or teachers are in the prison?*

**A.**: Two teachers, maybe three. One tutor. For the work of teachers and tutors to be useful their rights as well as duties must be clearly established. Their working conditions are aberrant. The supervision of the warden is too strict and blocks all initiative. In spite of the agreement in principle of the warden,

the generalization of studies is blocked, despite declarations at the level of the Minister of Justice and various wardens. A warden does not dare get involved because he does not know if his superiors will not disavow him the next day. A primary school boy, like most of the prisoners, if he studies, even out of self-interest,—thanks to parole—will never be the same afterward. I am not speaking on the basis of statistics but experience.

**Q**.: *Do you know that you have the right to vocational training?*

**A**.: No. Who would have told me about it?

**Q**.: *To take correspondence courses?*

**A**.: Yes.

**Q**.: *To sit exams?*

**A**.: Yes.

**Q**.: *Could you have benefited from them?*

**A**.: No. Because I refused for personal reasons.

**Q**.: *How much does that cost you per year (enrollment, books)?*

**A**.: 75F for enrollment in the CNTE. You have to allow 250F on average. The social Service does its best to help the most needy. Nevertheless some cannot spend this amount and go to the Auxiliary, which provides books and does not require enrollment fees most of the time. The CNTE sometimes does not demand the 75F when asked.

WORK

**Q**.: *Do you work?*

**A**.: No. Besides it's not really about work but of complete exhaustion.

**Q**.: *Are you classified in the General Services?*

**A**.: No. But I am classified "by" the General Services as "someone to watch very carefully."

MEDICAL CARE

**Q**.: *How are medical examinations?*

**A**.: Chaplin-like. 30 seconds in front of the cell door. In spite of declarations and some articles by penitentiary doctors, the medical services are of a much lower quality in the penitentiary system. That says a lot.

**Q**.: *In case of a sickness can you see the doctor immediately?*

**A**.: In theory and on condition that he is here. The doctor is much more difficult to see than the warden.

**Q.**: *When one is a defendant, there is a charge for medical treatments. Has that stopped you from treating yourself?*

**A.**: Be careful. There is a charge for dental care and glasses in addition to prosthetic instruments but medical care, including surgery, is free.

**Q.**: *Under what conditions can you go to health services?*

**A.**: Being very well regarded by the matron or having leprosy, cholera or systemic cancer.

**Q.**: *With what medications are you treated most often?*

**A.**: Aspirin. If it's very serious you go to Aspro or Valium.

**Q.**: *Did you have to complain about medical care yourself?*

**A.**: Yes.

**Q.**: *Are your teeth decayed?*

**A.**: No.

**Q.**: *Is your vision looked after?*

**A.**: No. Since I became a defendant my eyes are constantly fatigued.

**Q.**: *Was the social worker of any help to you?*

**A.**: Yes, but the social service as a whole seems to be stuck in the medieval era. The social workers are sorts of "charity ladies" barely tolerated by the warden. As it is currently designed, the social service is useless. The patronesses would do just as well. Rights and duties here also need to be clarified.

**Q.**: *Can you tell us about tests with psychologists?*

**A.**: I took intelligence and personality tests. They never shared the results with me. On the other hand, the results were communicated to an expert. The experts appointed by the examining magistrate are a huge joke. Some do not see prisoners but for a few minutes, often less than 10 minutes. And on the basis of these kinds of sessions they construct a 20-page study for the Court. The experts have access to files and build their report according to the given contents of the file. Everything is absolutely falsified, formulaic, just acts of sympathy between the expert and the evaluated (*expertisés*).

DISCIPLINE

**Q.**: *What do you have to say about discipline?*

**A.**: Nothing. Discipline varies from prisoner to prisoner. Moreover, there is a split among the guards: those who miss the good old days and those who treat the prisoners as men. They are more and more numerous. Nevertheless, it is symptomatic to see that it is always the former who win.

**Q.**: *Guards?*

**A.**: They are men similar to those who work at Simca[3] or elsewhere. What is infinitely more serious is that he who is vindictive and spiteful always finds material to expend, and it's far more serious here than on the exterior because the average prisoner has no means of defense.

**Q.**: *Of the search?*

**A.**: It's an infamous formality. One must experience it to describe it. A mechanical apparatus would be 100 times more effective, less humiliating. The search guards are the first to think so. In prison, the search is the way of transforming man into object.

**Q.**: *Have you been to the hearing room?*

**A.**: Yes, often.

**Q.**: *On what grounds?*

**A.**: Coffee found by families, taken at the window (prohibited), etc. . .

**Q.**: *Are there fines?*

**A.**: Yes. Personally, no one could make me pay them. I would refuse categorically.

**Q.**: *Have you been in solitary?*

**A.**: Yes.

**Q.**: *How long?*

**A.**: In total, 90 days.

**Q.**: *In a power cell?*

**A.**: No.

**Q.**: *Can you explain how that goes?*

**A.**: Yes, but not in three lines.

**Q.**: *Have you been a victim of physical violence?*

**A.**: Never. However, I know of many cases itemized with references, name and date.

**Q.**: *What hazing do you stand ready to denounce?*

**A.**: The blows first of all. Then the absolutely immobile strait jacket attached in solitary confinement. And in spite of the formal ban of the sentencing judge.

**Q.**: *Have you heard of hunger strikes?*

**A.**: I participated in all of them. I did one for my own reasons. They're not over, I believe.

**Q.**: *Of suicides?*

**A.**: Many. A boy disemboweled himself with a knife. Another hung himself. One committed suicide by hunger strike (111 days).

**Q.**: *Of revolts?*

**A**.: Yes, I was present at two.

**Q**.: *What are the most scandalous aspects of penitentiary life that you wish to see the outside involve the struggle principally and immediately: ways of conducting your defense once in prison, the right to information, elimination of physical violence, right to sexual life?*

**A**.: Everything. One cannot separate them. Also, the reform of the visiting rooms: the condemned have a right to only 30 minutes each week. This should be abolished rapidly.

**Q**.: *What observations do you have about this investigation and about this questionnaire?*

**A**.: Only one: you are at the wrong address. The reforms in the prisons cannot be carried out alone. They depend entirely on police and justice reforms. To act otherwise is to saw the tree into planks before cutting it down. The penitentiary system is not independent like the P and T[4] or the SNCF.[5] It's a part of a vaster system that we call justice. Moreover, the injustices committed by the administration can be seen as benign, next to those of all kinds of police and magistrates. With the powers they dispose, a warden of a prison or a head guard could render prison conditions absolutely untenable. They do not do it. For example, I never heard anyone speak of men hung by their feet and beaten in their most sensitive areas, nor of those plunged into baths, nor of men whose testicles would have been attached to electric generators. No woman, I believe, aborted because of kicks in the belly. Various police commonly use all of these methods. If magistrates full of humanism do not employ physical violence, they nevertheless use a still more inadmissible violence: the conditioning of witnesses and the orientation of their depositions, the will to make an investigation fit not with the truth but with the belief in guilt prompted by the police, threats of imprisonment, preventive detention, rigging cases, etc. Of course, outside of their contexts these facts appear benign. They are however tragic for those who experience them. Gold-plated cell bars and chicken for each meal would change nothing in the underlying condition of the prisoner. For a reform of the offender to be worthwhile, justice must present him with an inviolable face. The magistrate should ceaselessly question the legality of his methods. That an offender uses violence, theft, even murder is his concern. A magistrate who uses similar methods, deceitfulness, the cover up of police violence, the refusal of objectivity concerns a whole system, a whole civilization. If justice employs the same methods as the man that it judges, what is it done for? The

offender will harden and have the conviction that he's the noble man, the righteous man because he struggles alone, without the apparatus of the law, without the immunity of magistrates. The imprisoned man more than any other has a need for justice. He must find before him the face a social order that is the essence of civilization and not a group of bandits hiding beneath their magic robe to satisfy hatreds and the complexes of their education. In attacking the prisons, the problem is inverted. One takes the effect for the cause. In spite of what I have just told you, the necessity of an inquiry such as yours was urgent. I thank you. I am available to confirm my declarations and any time you wish.

2 Province

VISITS

**Q**.: *Visits?*

**A**.: No.

**Q**.: *Line to visit?*

**A**.: Yes.

**Q**: *How much time outside?*

**A**.: 1 hour and 30 minutes.

**Q**.: *Inside the prison?*

**A**.: 30 minutes.

**Q**.: *Duration of the visit?*

**A**.: 10 minutes, 15 minutes or 30 minutes according to the prisons.

**Q**.: *Visiting conditions?*

**A**.: The visits take place in very unpleasant conditions for the visitors as well as the prisoners. Most of the time the premises are of a doubtful cleanliness. The visits generally take place in very, very small screened cubicles where you absolutely cannot move.

**Q**.: *How are you supervised?*

**A**.: Depending on the prison, one or several guards listen, or, in the big prisons, a wire-tapping set creates the same effect.

**Q**.: *If you are a foreigner, can you speak your language?*

**A**.: Yes, only with an interpreter guard to be able to follow the conversation throughout the visit.

**Q**.: *Packages?*

**A**.: 1 package of 5 kg of clothes for Christmas, with special authorization.

**Q**.: *How do you obtain these authorizations?*

**A.**: A food package of 5 kg is authorized by the Minister of Justice for the holiday season. Unfortunately, most of the foodstuffs are prohibited and the inspection plunders the few things that remain because that's the order.

LETTERS

**Q.**: *Do you receive the letters addressed to you?*
**A.**: No.
**Q.**: *Can you write as much as you want?*
**A.**: No.
**Q.**: *Censorship?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *On what subject?*
**A.**: Because one time I did not want to tell my fiancé the exact reason why I found myself in prison. The censors wrote "liar" on my letter and gave the exact grounds. The result is that my fiancé let me go.

YOUR RIGHTS

**Q.**: *Did they tell you what your rights were in prison?*
**A.**: No. One time, I asked the head guard of T. . . who told me that once in prison I had nothing but duties toward the penitentiary administration.
**Q.**: *Observations concerning the rules?*
**A.**: Yes, because there is but one single penitentiary rule. It's just that each prison warden makes his rules in his own way and always to the detriment of prisoners, which is a flagrant injustice.

CELL

**Q.**: *How many?*
**A.**: 3, 4 or 5.
**Q.**: *Do you have your meal alone?*
**A.**: No, in the refectory.
**Q**. *Showers?*
**A.**: Yes, once a week.
**Q.**: *State of the straw mattresses?*
**A.**: I believe that all of the grime is found there.
**Q.**: *Laundry changed?*
**A.**: Weekly.
**Q.**: *Are your cells disinfected?*
**A.**: Yes, maybe once a year.

**Q**.: *Wakeup time?*
**A**.: 7AM
**Q**.: *Lights out?*
**A**.: 9PM

WALKS

**Q**.: *Duration?*
**A**.: 30 minutes a day usually. There are several of us.
**Q**.: *Are you always with the same prisoners?*
**A**.: No.
**Q**.: *Can you describe the walk?*
**A**.: The walk courtyard is around 6 m long by 4 wide. It is prohibited to speak too loudly, whistle, sing, and let oneself get carried away with certain entertainment.

FOOD

**Q**.: *Meal times?*
**A**.: 11 in the morning and 5 in the evening.
**Q**.: *Length of a meal?*
**A**.: Barely 15 minutes, such that there are few things to eat.
**Q**.: *Knife, fork?*
**A**.: Yes and no, that depends on the prison.
**Q**.: *How many times a week do you eat meat?*
**A**.: Two.
**Q**.: *Fruits?*
**A**.: Three.
**Q**.: *Quality of the food you receive?*
**A**.: Almost always rotting.
**Q**.: *Are the quantities sufficient?*
**A**.: No.
**Q**.: *Have you had illnesses?*
**A**.: Hair loss and above all I lost practically all of my teeth.

CANTEEN

**Q**.: *Means to buy items at the canteen?*
**A**.: Yes.
**Q**.: *Foodstuffs?*
**A**.: There is no requirement. We can take what we want.

**Q.**: *Cost per month?*
**A.**: 60F per month because you cannot spend more, even if you have the means.
**Q.**: *Have you undergone a medical examination since you have been in prison?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *Compulsory medical examinations?*
**A.**: One at each entry.
**Q.**: *Can you say how a medical examination goes?*
**A.**: They are very rapid and one must be very sick to be treated suitably. Otherwise you are treated with a shot of aspirin.
**Q.**: *In cases of sickness, can you see the doctor immediately?*
**A.**: No.
**Q.**: *Are paid treatments an impediment to your care?*
**A.**: Even as a defendant, the care is free.
**Q.**: *Seen a psychiatrist?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *Seen a psychologist?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *Dental care?*
**A.**: That depends on the prisons, but the care is botched.
**Q.**: *Visual care?*
**A.**: No.
**Q.**: *Seen a chaplain?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *Assistance given?*
**A.**: Above all a moral assistance.
**Q.**: *Has a social worker looked after you?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *Of your children?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *What were the consequences?*
**A.**: It stopped me from definitely losing my daughter.
**Q.**: *Have you seen a teacher or a tutor?*
**A.**: No.
**Q.**: *Right to sit exams?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *Practice a sport regularly?*
**A.**: No.

**Q**.: *Radio?*
**A**.: Yes, but not in all of the prisons.
**Q**.: *Film showings?*
**A**.: Yes.
**Q**.: *Example of films?*
**A**.: Varied.
**Q**.: *Newspapers?*
**A**.: Only books for kids and sports newspapers.

WORK

**Q**.: *Do you work?*
**A**.: Yes, 8 hours a day.
**Q**.: *Do you work in the prison cell?*
**A**.: Yes, on threads.
**Q**.: *Salary after deductions?*
**A**.: 40F.
**Q**.: *When are you paid?*
**A**.: At the end of the month.
**Q**.: *Do you work in the workshop?*
**A**.: Yes, on anything.
**Q**.: *Assembly line work?*
**A**.: No.
**Q**.: *Who is in charge?*
**A**.: A prisoner boss, a guard.
**Q**.: *Victim of a work accident?*
**A**.: No.
**Q**.: *Have you heard of it?*
**A**.: Yes.
**Q**.: *What is your salary?*
**A**.: Minimal because there are so many deductions that there is practically nothing left.
**Q**.: *What is the use of deductions on salaries?*
**A**.: Finances, legal costs, savings paid on release.
**Q**.: *Can you send money to your family?*
**A**.: Yes.
**Q**.: *Do your spouse and children benefit from Social security?*
**A**.: Yes.

**Q.**: *Who takes care of your children while you are in prison?*
**A.**: Welfare services.
**Q.**: *Is it always the same guards who look after you?*
**A.**: No.
**Q.**: *Have you been to the hearing room?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *For what reason?*
**A.**: Incorrect behavior toward guards.
**Q.**: *Have you been to solitary confinement?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *For how long?*
**A.**: 45 days.
**Q.**: *Can you describe how that goes?*
**A.**: Very often you receive a thrashing.
**Q.**: *Have you ever heard of suicides, hunger strikes, revolts in prison?*
**A.**: Yes.
**Q.**: *Have you been in contact with political prisoners?*
**A.**: No.

## II Narratives

### 1 La Santé

From the moment you walk through the door everything is put to work to humiliate you, debase you, make you understand that you must "walk straight" and that you are no longer a man but a number, and a number should be quiet and above all not complain. "You are going to shut up you over there," "Hurry your ass up a bit," "You are starting to piss me off," "I'll be damned," and all of that in a tone against which that of the adjutant of military quarters is just a soft and tender murmur.

On arrival, to be searched, you must be stripped naked "for detail" but under the pretext of gaining time. "You will get dressed again in just a bit, come sign here. . . take your package and go to the other room to get dressed."

#### MATERIAL CONDITIONS

They are often very hard.

Heating in winter that works poorly and in any case could not suffice in the best case to adequately heat the cell. This winter, in certain cells of the division,

the oil congealed to the point of being unable to leave the bottle, but it was still necessary to wash, shave with ice water. It must be said that in the winter supplementary blankets are distributed though they have no use except at night because it is strictly forbidden to lie down beneath the blankets.

The food is foul, though some efforts at improvement have been made for a while. Here is the menu which has used more or less the same things for several years.

- Every evening: a ladle of soup and vegetables. The soup is "drinkable," but the vegetables (almost exclusively rice and pasta) are absolutely inedible, and the prisoners without money often prefer to eat dry bread.
- At noon salad is distributed which is hardly washed or seasoned. Therefore, he who cannot buy oil and vinegar does not eat it. With this salad, the following are served at noon:
  - Monday: a ladle of vegetables, a slice of black pudding pâté
  - Tuesday: a ladle of vegetables, a cut of meat (50–100 g)
  - Wednesday: a ladle of vegetables, a poorly cooked and very small fish
  - Thursday: a ladle of vegetables, a cut of meat (50–100 g)
  - Friday: a ladle of vegetables, a poorly cooked and very small fish
  - Saturday: a ladle of vegetables, a hard-boiled egg. So, without being accustomed to "great cuisine," he who cannot buy supplements at the canteen is hungry on Saturday, for example, when he eats only a hard-boiled egg and some vegetables, with a ladle of soup in the evening. The warden cannot always be responsible, because it happens, on occasion, that the vegetables are almost well cooked and edible. Given that we find ourselves in prison and cannot ask for refined food, it is unthinkable that in France in 1971 men who contravened the law nevertheless remain men (although for the Administration it can perhaps be questioned) who do not have enough to eat.

WORK

It is sometimes very difficult to be able to work at La Santé and while it is possible, one must do it for an absurdly low salary: around 3 francs for the making of 1000 labels. An average worker working 8 hours makes 2500. If he is convicted the administration will deduce half of the 7.50F he would have made, that is, 3.75F. Out of his 3.75F, he will not be able to spend but 1.87F and the 1.88F that are left will be divided in two: 95 centimes for legal costs and 94 centimes for earnings

paid on release. One must therefore not be surprised if a lot do not wish to work in order not to be exploited beings by the slave drivers who are the agents of prisons and by the bloodsucker which is the Administration.

If the material conditions of work are often foul (dirty visiting rooms, a stool and a table of 80 by 60 cm in a cell of 3.80 by 3.80 in high security at La Santé for 4, sometimes 5 prisoners), they are not the worst.

## WHAT IS INTOLERABLE

To feel subjected and to be subjected to the arbitrariness of the guards, frustrated beings often of little intelligence, some of whom provoke the prisoners in order to make them fly off the handle. Others, drunk from morning to evening, allow themselves the rudest remarks, but one must bear them, be quiet, because the guard at La Santé and in all of the prisons in general is king. Whether he is stupid, drunk, narrow-minded, dishonest, he is right. And his word alone is enough to get you sent to "solitary." He will write a report indicating what he wants (he is absolutely not controlled), and the next day you will appear in the "hearing room." Right or wrong, that does not matter. You will be wrong. "But, warden, sir, I was at the window, but I did not talk." "It is forbidden to be at the window and if the guard says you talked, it's because it was true." "Warden, sir, if I tell the guard to leave me alone, it's because he was drunk and went around my cell looking for what was not in conformity with the rules and quibbled about a blanket that was incorrectly folded or because the washbasin was not clean." "You are a liar. The guards do not drink." And it's solitary, and if you're not satisfied, the "embossing machine" (though the beating has become increasingly rare for several years it still exists unfortunately).

In solitary, prison within the prison, a "light diet": one day, normal meals served with a wood spoon, which necessitates eating meat when there is any with hands (even though the piece is so small you can do it in just a mouthful very often). The day after this sumptuous day there is only a bowl of soup given at noon and in the evening. Add to this food diet, the prohibition of receiving and writing to family (just one letter to warn them before arriving), cold in the winter (the heating pipes are in the ceiling), boredom and nothing else to do but to turn around because if textbooks are left, the pencils, pens are forbidden. The filth: you have to sleep without sheets, on a mattress whose fitting sheets are glowing with dirt (of sperm in particular, because a lot of prisoners use masturbation as a sleeping drug). But as this diet is not sufficient for the sturdy there are warnings

of shaving the head bald and dry bread with water in the rules posted on the door. Of course, the visiting room and canteen orders are taken away, if not it would not be funny. In 1971, in a civilized country, you can dream.

Solitary in itself is still not the worst of it. The worst is the following. I write these lines while watching my door in order not to be surprised, which would cost me 8 or 15 days of solitary plus a disciplinary report. For being at the window, for the exchange of blows with a fellow prisoner you get a report and when[6] you ask for parole it is refused for bad behavior. "Just think. He's a rebel. Parole is not made for people like him." (At any rate, it's not made for anyone and when you win 6 months out of 4 or 5 years, you must be happy because it's very unusual). We will not consider the futile reasons for these reports. Just their numbers will suffice. As for those who made them, a guard is a guard and a guard is never wrong. Also, little does it matter if I truly intend to get back on my feet on the way out and if, returned to prison without a primary leaving certificate, I plan on getting a professional certification next year. The only thing that matters is that I am a rebel and parole is not made for people like me. So, in the first place, what is most intolerable is being subjected to the arbitrariness not only of the guards but also of the whole administrative personnel. Censorship sends back the letters that it wants when it wants and under any pretext. "Do not speak of family affairs" or more simply "Prohibited." Do you have something to complain about? The warden does not follow up on complaints. Do you write to the Minister of Justice? The prosecutor? They send letters to the warden who, of course, does not follow up on them and even punishes unjustified complaints sometimes. As for the rules, it is difficult to know them exactly and to know what our rights are. Anyway, they are irrelevant because all of the rules in prison go in one direction: from the administration to the prisoner.

## MEDICAL SERVICE

This one is perfectly ineffective. The nurses and doctors are in general very nice and understanding. It's nonetheless true that through their fault or not it is difficult to be treated correctly.

As for the dentist, if you are not convicted you must pay. And again, if you are convicted but have some money, even a little, it is no longer free and the least you could say is that the fees of the prison dentist are not the lightest. And even before treating a tooth he asks accounting if the prisoner has money in his account and how much.

There would be much more still to say about the abuses of prisons: reading restrictions. It is not possible to read the books you want to. Mail restrictions and a lot of other things but all of that would exceed the framework of a letter.

## 2 Nevers

### VISITS

As a convict, you have a right to a visit by your family, half an hour a week. Friends should have a special authorization. In this way, I had a friend visit (who had "connections"). You do not have the right to visits by your lawyer, once you are convicted. Therefore, no one can defend you any more.

You can ask for an extension of time in the visiting rooms in writing. This extension is given to prisoners who behave well. It can reach half an hour, but it depends on the number of visits. If there are too many visits, the visiting rooms are full and an extension is out of the question. And half an hour a week goes very quickly.

In general, you cannot wait inside the prison.

The visiting rooms are little individual cubicles inside of which you are confined. Two plexiglass sheets separate the prisoner from the visitor. To speak to each other, you must shout very loudly and, in the back, there are guards that listen or even intervene if you say either inaccurate things (from their point of view) about the prison, or if you speak of forbidden things. In the latter case, the visit can be cut short by the guard. You cannot smoke in the visiting rooms. The visitor cannot show newspapers to the prisoner.

What is more unbearable is the separation and surveillance. The end of the visitation too, because often you do not finish saying what you had to say. As you do not have a watch, you are often left surprised at the end. Once the guard informs you that the visit is over, you must leave the visiting room immediately.

When you are a defendant, you have a right to two half hour visits each week as well as those of your lawyer. But it happens that during the preliminary investigation and hearing you become incommunicado: you receive neither visits nor letters.

### PACKAGES

You cannot receive packages. Except for Christmas, when you can receive 1 package of 5 kg or 2 of 2.5 kg. These packages are obviously searched and you cannot receive alcohol, books, liquor-filled chocolates, canned food (I believe), glass bottles, tobacco (I certainly can't remember it).

## LETTERS

I received practically all of the letters written by my family with a delay (7 days) when, for one reason or another, the censors judged the letters too dangerous to censor them themselves. In this case, these letters go to the sentencing judge who either bluntly intercepts them or gives his authorization so that the letters are communicated to the prisoner. In the former case, the letters are not returned to the prisoner upon his release from prison.

As for letters from friends, there are many that I did not receive.

Censorship is stupid and spiteful. In the first letters, non-courteous words about prison were underlined three times. That's the stupid side. The spiteful side: rather than censor by crossing out certain passages of the letters the censors found nothing better than to cut out the censored passages with scissors. So from time to time you receive half of the letters.

As a convict, you can write two letters a week (in theory 30 lines maximum, but there are allowances if you behave well). As a defendant, you can write every day, and the letters to lawyers are not opened. As for writing what you want, it is out of the question, even though they do not know what I am forbidden to write (in this way, I was able to write quite a number of things).

## RIGHTS

No, we do not know the rights we have in prison. To tell prisoners about their rights is contrary to the spirit of prisons: we have only the right to obey the guards (*cf*. Ch. Exbrayat, editorial writer for *Journal du Centre*: "It is out of the question to leave prisoners free of their fate").

The fact of never knowing the rights that you have is certainly one of the most difficult things. But even if you knew them, who would defend a prisoner who should go to the hearing room? It should be recalled that convicts do not even have the right to see their lawyers. . .

At Nevers prison, you are alone in the cell. That's the normal regime. But there can be exceptions.

You have your meals all alone in the cell.

There is no bathroom plumbing. You have a bucket at your disposal for the toilet, and a washbasin to wash your dishes, your laundry, and to wash yourself. As there is no running water, you have a water pitcher which is changed two times a day. (*Nb*: those who empty the slop pails are the same ones who serve our food. . .)

You take showers one time a week in a group.

State of the straw mattresses: dirty.

The towel, dishtowel, and underpants are changed one time a week. The pajamas, sheets are changed one time a month. The pants, jackets, and pullover were not changed for me during my two months of detention.

The cells are not disinfected, even between the changes of two prisoners. The cell is only washed with the departure of a prisoner. So, when I arrived in my cell, the slop pail was black with grime. . .

To do housework, you have only a little brush at your disposal. During the two months, I did not have the possibility of cleaning my cell with a floor cloth but one time, and I still believe that it was due to the fact that I protested. I do not know if the other prisoners were able to do the same (I do not believe so).

Wakeup time: 6:40AM. You dress in clothes that you were required to leave outside the cell the prior evening. 7:30AM: breakfast. 11:30AM: lunch. 5:30PM: dinner. 6PM: you get undressed. You put your clothes and the stool outside so that you must lie down at 6PM. Lights out: 9PM.

WALK

Duration: 1 hour. But at the time of my first detention at Montbéliard, I did not know my rights on the subject and, as I was always alone, I often walked a quarter of an hour, ten minutes.

The walks are done in five, except in the case of isolation.

Not always with the same prisoners.

During the walks, you go around in a little courtyard ($20 \times 10$), where you walk back and forth. You are watched from the top of the prison by a guard. You cannot play sports during this time (no equipment).

FOOD

Duration of meals: 5 minutes (but it's because you are alone, and there is not much to eat). You have a little pocketknife, but it does not cut and is unusable after two or three times (Moreover, I am sending you my pocketknife).

No refectory at Nevers.

You eat meat twice a week, or else it's fish or an egg. Fruits: one apple or one orange every other day. Or else, applesauce or "Laughing Cow" cheese (or something like it).

Quality of the food: apples, beans, split peas, rice or pasta. You throw out lots of it. The quantities are largely sufficient in so far as the food is bad (you never have seconds).

Two months is not enough to catch a sickness because of the food.

CANTEEN

You are obliged to buy items at the canteen: butter, beer, Nescafe, sugar (they only give us three pieces of sugar a week), tobacco (limited to 7 Gauloises or 3 Bleus a week), newspapers, a toothbrush, toothpaste, a comb, a ballpoint pen, toilet paper, stamps, paper, envelopes, matches (lighter fluid is banned). You can have cigarette lighters.

Without buying a lot at the canteen, I spent around 150F a month.

MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS

One medical examination 2 days after having entered. They do not examine us (even if we are sick). They ask us only if things are okay. They test our blood. No X-rays. The examination lasts a few seconds.

The doctor comes once a week, but the medical examination is not required. You must ask the nurse of health services for a medical examination. You must find out if there is not a required visit at least once a year. At Montbéliard, I had rotting teeth. The response of the doctor: "We do not concern ourselves with that here."

In the case of a sickness you can actually call the doctor. But you must be sick, and the signs of the sickness must be very apparent.

Sports: you must be at least 20 years old to play sports 2 times a week for one hour.

No radio, no TV, no films. Mass only every Sunday. As the altar is practically right in the middle of the prison, you are almost required to listen to it.

Newspapers (weeklies): *Match*, *Jours de France*, *Entreprise*, *Tintin*, *Mickey*, *Point de vue sur le monde*, *Rustica*, *La vie catholique*, *le Pélerin*, *le Figaro littéraire*; (monthlies): *Sélection*, *Constellation*, *Réalité*, *Lectures pour tous*, *le Chasseur Français*.

These newspapers are often censored, above all the articles concerning the prisons or leftists (and it was not because I was one).

You have a right to 2 books on Tuesday and 2 on Friday. You could choose these books, but the catalog is never at our disposal, which means that the person

in charge of the library gives the books which happen to fall into his hands. The person in charge of the library is a prisoner.

Yes, I could send money to my family.

SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

The night: 4 to 5 times a night the guard turns on the lights in the cell to see if you sleep. He looks through the peephole. During the day there are rounds.

It is not always the same ones who watch over us.

The guards treat us differently depending on the prisoner. But let us say in general that they try to constantly show that it is they who are in charge and that you have only to obey.

HAZINGS

- Never look out of the window.
- Never walk alongside the walls.
- Never put your hands in the pockets.
- Never sing or whistle (outside, a dog breaks our ears: he barks each time there is a noise or someone enters or leaves the prison. The prisoners are driven mad by his barks. But we cannot make the least bit of noise. We are treated worse than dogs).
- All mildly special requests should be made in writing to the head guard of the prison who agrees to them on condition that you behave well.

But beyond the rules themselves there are no very serious hazings.

At Nevers prison you spend the last night in solitary, but it is not a punishment! At Montbéliard, it's when I entered the prison that I went through solitary (unheated).

In solitary, everything is immobile: the stool, table, bed. There is a double door, in which one door (the one that is inside the cell) is barred. The same goes for the window that you therefore cannot open.

## III Answers

### The Visits

*Do you have visits?*

FRESNES: The visits depend on a stack of wretched papers that people who want to visit us should fill out. Ask for permission from the examining magistrate, photos, papers, and, in the end, you are not sure of getting permission.

DOUAI: My father each month, my mother each week. On the other hand, my companion known as the "concubine" had to wait 3 months to get her permit to visit. As she came from Paris, a city more than 100 km from the prison, I had a right to a double visitation a month. In fact, it was given to me the first time. Afterward, always refused. The reason: your parents visit you regularly. This person is not a next of kin. No friend got a permit. The only persons admitted were my parents, which I hardly saw and my "concubine." Each time it always took them a whole day. My "concubine" worked weekdays. But the days of convict visits at Douai were Monday and Thursday. They did not want to authorize her to visit me on Saturday.

SAINT-MALO: I do not know. I did not receive any visit.

TOUL: I cannot respond exactly to your question, because I never had a visitation at Toul.

CAEN (Centrale): Once a month. The persons that I wished to see the most did not get permits.

GRADIGNAN: Prisoners told me that their families were not able to see them because someone came before; yet, their families had travelled across France. In prison, a visit is long awaited and prepared. If the visitor does not come, you are distraught. You must have regular visits. Otherwise, they do not become integrated into prison life; they do not change anything in its flow.

*How long do they wait in line to visit you?*

PROVINCE[7]: The duration of a visitation is half an hour. But the families are there well beforehand. They wait their turn 1 hour, 2 hours without shelter, even in the coldest of winter. A person must faint for them to let him in or a child must cry of cold, full of purple in the face, as happened the other day, so that they allow him to enter, the mother remaining outside.

*Can you describe the conditions of the visit (what appears to you the most unbearable)?*

LA SANTÉ: They are, in the first place, all of the bars that separate the visitor and visited, and then the difficulties of conversing because of the noise.

LA SANTÉ: The repulsive filth of the somber, uncomfortable and noisy visiting rooms. What is most intolerable is not feeling intimacy in the visiting room, because of the distance, the double bars, the dirty window and the noise.

LA SANTÉ: The noise.

LA SANTÉ: The little cage and the guard who keeps coming and going.

TOULOUSE: Beyond the conditions of receiving visitors, the conditions of the meetings are intolerable. You can hardly see your counterpart. It is very

difficult to hear each other and make yourselves understood. Given that the cubicles are not closed, each tries to drown out the voice of the other 12 who are going through the visiting room with him to make themselves heard.

FRESNES: The visiting room is the most horrendous. Behind the bars you scream your head off to make yourself understood.

LA SANTÉ: The visiting rooms are very somber. You hardly see your interlocutor. We are required to yell to make ourselves heard.

LA ROQUETTE: The visiting rooms are very noisy. While awaiting the visitors you cannot speak. Opaque glass separates the two persons. You must yell. The guards circulate and listen.

PROVINCE: The cubicles are 90 cm large with voice permeable glass. On each side, a round stool. A guard walks up and down or stands in the doorway on the side of the prisoners. According to the question I asked the prisoners the presence of the guard is most intolerable. The noise of voices and the crowding of cubicles, which are only separated by a wood partition, prevent all private conversations. You are only left trite remarks, family news.

ÉPINAL: During the visitations we can have 3 times a week during 15-day periods, we are limited to speaking of the weather, since if we speak of something else they threaten us with bans (Here, I am inaccurate. They said nothing to me, when I spoke of the arrival of Apollo VIV on the Moon).

METZ: The visitation takes place in deplorable conditions, with 9 in a visiting room in such a small space. You must push and shove more than everyone else to be heard.

DOUAI: Henhouse-visiting rooms. The disgusting farmyard where parents and visitors are crammed together. The prisoners should comfort the visitors. A terrible ordeal for the visitor.10 to a visiting room, the equivalent of 20 persons shouting. The arrogance of the guards toward visitors. The total distrust of regular visitors and parents. 20, 25 minutes at best. The prohibition of the dialogue. The impossibility of exchanging ideas. We have a thirst to speak and hear. We are reduced to trite remarks. The impossibility of reading anything at all.

CAEN: A few years ago, it was around little tables that the prisoners could see their families. Unfortunately, the little tables were replaced by a long table with a central window thirty or so cm high, according to the system known as the American. Nevertheless, no one complained too much because you were never totally separated from your next of kin. But the American system

was itself replaced by the grill system. The visitor and prisoner are each shut up in a booth as well as separated by two glass walls. The visiting room loses all of its warmth.

FLEURY: You are watched every minute, at any time by guards on each side.

FLEURY: The windowpanes where I cannot embrace those who come to see me.

TOULOUSE: Speaking with the prisoner behind windows with holes, unable to touch him.

## 2 Mail, Censorship

*Can you write as much as you want?*

LA SANTÉ: After sentencing, you can write to your family once a week. The letter cannot exceed 30–40 lines. You can no longer write to your lawyer.

FLEURY: All of my letters arrive at the homes of people who were not imprisoned in the place where I am. My brother in law does not receive my letters because he was a prisoner with me. Censorship eliminates our letters if we speak in them of our friends who are prisoners with me. I receive all sent mail, except from former prisoners.

SAINT-MALO: You can write as much as you want provided that you have enough money to pay for stamps. In the case of suspect letters, the prisoner is called by the warden.

GRADIGNAN: With money you can always have a letter sent.

*Were you a victim of censorship? What about?*

TOUL: A letter from my brother that had no reason to require censorship. A letter from my mother that was not delivered to me until my release.

NÎMES: Censored, because I said that we ate poorly, that they beat us, that they put us in solitary for no reason.

FLEURY: The removal of all poems, drawings.

DOUAI: One letter in three disappeared. My 8-year old daughter sent me drawings for Father's Day. They delivered the letter to me. As for the drawings, they were thrown in the trash. The Arabs and Yugoslavs could not write.

LA SANTÉ: The guards who read the letters do not understand French.

DOUAI: 1. Each time that I use uncommon words, that I express sentiments that they apparently do not understand, my letters come back; 2. All poetry is strictly censored; 3. Political information, even of the Third World (2 letters from my mother in Morocco last August), all of the letters from my wife that allude to current events; 4. No sketches and drawings.

GRADIGNAN: People do not write a lot in prison because of spelling. They are ashamed of their spelling before the censorship. The mail nevertheless occupies a big place. The visits are on set days. They are limited. But you receive and write letters in the cell.

TOULOUSE: I did not receive the letter of a comrade who spoke of the political situation outside of the prison. I did not even know that it had arrived at the prison: they only gave it to me on release and it was still necessary for me to come back to look for it. Two letters that I wrote to my family and comrades were censored for political reasons.

SAINT-NAZAIRE: Several of my letters had been rejected by the censorship. The reason: subversive comments.

*Do you have the right to receive packages?*

LA SANTÉ: All of the packages are opened. Example: a chicken is torn apart to see what there is inside. The jam is emptied. Everything is mixed, uneatable. There is no tolerance for towels, bars of soap, shoelaces, which are given back upon release.

RENNES: At the women's prison a Protestant organization had given a packet containing a bar of soap and a hand towel for Christmas. They left them at the office. The prisoners will get them upon release (for some of them in 10 or 15 years).

DOUAI: Not having anyone or the means, I corresponded with no one and I received nothing. I cannot respond to your questions.

## 3 Rights, Rules

*Did they tell you what your rights are?*

TOUL: They told me that we didn't have any.

*Who told you?*

The guards. Every prisoner who comments about the rules to the warden is punished.

AVIGNON: No one spoke to me about my rights.

TOULOUSE: We do not know the rules. They are partially posted on a bulletin board in each quarter. They absolutely did not speak to us about the rights of prisoners.

SAINT-MALO: From the old timers.

SAINT-NAZAIRE: From the other prisoners only.

LA ROQUETTE: You must ask for the rules to see them.

LA ROQUETTE: It was very difficult for me to get them. Now, during the first days, above all if you are isolated, you simply do not know what you have a right to. And the guards answer all of the questions with "I do not know." For example, it took a week before knowing that I could write to whom I wanted to and to make use of as many stamps as I wanted to. Of course, these rules are vague enough to be able to be interpreted on a case-by-case basis.

*Do you have observations to make about the rules?*

LA SANTÉ: A shit concentrate.

RENNES (H): Everything is prohibited. No right to speak in the hallways. No groups in the courtyards.

PROVINCE: Their rights are nonexistent. All power, all protest, all speech are harshly denied to them, all the more harshly denied if the guard is not promoted. After about a year, it is common enough for the prisoners to address their complaints to the warden of the prison or even to their judge to get what they need or to protest against a lack of something or an error.

DOUAI: Revolting. Social cohesion is broken and prohibited. They rot out our brains, offer the right to treat us like dogs. The length of the sentences adds to our rage. We leave our cages where we turn around 23 out of 24 hours dehumanized, pissed off.

LA ROQUETTE: What do you call the rights of prisoners?

## 4 The Cells

GRADIGNAN: 8 $m^2$ brightly lit by security windows, a washbasin, a toilet, two closets, a copy of the rules, an intercom system. Complete isolation. The need for contact turns into delirium. I bang my head against the walls to break the monotony. You get to the point of no longer wishing for contact in order not to be reminded of anything on the outside. The intercom allows you to contact the guard and listen to the radio during certain hours. The guard can listen when he wants to the activities of a prisoner.

LOOS: The Loos prison is disgusting. The walls are filthy. There is no flush. You still have to crap in the sanitary tubs which you empty in the morning after coffee. An unbearable odor of shit reigns in the passageways.

POISSY: You sleep in hencoops. The walls are damp. No heating in the dormitories and workshops. The mice and the rats swarm.

DIJON: The cells are made for one person, but two or three prisoners inhabit them.

LA SANTÉ: Exceptionally, in the 6th division, where the accountants are lodged, the hygienic conditions are acceptable. In blocks A, B, C, D, E hygienic conditions practically do not exist.

ÉPINAL: The nonexistence of water and toilets in every cell. For physiological needs, I should admit to the existence of a chamberpot (sanitary tub) in each cell where you can put Purodor, but rationed in minimal doses, obviously. You have access to showers once a week for a length of time that does not exceed ten minutes, almost not enough time to wash your hair. Really! The sheets, changed monthly, are in a filthy state. The heating exists rather theoretically, which obliges us to keep the window closed all of the time, which, with the smell of the chamberpot, the smoke of the cigarettes, produces an absolutely stifling atmosphere. The light is very weak, which means that you cannot read for a longtime, requiring even a visit to the doctor.

METZ: Sanitary tub-bowel-pitcher system.

TOUL: I was put into a non-disinfected cell and I got scabies.

RENNES (H): Some guards enjoy watching us take care of our needs.

DOUAI: When you are on the sanitary tub and you reach for a blanket to hide yourself from the others, the guard takes it off you, tells you off and sends you to solitary for the deterioration of material.

DOUAI: We had a shower a week. We complained several times to get two showers a week—like the pigs in the pigsty.

CAEN: You are put in isolation the moment you arrive at the prison: 3, 6 or 9 months according to the punishment you should serve. In the cell, there is only a little window high up. No running water, a bowel. You are required to work by putting straw bottoms on chairs. As the straw must be moistened, you use the bowel water with which you should wash yourself. In the evening, you push the straw under the bed. You only need to go one day without working for the straw to begin to rot. When you return from the walk and enter the cell, you smell as if you live in a cowshed.

TOULOUSE: In area 4 the cells have toilets and trashcans. But in area 3 and some floors of area 2 there were only nauseous and disgusting sanitary tubs.

FRESNES (Hôpital): At Roquette, there was a bucket in the middle of the room, completely without water. At the Fresnes hospital, where I had been transferred in '68, there was a toilet in the corner and on top a faucet with a trickle of water. We were 4 to a cell. No matter that we were sick, we were required to scrub the floor in the morning: a 60-year-old woman with phlebitis, like the others. A shower every eight days, but every 15 if there were too many people.

## 5 Food

ÉPINAL: Noodle and potato based. The lack of meat, fruits, fresh vegetables is noteworthy enough. The morning coffee made with grilled barley provokes nausea. On Sunday there is no milk, perhaps to balance out the slightly more substantial meal at noon. The bread, when it is hard, is wet, then dried in the oven and it is ready for more than a week of breaking in.

FLEURY: Meat: 5 to 6 times a week. The fruits: no. Quality: canned.

FLEURY: You must buy the butter, the salt at the canteen. That costs 150 to 200F a month.

RENNES (H): As good as in the army.

MONTBÉLIARD: 150 g of beef a week half of which is fat. Rice one time, beans, lentils once a week. The other meals: potatoes. The milk is disgusting. One evening the guys at the workshop rejected the meat: there were around twenty miniscule pieces for 9 or 10.

DOUAI: Never meat. It was resold. They gave us balls of bread soaked in the jus of the meat. A fruit one time a week. The potatoes were never cooked. The food was vile.

POISSY: The food is better than average and rare. He who does not buy items at the canteen cannot maintain a healthy enough state to be able to work later.

## 6 Work

PROVINCE: Prisoners are paid 31.75F for a thousand scourers. A novice makes 200 a day; later, he gets to 500. They are resold in hardware stores for 50 centimes each. For 100 dozen clothes pins in a cardboard box, a prisoner receives 1.25F a box. A trained prisoner working at least eight hours a day gets to make two boxes a day, namely, 200 dozen for 2.50F. The concessionaire resells them for 150F per 100 dozen. The administration keeps half of the salary of the prisoner for "lodging expenses," ¼ for earnings paid on release and legal costs. ¼ is paid to the prisoner.

LA SANTÉ: I do not want to work in a cell. That yields nothing. All of the work is paid by the piece. You must, for example, screw 1000 bolts to earn a franc. And afterward, you are left with 30 centimes.

LA ROQUETTE: Work folding cardboard boxes most often. I saw: Bas Dior bags, Algocratine boxes and an advertisement for Danon. Rates: 8F for 1000 Algocratine boxes. 100 an hour is a good average. And at that point, they keep

a part for various expenses (I was never able to get an explanation why). You can also be a cleaning lady, which is to say that you are cleaning from 7 in the morning. The pay, once all of the salary deductions are made, is 50F a month. In the showers, a less difficult work, it is 34F a month.

ÉPINAL: Pharmaceutical labels. Labels to stick or to print. For example: "At the steering wheel, one's eyesight is life." In cells of 3 to 5 maximum, each one has his role: cut out the paper, pass the pad, arrange in stacks of 500, attach.

RENNES (H): I worked as an assistant (sweeping the passageway, serving the soup). For the whole day, a snack at 9AM of ½ a liter of cider. It is possible to do work in the cell (to make nets) and work in the workshop (to make chairs). 35F useful for the canteen (*cantinables*) in an account each month.

LA SANTÉ: The kitchen assistants work 10 hours a day every day without a break.

LA ROQUETTE: Accounting: .50F a day.

FLEURY: Assigned to kitchen services. I wake up at 5:30 in the morning and go back to my cell toward 6:30 in the evening. Just about 10 hours. 70 centimes a day paid every two months.

AVIGNON: We were providing laundering, the ironing of the clothes for resident personnel. We were knitting their sweaters, even those they offered as gifts. We were receiving 3F a month, a packet of Gaulouises or a chocolate bar. You did not complain about being busy, but it was unpaid work.

CAEN: At the beginning of the stay you are put in isolation (that can last 9 months). Making straw tops and bottoms for chairs is the only work to show that you are hardworking, disciplined, salvageable. The civil foreman of a concessionaire in Caen teaches the job to newcomers. For me, my first chair took me 8 days. I made three chairs the 1st month. They were angry with me. When you do not go fast enough you are deprived of cigarettes, then there is solitary (with a reprieve initially and then without a reprieve). We were paid 3F a chair. If you made one a day you earned 12F at the end of the month after all of the salary deductions. There are bonuses for certain outputs but they are eliminated at the slightest scuffle in the workshop. With a year of good behavior, on arrival at area B, you get 1/10 extra (1.20F a month). But the 1/10 of good behavior is eliminated at the slightest incident. If you save a bundle of thin straws you have a bonus of 35 centimes a bundle. It's 5 centimes for the thickest. During my whole stay my record at the workshop was 40F. If you had been a good worker on the chairs you went to the assembly shop or wood

sculpture shop. There you initially earn 70–80F, then you get to 120–150F. There was a record holder for the sculpture of the back of chairs. He got 500F. It was he whom they showed to visitors. They made him announce his salary to show that you can make money in prison. Sabotage was simple: slide fish bones down the straw of chairs. And, as in Caen, there are a lot of cats and the cat scratches so hard. . . Now it is being increased: 4.30F a chair top.

FLEURY: You make plastic lids for the Poivrosage peppershakers. You are paid one centime for 4. That makes for 2.25F a thousand. You can make on average a thousand a day. After 30,000 or 40,000 peppershakers, you can make disc pockets. They're better paid.

CAEN: In the prison, there is a big workshop and very modern machines. They are showed to people from the penitentiary administration, to future magistrates. In fact, we only fabricate chairs. For 10 or 15 years we have made the seats, feet, backs of chairs. On release, it's the only thing we know how to do. All of the prisoners work for the same concessionaire. His name is Mr Brée. He has an office at the prison. He is there with his foremen from the morning till evening. They go through the workshops. They watch. When they see that you don't give a damn they call a guard: "Look at X or Y, they are[8] not at their machine." It often happens that the guard does not go. He says that it's not his job, that he is there for discipline and not to supervise the production and profits of Mr Brée. And Mr Brée does not just sell his chairs to local churches; he sells them throughout all of France and abroad. When they have a need for a guy at a machine, they do not look to see if he is capable. They put him there. A few years ago a guy came back from Château-Thierry. He went there because, mentally, things were not going very well. He came back like a zombie: drugged to the marrow by tranquilizers. They saw very well that he did not control his movements. He walked like an automaton. The day after his arrival they put him to work on a rather difficult machine. I warned the foreman that it was not possible. Of course, he did not listen to me. It did not take a morning. His whole right hand went through it. I know it because I'm the one who swept the pieces.

CAEN: I had a work accident in the middle of winter. I sawed off the square feet of the chairs. Terrible speed. No heating. Drafts coming from everywhere. I rushed along to heat myself up. I cut off my finger. I felt nothing. The person next to me said: "Look, your finger is in the sawdust." Fainting. They put me in a stretcher, a civilian hospital, not at Fresnes. When it is a work accident, they are required to take us to a civilian hospital.

I stayed there for 45 days. Policemen guarded my room. Afterward, I had a disability pension of 12%, that is, 220F a quarter. During 2 quarters, they took half of the pension away from me. They did not have a right to touch it, not a centime. I sued on the labor relations board. They were afraid and immediately reimbursed me before the proceedings. Afterward, they did not touch it anymore.

AVIGNON: I wanted to work, but they did not want me to.

## 7 Walk, Leisure Time

*Can you describe the walk?*

LA SANTÉ: 6 m × 3 m.

FRESNES: It's a surface area between 4 walls and we come and go (3 m × 5 m).

LA SANTÉ: ½ hour in 1968. Now, ¾ hour. 2 or 3 cells side by side.15 persons in a 7 m × 4 m courtyard. The first walk at eight in the morning. It took 20 minutes, including the ascent and descent. You cannot talk for long with your companions. The guards are on the footbridge above the courtyard. Walks only in the morning. Helpers and political prisoners have their walks in the afternoon.

RENNES (H): One hour normally but often reduced to ½–¾ hour in a group of 20 or 30 in general, with the same prisoners. You are always required to walk in a courtyard of 20 × 10 m. With certain guards you can talk to other prisoners.

DOUAI: 10 steps long, 5 steps wide. If it rains, a puddle of water covering 4/5 of the walk. If it is dry and windy, black dust coming from the slag heaps. Systematic searches. No singing and outbursts of laughter. Length of time limited to 40 minutes. On Sundays you have 20 minutes because of mass. Even Muslims. August 15, 1970 falling on a Saturday, we had 20 minutes the following two days.

DIJON: Obligatory walk for half an hour in trapezoid courtyards. No shelter on rainy days. The prisoners stand up against the walls. The ground is like a huge puddle for 3 or 4 days. The prisoners are exempted from the walk only by medical order.

FRESNES: 8 days of solitary for having refused to go walk.

*How do you keep yourself busy outside of work?*

FLEURY: Cards, writing, reading.

*Sports?*

One hour a day or the walk, but not both.

*Radio?*
Yes.
*TV?*
No.
*Films?*
Yes, once on Saturday.
*Newspapers?*
*Paris-Match*, *Jours de France*, *l'Équipe*, *le Pèlerin*.
FRESNES: *Radio?*
No.
*TV?*
No.
*Films?*
If you work.
LA SANTÉ: *Sports?*
No.
*Radio?*
No.
*TV?*
No.
*Newspapers?*
*Match*, *Sélection, Jour de France*, expurgated on occasions.
RENNES (H): Politics, Jehovah's Witness. Minors can practice basketball. We have radio on Saturday from 3 to 5 and the whole day on Sunday after mass (but they cut out the news items).
*TV?*
Never.
*Films?*
Never.
*Newspapers?*
Censored *Paris-Match*, *l'Équipe*, *Tintin*, *le Pèlerin*, *la Vie Catholique*.
ÉPINAL: Non-existence of radio. The only permitted newspapers are *Jours de France, le Pèlerin, Paris-Match, Historia, l'Équipe*, etc. But even those are censored. The lack of information combined with the type of work that they give us (fastening strings to labels) leads to the complete mental dulling of the prisoner.
PROVINCE: *TV?*

A set only for the benefit of those who work at the prison (maintenance, accounting, office of the head guard). The sweepers do not have a right to it. It is available Saturday afternoon and Sunday afternoon.

*Films?*

Once a week. We have to pay: one franc. When we do not have money we cannot go, unless the social worker gives us a ticket withdrawn from the relief fund, which does not happen all of the time. The tickets are purchased at the canteen without knowing the title of the film. In general, we find that it occupies our time for a moment, allows us to reflect. They are always very old films.

*Radio?*

In the past, there was a radio with amplifiers, but the new warden had it removed.

LYON (F): On Sunday there is no workshop. You can listen to the radio (an old set in the refectory) but it must be turned off during the news.

METZ: The only "activity" here is going around in circles in the courtyard, one hour a day. No sports, no radio or television.

Isolation + idleness = mental dulling.

DOUAI: No sports, no radio, no TV. Never film. No organized leisure activity: only mass and choir. Buy a paper and write but everything that you write is censurable and censored. The same for all drawings. No painting. We issued pamphlets to complain about the right to information.

PROVINCE: *Can you practice a sport?*

If you work to amass a little money you do not have the time to play sports.

*Can you listen to the radio?*

No.

*The TV?*

On Sunday afternoon after I work.

*Film?*

One showing only for Christmas.

*What newspapers can you read?*

Sports newspapers only.[9]

## 8 Medical Care

TOUL: *Under what conditions can you go to the hospital?*

When you are almost dead.

*Have you been sick without going to the hospital or health services?*

Yes.

*What medications did they give you?*

Phenobarbital. Phenegran.
*Have you seen a psychiatrist?*
No.
*A psychologist?*
No.
*Are your teeth treated?*
They are very well treated when you pay, if you insist a lot.
PROVINCE: *Under what conditions can you go to health services?*
You must be in a coma.
*Have you been sick without going to the hospital or health services?*
Yes and treatment was refused.
*Are your teeth treated?*
If you ask to see the dentist and you have to pay for it!
FRESNES: *Under what conditions can you go to health services?*
None during the night even if you are dying.
FLEURY: *How is the medical examination?*
Questioned by the doctor without an auscultation.
LA SANTÉ: *Can you describe how the medical examination goes?*
Too rapidly, making it impossible to be well examined.
*Under what conditions can you go to health services?*
You really must alert everybody to be taken into consideration.
*What medication did they give you?*
Valium, Methotrimeprazine, Theralene.
AVIGNON: *How is a medical examination?*
In the presence of a guard (which is revolting). Sometimes 2 or 3 of us have a medical examination at the same time. So, you are never alone with the doctor.
*In case of a sickness can you see the doctor immediately?*
At night, no. It is difficult to make yourself heard by the guard.
LA SANTÉ: You can be sick as a dog. The doctor will not come. Everything goes through the warden. You write to the warden that you want to see the doctor. The warden judges the reason. The doctor almost never comes to the cell. You should go to health services. Aspro for everything. In prison, you already go to the hairdresser, then visit the psychiatrist the same evening. Upon entry everyone goes to the psychiatrist: at what age did you pee in your pants? Did you sleep with your mother, with your sister? After the psychiatrist, the doctor.

LA SANTÉ: *Can you tell us how a medical examination goes?*
Neither better nor worse than in an SS clinic.
LA SANTÉ: *Can you tell us how a medical examination goes?*
Like elsewhere in occupational health systems.
LA SANTÉ: A medical examination lasts exactly 6 or 7 hours, all afternoon. Immediately after soup, they take you into a 3 m by 5.30 m room, with prisoners from other divisions, then they count how many of you there are and you wait. At the end of a few hours they make you leave 2 or 3 at a time. They make you strip down in the hallway and you wait your turn. But, rest assured, the doctor never spends more than a minute on a prisoner no matter what you have. It's always the same treatment, Aspirin, Valium, and Oxazepam, and, as soon as there is a search of the cell, the guards take these medications. It appears that we do not have the right to have them.
LA ROQUETTE: In the first week, there is a blood test, a gynecological cancer screening and a lung X-ray made with such a dilapidated machine that it surely escapes all safety rules. You see the doctor once a week. But it was not possible for me to see him in the meantime, when I had an enormous boil that had become infected, then a cough that kept the girl in my neighboring cell from sleeping. The doctor does not examine us. At best, he poses questions and takes our blood pressure. Moreover, there are often errors in the medications distributed in the evening or morning.
AVIGNON: *Can you tell us how a medical examination goes?*
No approaching the doctor (2 m around). It's he who approaches you.
*Under what conditions can you go to health services?*
When you are almost dead.
*Have you been to health services, to the hospital?*
I went to both. I wanted to hang myself and slit my veins.
*Under what conditions can you go to the hospital?*
I went there because I had swallowed a spoon.
*Have you seen a psychiatrist?*
Yes.
*A psychologist?*
Yes.
*Are your teeth treated?*
As a defendant, yes; as a convict, pulled out.
FLEURY: The doctor does not come immediately. You must be half dead to go to health services. Aspro for every sickness. Medical care: a childhood friend

imprisoned for 18 months had a toothache. They extracted it for him. He still had a toothache. They left it and said: "We took out your tooth." "But I am sick." "You want to go to health services to take a rest. It's well-known." His mother coming from the visiting room told him: "Ask to be treated." He did not want to. The ache was too painful. His mother lodged a complaint. They made him transfer to Fresnes hospital. His condition having been judged too serious, he was hospitalized at Salpétrière. He had been without care for a longtime. He had a cancerous cyst.

POISSY: In these last months there was a prisoner who had multiple sclerosis. There came a point when he could not retain his urine and feces. It was insubordination for the guards, for the warden. They punished him. It was at the end of several weeks that they realized that maybe it was not only ill will. They ended up sending him to the Fresnes hospital.

FRESNES: Every three months there is a voluntary blood drive for the hospitals. In exchange, they give us 3 cigarettes, 2 sandwiches, a lemonade.

CAEN: We all wanted to go to the blood drive. For the sandwich, for the nurses, for the candy.

## 9 Surveillance, Hazings

FLEURY: *What do you have to say about discipline?*
Too harsh.
*Guards?*
We are dogs for them.
*Have you been to the hearing room?*
Yes.
*For what reason?*
Revolt.
*Penalized?*
Yes.
*In solitary?*
Yes, two months in fourteen.
FLEURY: *Can you describe the surveillance system?*
At every moment, day and night through the peephole.
*How do the guards treat you?*
Like dogs.
*What hazings do you stand ready to make known?*
When you write to the guards or directors, you do not get a response.

FLEURY: *What do you have to say about discipline?*
Oh, whatever, idiotic remarks.
*Guards?*
The majority: illiterate and unsympathetic.
TOUL: *Can you describe the surveillance system?*
Every hour of the night a guard watches through the bull's eye.
*What hazings are you ready to make known?*
There are very few kind guards but many bad ones.
*Have you been to the hearing room?*
Once for an unjustified medical examination: I was losing my hair and I had sore gums.
FRESNES: *Can you describe the surveillance system?*
Guards appear on each floor every 10 minutes. They watch the cell. They check the bars every day.
AVIGNON: *The guards?*
That depends on the guards. Like dogs, let's say.
ÉPINAL: The behavior of the guards is highly variable depending in general on the quality of the alcohol drank during the day. The prisoner should not lie down in bed during the day. The prisoner can speak only with his cell companions, though in such a way that the conversation is not heard on the other side of the door.
LA ROQUETTE: *Hazings?*
On many occasions and bearing on insignificant details:

- the manner of stretching out your bowl and plate is never right
- you must get dressed, including your coat, in the cell whereas you are undressed again a few seconds later to be searched.
- the changing of cells for no reason is always hard even for those who are alone (they know their neighbors and can always communicate)
- not just the regulatory searches before and after the visit of the lawyer, before and after court, but also unexpectedly in the cell. It must be confirmed that no prisoner sneaks food or a word into the courtyard of the walk.
- all forms of solidarity are prohibited. I had to throw away a large part of my Christmas parcel that risked going rotten rather than send it to another even completely unknown prisoner.
- all hysterics are considered like a comedy and can be severely punished. It is obvious that "all prisoners are lying."

LA ROQUETTE: One of the intentions is to make each prisoner crawl. I heard some guards take a sadistic pleasure in humiliation. For example, in refusing to give work to a prisoner who needed money in order to make him beg. To maintain my spirit of revolt and maybe to give some ideas to those who could hear the shouts of the guards, I tried to banish "Thank you" and "Please" from my vocabulary. And this simple measure put some guards in a state of rage that cheered me up.

LA ROQUETTE: *Hazings?*

They are so numerous. The prisoner is not treated like a human being.

LA SANTÉ: *How are you supervised?*

They are part of it just like us. There is a head guard who terrorized the guards on our floor. He hid behind the staircase to surprise them. In the morning, he yelled, he exhausted the prisoners with orders that were as stupid as they were useless. "Walk along the walls, button your jacket, one behind the other, etc." His principal pleasure was the hunt for (authorized) magazines that prisoners had the secret habit of exchanging during the walks. When he found them, he tore them apart. In the afternoon, he was calmer. It is true that he was drunk.

LA SANTÉ: *How are you supervised?*

How could you make a guard understand that he has a human being in front of him when he himself is poorly treated by his superiors? I saw a guard completely panic in the presence of an especially formidable sergeant.

GRADIGNAN: *How are you supervised?*

The guard, sergeant, head guard, warden, examining magistrate.

SAINT-MALO: *How are you supervised?*

In prison, as in the psychiatric hospital, it is better to be quiet.

LA SANTÉ: *How are you supervised?*

By the mentally ill.

LA SANTÉ: *How are you supervised?*

The despicable peephole. There are times when it has no importance. There are others on the other hand . . . I did often see an eye looking at me while I was bathing or sitting on the toilet.

## 10 The Search

LA SANTÉ: The guards make a whole cell go into the hallways. You are lined up against the wall, arms behind the back in a hallway 60 cm wide. They turn everything upside down and do not at all tidy up. Everything that you

bought at the canteen is overturned—sugar, jam, etc. This search takes places regularly 3 times a week.

LA SANTÉ: To get completely undressed in front of two men in uniform: "Turn around, bend over, cough."

LA SANTÉ: There exists an infinity of ways of doing the search. I saw some searchers satisfy themselves by reading a magazine, some books, smoking a cigarette. It also happens that they are gripped by frenzy. And when you return to your cell you find everything heaped on the ground, the laundry undone, books spread out, lessons scattered. If you protest, solitary is at the end for you.

PROVINCE: They put you nude in the hallway. Some guards are not ashamed of groping you. The last time they took all the cigarette butts we set aside. A photo of my fiancé. We complained. They told us to take it up with the head guard. As that would have been solitary we could say nothing.

## 11 The Hearing Room and Solitary

LA ROQUETTE: In addition to daily hazings, there are punishments due to reports driven by "lack of respect for the guard" (arbitrary power is of course total since a prisoner can only be lying) or by an infraction of the rules. You go to the hearing room made up of the warden and different heads. Examples of punishments:

- elimination of books (4 a week), of films (every 15 days), of cigarettes
- transfer to the 2nd division where the prisoners are always alone except during walks
- elimination of food except bread and soup during some days

LA SANTÉ: It's in the hearing room that solitary is decided. The general sergeant, warden, assistant warden, 2 guards. There are two guards who remain at the door. First of all, in the lead, the job applications (you write to the warden, you say whether you want to be an assistant, the guard makes a report, you are called to the hearing room). The warden arrives at the hearing room completely informed: you cannot look at him. You have your nose against the wall.

TOULOUSE: I should have gone before the hearing room and probably gone to solitary if I had not been released before the set date. The reason: having sent with other comrades a letter to the warden to ask him for an improvement of hygienic conditions in the prison. I had been targeted because I had signed

the letter and I had not signed it personally, petitions and other collective actions being prohibited.

DIJON: The price of punishments is: 4 days: minor injuries to guards; 8–10 days: fights between prisoners, injuries to guards, accumulation of medicines: 1 month or more: escape, attempts, guard attacks.

FLEURY: Solitary is not human. Alone in a hole you do not see the day. Deprived of mail, of tobacco, of visits. No right to sit or lie down from 7 in the morning until 9 in the evening.

RENNES (H): Confined all day, double doors, double bars. Barred windows. A meal every other day. Out for half an hour every other day. Mattresses in the evening taken away in the morning.4 m by 2 m cells. I heard of 3 suicides (hanging, slashing veins, spoon swallowing).

LA SANTÉ: A room without a window with an electric light day and night. Since 1970 we can have 10 packets of cigarettes instead of 3. You can remain alone because you are isolated from all materials: padlocked bed, stool fixed to the ground, no sheets, a very thick blanket. No possibility of suicide. Before '68, you were on the ground. Mice visited you. You loved them. You saw someone. They give tranquilizers to live there.

RENNES (F): A prisoner stayed in solitary for two months (quarrel with another prisoner who squealed on him). Dressed in penal attire, he was thrown into a miniscule cubbyhole with a filthy straw mattress, a permanent semi-obscurity, ¼ hour walk, the impossibility of reading, writing, receiving letters, even from family, or having any activity. A little bowl of water a day to wash, a slop pail emptied once every 24 hours. It was several years ago: they gave him normal meals on alternate days (the other day, bread and soup equivalent to water). It seems that now they give something to eat every day. All of it animated by shouts of neighbors beat up by guard-men.

DIJON: A straw mattress given only for the night, placed on a slab of cement. Toilets but no washbasin; a bowl but no water faucet. The regime was humanized a little bit. The deprivation of foods 3 days a week does not last longer than 8 days rather than 15. The prisoner can read and write. There is a one-hour walk in the afternoon.

MONTBÉLIARD: There is a table fixed to the wall and a concrete seat. The bed is sealed to the wall. They take the mattresses during the day. You can sit, but you must not get caught: you get up the moment you believe that a guard arrives. During the first 15 days, you have half-rations, and in any case never meat. At the end of 15 days, you receive the same food as the others.

There is no heating. In the night, you have 3 to 5 blankets but during the day, if it is winter, it's not bearable. You do not have water. If you want to wash, you must bang against the door. You are more often beat up than elsewhere. If the guard is in a bad mood he calls two or three others and you get your thrashing.

BESANÇON: I was there a few years ago. There were two thick doors there. And no bed, a sloping board: 40 cm of ground for the head, 20 cm at the feet. I was 14 years old when I was there. I was in the area for minors. I was there one day, then two, then four, then eight. The worst is that you hear nothing, absolutely nothing. Not even street noise. You are completely disoriented. Very quickly, you no longer know what time it is, how many days went by. You cannot receive visits. I did not have to complain. My mother came to see me on X's moped. They allowed the visit even though I was in solitary.

TOULOUSE: In solitary, they hit willingly. They put a blanket on tied victims (so that the identity of the guards is not known). A while ago a prisoner-laborer (*corvetier*) was tied by the feet to the central heating pipes. They tied up one arm in front, one arm behind and 4 guards hit him. The new warden is against it, which puts him at odds with the guards.

FLEURY: Even though we are in a model prison, there are concentration cells. Tied to the bed: a strap on each ankle, a strap on the waist, a strap on each wrist that they detach for meals. Of course, they give you tranquilizers. And it's the doctor who comes to say whether you are "calm" enough to be detached. But if the doctor finds that you're still not doing well or if it occurs to him not to show up you wait several days tied up.

LA SANTÉ: It is rare for them to leave you tied up with hands behind the back for more than 48 hours. Nowadays they are wary: when you are left with arms behind the back you are so stiffened that you can no longer put your arms back in front. The nurse and doctor are required to massage for a longtime.

## 12 The suicides, strikes, revolts

CAEN: The neurologist comes once a week. This doctor is very good. The other days we depend on the guards. There was a guy who was not doing well at all because of his wife. It had been two days since he last ate. I said to him: "Eat, you must not get discouraged." I felt it coming. In the evening, he told the guard: "Things aren't going well. Give me tranquilizers. I'm cracking up." The guard shouted. At closing, he double bound him. The guy hung himself at night. The guard did not come during the night. He did not make his

rounds. He got a hammering because, naturally, the guards go back and forth between themselves.

PROVINCE: I have a companion who is an alcoholic. It's always when he is in a drunken state that he commits his offenses. He asked the sentencing judge permission to be in detox. The judge agreed. It was necessary for him to be partially released from the prison in order put his aversion to alcohol to the test at the psychiatric hospital. At the last moment, the judge refused: it was always the same judge. So, he started a hunger strike. I really think that it is still taking place.

CAEN: A prison visitor was forced out in 1964. She broke up a married couple. The prisoner's wife was also doing time. They could not see each other, and this visitor was supposed to work out everything. She did the opposite. She told the wife: "Forget about him." Women and breakups are often the cause of suicides. I tried to kill myself three times.

FRESNES: While I was being treated at the Frenses hospital, they told me that every week surgeons saw guys who had swallowed anything: nails, razor blades, glass, metal buttons. One guy came back seven times. There was one who had a carpenter's nail driven through the skull. The surgeon collects what he finds in the stomach and belly of people, which put him into conflict with the administration. He brought a jar full of objects found in bellies. It seems that he wanted to show it all at a conference. The warden had a memorandum put out: all objects found in the belly of prisoners belong to the penitentiary administration.

PROVINCE: Individual revolts or revolts in groups of 2 or 3 are frequent. Over the course of these last years, I heard about a general refusal of food.

FRESNES: Before I entered there was a hunger strike because of the food. There was also an attempted resistance by others sentenced to solitary and by myself. But we were bludgeoned and forcibly locked up in solitary.

CAEN: One day at the workshop a guard who had been looking to get me for eight years came up to the drill where I work. "You make too much dust." I said nothing. I carried on. He shouted: "You should not take me for a ride." I landed a right on this asshole with glasses. I kick boxed him on the ground. "I know how much I will get. You are also going to get 3 months in the hospital. 90 days for 90 days in solitary so that at least we are even." It took them three hours to get me and throw me into solitary. In the cell I broke everything, piled everything behind the door. I had an 18 cm blade that I sharpened at the workshop. I made a breastplate for myself around my waist, protecting my

belly and genitals, with chair rungs and barbed wire. They flung three teargas bombs at me. They were not allowed to but during my time it happened 5 or 6 times at Caen. In solitary, 7 days later, as I was tied to a pipe, 7 of them descended on me. I was KO. They were still hitting.

TOUL: Hunger strikes happen very often. They happened between 1969 and 1970 when I was there. Many prisoners did not work and wanted to be transferred to learn a trade and work. They were received by a categorical refusal and agreed to do a hunger strike. They were put in solitary until they submitted. A guy who nearly died after having opened the veins of his arms was transported to the hospital for a blood transfusion. After having gone into hysterics another guy was attached to a straitjacket for 10 days without being detached to wash or relieve his needs which piled up around him, breathing his needs which piled up around him for 10 days in this manner.

LOOS: In the winter of 1969 the heating was out of order and during one month we froze to death without it, as it was—8° outside. They gave us a supplementary blanket. And the guards prohibited us from going to bed during the day. They gave you reports. I had several and when they asked me why I sleep, I told them that it was to reheat myself. The warden said to me: "You only have to run in your cell." Or again "you only had to not come here." I also started a hunger strike, always so that we could have heating. They put me in solitary for 8 days and bludgeoned me. I wished to write to Pleven.[10] They tore up the letters. They put me in isolation because I incited my friends to do like me. I wanted to fight to the very end in writing to my lawyer. The warden told me: "You no longer have the right to write to your lawyer. You are no longer a defendant." Out of anger, I put my finger in his face. So, that had been my party. The next day the warden came to see me saying to me: "What you did is very serious. You risk six more months." He tried to have me blackmailed. He told me: "If you stop writing, going on a hunger strike, inciting your friends to revolt, I will not lodge a complaint." As a result, I told him that I very much wanted to go before the court. At least it would have been an occasion for me to denounce the regime that they make us live. He left telling me: "You will remain in isolation until your release." And I actually stayed there. I wished to commit suicide by cutting my veins open, but all went well for me.

CAEN: I knew of revolts with OAS[11] political prisoners in 1963 in Caen. The political prisoners wanted to smash our faces. We did not like them so much. Guys from the army, the paramilitary, the French colonial army. They broke

their doors, then clashed with the guards. We ourselves got out and we beat the guards. In solitary, the guards broke the two arms of X.

FLEURY: There was a revolt on 12 May 1970. That began with a walk of prisoners from the third floor of the D4 three bladed building (*tripale*). GP[12] Maoists were with them. They wanted to get 2 hours of walking instead of only one. They took all of the sports equipment: dumbbells, weights. They broke the wall bars to make them into clubs. Some went up the roof to harangue the others. All of the prisoners on the other floors were put to banging against the doors and to throwing what they could through the windows. There were foam mattresses that were cut up, set on fire and thrown in the courtyard. The warden sent for the antiriot police there to use teargas. Later on, during the hunger strike of political prisoners, there were around twenty guys who went on strike to demand the abolition of preventative detention for light penalties. But the department head went to see them one on one. So that did not last.

LA SANTÉ: We heard that at Fresnes there was a hunger strike for the reduction of long sentences. The hunger strike is a part of the Muslim block on Friday evenings. They protested against conditions of detention and they stood with Fresnes for the reduction of big long sentences. In two days, that spread throughout the whole of La Santé, except C block—the one for assistants, who are always afraid of being transferred. On the walk we decided to ask for 2 showers and a bar of soap a week. On Monday, we put ourselves to work on tracts. We cut out *le Figaro Littéraire* and stuck the letters. And then we set ourselves to knocking down the doors: it suffices to knock not very hard but all together and continually. Then that creates a terrible noise outside that can be heard even on the street and above all in the summer when all the windows are open. The guards go crazy. It is enough to stop knocking when they approach the cell[13] to avoid being spotted, while it continues elsewhere and gets going again in the cell they had just gone by. The Muslims burned their straw mattresses and threw them through the window. It was no longer possible to burn the doors after the big revolt of 1967. They were all replaced with metal doors. It has been a long time since the floors were gone. When the Muslims began to break open the doors they called the CRS which threw 2 or 3 teargas grenades in each cell. There were up to 250 persons in solitary, above all Muslims. Some of them had their skulls smashed and were transported to Fresnes. They dispersed the others in the provinces. During this time the guards worked to rule. Since 1956 they have gone on strike and where the

guys from La Santé were revolting they no longer had the right to strike. So in 1970 they worked to rule. Instead of calling 40 persons at the same time for the lawyers they called them one by one. The lawyers and the visitors complained about waiting. The head guards were required to do the job and, in addition, they did not want to tell us that the guards were on strike. They were afraid of collusion.

## Notes

1 Translator's note: The CRS is the acronym for the Republican Security Companies, the French riot police.
2 Translator's note: The CNTE is the acronym for the National Center for Distance Education.
3 Translator's note: SIMCA is the acronym for the Industrial Society of Mechanical and Automotive Bodies, a French automobile company.
4 Translator's note: The P and T is the acronym the Post, Telegraph, and Telephone Administration.
5 Translator's note: The SNCF is the acronym for the French National Railway Corporation.
6 Translator's note: The preceding part of this sentence is mistakenly printed twice in succession in the original pamphlet.
7 For security reasons, we cannot specify the locality of certain prisons.
8 Translator's note: *Sont*, the third person plural form the verb to be in French, appears misprinted as *sons* in the pamphlet.
9 List of the weeklies and monthlies permitted at La Santé: *l'Équipe*, *France Football*, *Miroir-Sprint*, *Point de Vue*, *Paris-Match*, *Jours de France*, *Mickey, Pilote*, *Entreprise*, *La Vie française*, *l'Usine Nouvelle*, *Tel Quel*, *Le Pèlerin*, *Bunta*, *Epoca*, *Europeo*, *Mundial*, *Blanco y Negro*, *Times*, *L'Auto-Journal*, *l'Auto-mobile*, *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, *Le Chasseur français*, *L'Action automobile*, *Constellation*, *Sélection*, *Lectures pour tous*, *Neptune nautisme*, *Bateaux*, *Les Cahiers du yachting*, *Arts et Décoration*, *La Vie des bêtes*, *Historia*, *Historama*, *Miroir de l'Histoire*, *Caravaning*, *Aviation Magazine*, crosswords (different publications).
10 Translator's note: René Pleven was Minister of Justice from 1969 to 1973.
11 Translator's note: OAS is the acronym for the Organization of the Secret Army.
12 Translator's note: GP is the acronym for the Proletarian Left.
13 Translator's note: *Cellule*, the French word for cell, appears misprinted as *vellule* in the pamphlet.

# Bibliography

## Published works by Michel Foucault


Foucault, Michel. "Création d'un Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons." *Esprit*. March 1971a, 531–2.

—. "Je perçois l'intolérable." *Journal de Génève*. July 24, 1971b, Samedi litérraire, 3.

—. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." In *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, edited by Donald F. Bouchard, translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, 139–64. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977.

—. "The Eye of Power." In *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, 146–65. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980a.

—. "The History of Sexuality." In *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, 183–93. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980b.

—. "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century." In *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, 166–82. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980c.

—. "Interview de Michel Foucault." *Actes* 45–46 (June 1984a): 3–6.

—. "Politics and Ethics: An Interview." In *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow, 373–80. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984b.

—. *The Care of the Self: Volume 3 of The History of Sexuality*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1988.

—. *The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990a.

—. *The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990b.

—. "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth." *Political Theory* 21, no. 2 (May 1993): 198–227.

—. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

—. "The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom." In *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, edited by Paul Rabinow, Vol. 1, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Robert Hurley et al., 281–301. New York: The New Press, 1997a.

—. "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress." In *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, edited by Paul Rabinow, Vol. 1, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Robert Hurley et al., 253–80. New York: The New Press, 1997b.
—. "The Punitive Society." In *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, edited by Paul Rabinow, Vol. 1, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Robert Hurley et al., 23–37. New York: The New Press, 1997c.
—. "Interview with Michel Foucault." In *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, edited by Paul Rabinow. Vol. 3, *Power*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley et al., 239–97. New York: The New Press, 2000a.
—. "The Moral and Social Experience of the Poles Can No Longer Be Obliterated." In *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, edited by Paul Rabinow. Vol. 3, *Power*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley et al., 465–73. New York: The New Press, 2000b.
—. "The Subject and Power." In *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, edited by Paul Rabinow. Vol. 3, *Power*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley et al., 326–48. New York: The New Press, 2000c.
—. "Truth and Power." In *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, edited by Paul Rabinow. Vol. 3, *Power*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley et al., 111–33. New York: The New Press, 2000d.
—. "L'article 15." In *Dits et écrits,1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1066–77. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001a.
—. "'En abandonnant les Polonais, nous renonçons à une partie de nous-mêmes.'" In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 1159–62. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001b.
—. "L'esprit d'un monde sans esprit." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 743–55. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001c.
—. *Fearless Speech*. Edited by Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001.
—. "Je perçois l'intolérable." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1071–3. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001d.
—. "Le premier pas de la colonisation de l'Occident." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 1080–8. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001e.
—. "Des questions de Michel Foucault à Hérodote." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 94–5. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001f.
—. "Rapports de la commission d'information sur l'affaire Jaubert." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1066–77. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001g.

—. "Les réponses de Pierre Vidal-Naquet et de Michel Foucault." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 1029. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001h.

—. "(Sur les prisons)." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 1, *1954–1975*, 1043–4. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001i.

—. "Toujours les prisons." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 915–18. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001j.

—. "Va-t-on extrader Klaus Croissant?" In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange, Vol. 2, *1976–1988*, 361–5. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001k.

—. *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975*. Edited by Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2003a.

—. "Le discours de Toul." In *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons: Archives d'une lutte, 1970–1972*, edited by Artières, Philippe, Laurent Quéro and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, 167–8. Paris: Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003b.

—. "Il y a un an à peu près. . ." In *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons: Archives d'une lutte, 1970–1972*, edited by Artières, Philippe, Laurent Quéro and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, 197–9. Paris: Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003c.

—. "Non, ce n'est pas une enquête officielle. . ." In *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons: Archives d'une lutte, 1970–1972*, edited by Artières, Philippe, Laurent Quéro and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, 65–8. Paris: Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003d.

—. "Pour échapper à leur prison. . ." In *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons: Archives d'une lutte, 1970–1972*, edited by Artières, Philippe, Laurent Quéro and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, 151–5. Paris: Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003e.

—. *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976*. Edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003f.

—. "Dialogue between Michel Foucault and Baqir Parham." In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, 183–9. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005a.

—. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982.* Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005b.

—. "Iran: the Spirit of a World without Spirit." In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, 250–60. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005c.

—. "Is It Useless to Revolt?" In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, 263–7. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005d.

—. "The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt." In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, 220–3. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005e.

—. "The Revolt in Iran Spreads on Cassette Tapes." In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, 216–20. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005f.

—. "Tehran: Faith against the Shah." In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, 198–203. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005g.

—. *History of Madness*. Edited by Jean Khalfa. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. New York: Routledge, 2006a.

—. *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–1974*. Edited by Jacques Lagrange. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006b.

—. "The Incorporation of the Hospital into Modern Technology." In *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, edited by Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, 141–51. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007a.

—. "The Meshes of Power." In *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, edited by Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, 153–62. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007b.

—. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007c.

—. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.

—. *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983*. Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010.

—. *The Courage of Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984*. Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.

Foucault, Michel, Catharine von Bülow, and Daniel Defert. "The Masked Assassination." In *Warfare in the American Homeland: Policing and Prison in a Penal Democracy*, edited by Joy James, 140–58. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.

## Unpublished works by Michel Foucault

Foucault, Michel. "La société punitive." 1972–1973. TS by Jacques Lagrange. Bureau de Mme Marie Renée-Cazaban, Service de Bibliothèques et Archives. Collège de France, Paris, France.

—. "[Discussion avec la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire destinée au journal Rouge]." Early 1978. C 82. Audio Cassette. Fonds Foucault. Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.
—. "Entrentiens Trombadori – Foucault (s.l.n.d.)." December 1978. D 227. TS. Fonds Foucault. Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.
—. "Discussion with Philosophers." 23 October 1980. C 16. Audio Disc. Fonds Foucault. Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.
—. "Émission radiophonique sur la situation en Pologne." 16 December 1981. C 154. Audio Cassette. Fonds Foucault. Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine, Paris, France.

## Other works

Afary, Janet and Kevin B. Anderson. *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
Almond, Ian. "'The Madness of Islam': Foucault's Occident and the Revolution in Iran." *Radical Philosophy* 128 (November/December 2004): 12–22.
Arendt, Hannah. *On Violence*. New York: A Harvest Book, 1969.
—. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: A Harvest Book, 1985.
Artières, Philippe, Laurent Quéro, and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, eds. *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons: Archives d'une lutte, 1970–1972*. Paris: Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003.
Badiou, Alain. *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*. Translated by Peter Hallward. New York: Verso, 2001a.
—. "Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou." In *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, translated by Peter Hallward, 95–144. New York: Verso, 2001b.
Beaulieu, Alain. "Towards a liberal Utopia: The connection between Foucault's reporting on the Iranian Revolution and the ethical turn." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 36, no. 7 (September 2010): 801–18.
Bernauer, James. "An uncritical Foucault? Foucault and the Iranian Revolution." Review of *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson. *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 32, no. 6 (September 2006): 781–6.
Bosteels, Bruno. "Post-Maoism: Badiou and Politics." Special issue, *positions: east asia cultures critique* 13, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 575–634.
Brich, Cecile. "The Groupe d'Information sur les prisons: The voice of prisoners? Or Foucault's?" *Foucault Studies* 5 (January 2008): 26–47.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited by Anatol Rapoport. New York: Penguin Classics, 1968.

Confédération Française des Travailleurs Démocratique, ed. *Michel Foucault, une histoire de la vérité*. Paris: Syros, 1985.

Defert, Daniel. "Chronologie." In *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, Vol. 1, *1954–1975*, by Michel Foucault, 13–90. Edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001a.

—. Note to "Préface" in *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, Vol. 1, *1954–1975*, by Michel Foucault, 1063. Edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the assistance of Jacques Lagrange. Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2001b.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Foucault*. Translated and edited by Seán Hand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.

—. "The Intellectual and Politics: Foucault and the Prison." *History of the Present* 1, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 1–2, 20–1.

Duffield, Mark. *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*. Malden, MA: Polity, 2007.

Eribon, Didier. *Michel Foucault*. Translated by Betsy Wing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Fanon, Frantz. *A Dying Colonialism*. Translated by Haakon Chevalier. New York: Grove Press, 1965.

—. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press, 2004.

Fields, A. Belden. *Trotskyism and Maoism: Theory and Practice in France and the United States*. New York: Praeger, 1988.

Gandal, Keith. "Michel Foucault: Intellectual Work and Politics." *Telos* 67 (Spring 1986): 121–34.

Genet, Jean. *Prisoner of Love*. Translated by Barbara Bray. New York: New York Review Books, 2003.

Gordon, Colin. "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction." In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, 1–51. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons. *L'Assassinat de George Jackson*. Paris: Gallimard, 1971a.

—. *Enquête dans une prison-modèle: Fleury-Mérogis*. Paris: Champ Libre, 1971b.

—. *Enquête dans 20 prisons*. Paris: Champ Libre, 1971c.

—. *Suicides de prison*. Paris: Gallimard, 1973.

Hardt, Michael. "Militant Life." Review of *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, Cours au Collège de France, 1982–1983* and *Le courage de la vérité: Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II, Cours au Collège de France, 1983–1984*, by Michel Foucault. *New Left Review* 64 (July/August 2010): 151–60.

Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. *Commonwealth*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.

Hoffman, Marcelo. "Containments of the Unpredictable in Arendt and Foucault." *Telos* 154 (Spring 2011): 141–62.

Honig, Bonnie. "What Foucault Saw at the Revolution: on the Use and Abuse of Theology for Politics." Review of *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, by Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson. *Political Theory* 36, no. 2 (April 2008): 301–12.

Kurusawa, Fuyuki. "The Exotic Effect: Foucault and the Question of Cultural Alterity." *European Journal of Social Theory* 2, no. 2 (May 1999): 147–65.

*Le Matin.* December 21, 1981.

*Le Monde*. "Plusieurs personnalités regrettent 'le silence des autorités françaises'." February 4, 1976.

Lenin, V. I. "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism." In *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, *December 1915–July 1916*, edited by George Hanna, translated by Yuri Sdobnikov, 185–304. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964.

—. "Letters from Afar." In *Revolution at the Gates: A Selection of Writings from February to October 1917*, edited by Slavoj Žižek, 15–55. New York: Verso, 2002.

Macey, David. *The Lives of Michel Foucault*. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

Marx, Karl. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.

—. "The Civil War in France." In *Marx: Later Political Writings*, edited and translated by Terrell Carver, 163–207. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. "Manifesto of the Communist Party." In *Marx: Later Political Writings*, edited and translated by Terrell Carver, 1–30. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Mauriac, Claude. *Le Temps immobile 9. Mauriac et fils*. Paris: Grasset, 1986.

Miller, James. *The Passion of Michel Foucault*. New York: Anchor Books, 1993.

Nealon, Jeffrey T. *Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications Since 1984*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Negri, Antonio. *The Porcelain Workshop: For a New Grammar of Politics*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008.

Neocleous, Mark. *Critique of Security*. Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008.

Paras, Eric. *Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge*. New York: Other Press, 2006.

Patton, Paul. *Deleuze and the Political*. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Philp, Mark. "Foucault on Power: A Problem in Radical Translation?" *Political Theory* 36, no. 2 (February 1983): 29–52.

Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.

Rancière, Jacques. *Hatred of Democracy*. Translated by Steve Corcoran. New York: Verso, 2006.

Reid, Julian. *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity, and the Defence of Logistical Societies*. New York: Manchester University Press, 2006.

Revel, Judith. *Dictionnaire Foucault*. Paris: Ellipses, 2007.

Rose, Édith. "Rapport de Mme Rose psychiatre de la Centrale de Toul." In Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel*, Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, 164–6.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *On the Social Contract*. Edited and translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.

Scullion, Rosemarie. "Michel Foucault: the Orientalist: On Revolutionary Iran and the 'Spirit of Islam'." *South Central Review* 12, no. 2 (1995): 16–40.

Senellart, Michel. "Course Context." In *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, by Michel Foucault, 369–401. Translated by Graham Burchell. Edited by Michel Senellart. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Walzer, Michael. "The Politics of Michel Foucault." *Dissent* 30 (Fall 1983): 481–90.

Welch, Michael. "Pastoral power as penal resistance: Foucault and the Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons." *Punishment & Society* 12, no. 1 (January 2010): 47–63.

Wright, Steve. *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002.

Zanotti, Laura. *Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011.

Žižek, Slavoj. *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce*. New York: Verso, 2009.

# Index


Abadan 114
Abeille, Louis-Paul 103, 106, 113, 115
abnormal 30–1
*Abnormal* (Foucault) 54–5, 96
Afary, Janet 5, 15, 94
Agamben, Giorgio 91n. 129, 116, 120n. 85, 138
agonism 83
aleatory events 70, 99, 109
alethurgy 137
Alexander 140
Algeria 113
Almond, Ian 94
Americas 61
analyses of power *see also* political militancy; political practices
  dialectic between Foucault's political practices and 11
  dialectical interplay between Foucault's major political engagements and 12
  dialectical interplay between Foucault's political engagements and his 133
  dialectical interplay between Foucault's political practices and 8–9
  dialectical interplay between Foucault's militant political practices and his 124
anarchism 73, 140
anarchists 74
ancient Greek literature 128
ancient Greek political life 101
Anderson, Kevin 5, 15, 94
animal life 140–1
animality 140–1
anti-disciplinary movements 8, 39
anti-psychiatry 3
antiquity
  classical 126
  exercise of sovereign power in 120n. 85
  Greco-Roman 1, 11, 26, 123–4, 142
  Greek 141, 147n. 99
  political thought of 83
  return to 125
*aphrodisia* 85
Apollo 138, 147n. 99
archaeology 94
*The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault) 2
archaeology of madness 3
Arendt, Hannah 58, 62, 83–4, 91n. 129
army 32, 64, 68, 78–9, 131
  Polish 130
art of distributions 27–9
*The Assassination of George Jackson* (GIP) 23
Association for the Rights of the Detained 24

Baader-Meinhof Gang 4
Badiou, Alain 5, 23, 142
barbarian 66
  filterings of 66–7
bare life 138
Basque separatists 4
Baudrillard, Jean 152
Beaulieu, Alain 5, 77
Beccaria, Cesare 25
Bentham, Jeremy 32–3, 35
Bernauer, James 95
Berkeley 82
biopolitical life 125, 152
biopolitics 8, 10, 62, 70–2, 74–5, 93–6, 98–100, 102, 105, 107–9, 116, 120–1n. 85, 125, 151–2
*The Biopolitics of the War on Terror* (Reid) 151
biopower 71–3, 93, 99, 102, 120–1n. 85, 125
*The Birth of Biopolitics* (Foucault) 5, 108–9, 112
Blanquism 73
Blanquists 74

Blumsztajn, Seweryn 132
body 27–30, 34, 36, 54, 56, 58, 68, 70, 97–8, 101, 104, 138
  bare 138
  biopolitical 151
  control of 27
  disciplined 138
  docile 37
  forces of 34, 56
  gestures of 28
  individual 27, 70, 98–100, 104
  individual-as- 70
  movement of 28
  multiple 70
  natural 104
  political technology of 16, 35–7, 39
  population 99
  position of 28
  productive 58
  social 61, 76, 80
  social and economic 66
  subjection of 140
  subjugation of 9, 12, 151
  utility of 34
Bonneville, Nicolas 67
Boulainvilliers, Henri de 48, 63, 65–7, 75–7
Bourdieu, Pierre 130
Bourguiba, Habib 2
Brazil 95
breakup of collective activities 35, 38
Bréquiny, Louis Georges Oudard Feudrix de 67
Brethren of the Common Life 31
Brich, Cecile 16, 20–1
Brissot, Jacques Pierre 25
Britain 24
Bülow, Catharine von 23
Burgundians 66

*Capital* (Marx) 19, 51
capitalist mode of production 19
*The Care of the Self* (Foucault) 1, 85
Celts 67
Central Ney 22, 50
Chapelle Saint-Bernard 19
Chapsal, Jean François 67
Charles III 22–3
chauvinism 115–16
Cheysson, Claude 129–31
Christian ascetic texts 129
Christian experience 129
Christian techniques for spiritual direction 54
Christianity 1, 11, 26, 123–4, 126
"Christianity and Confession" (Foucault) 81
Chrysostom, Dio 140
circulatory life 152
city-state 101
civil society 59, 78, 104, 108, 141
civil war 51–4, 69, 76
*The Civil War in France* (Marx) 73
Clausewitz, Carl von 51, 53, 59–60
Coke 75
Cold War 111
collective interest 105
collective will 11, 95, 112–16, 153 *see also* people
Collège de France 1–2, 5, 7, 10, 16, 24, 26, 47, 51–2, 54, 56, 77, 80, 83, 95–6, 101, 108, 123, 126, 134–6
Communards 73–4
Commune of Paris 73–4, 130–1
conditional imperatives 7, 80
conduct over conduct 10, 47, 101, 136 *see also* government
confession 81
contractarianism 77
control of activities 28
*Corriere della Sera* 4, 94, 110
courage 3, 22, 42n. 43, 111, 127–8, 134, 136, 138–9
*The Courage of Truth* (Foucault) 126, 135–6, 142–3
courageous truth-telling 42n. 43, 83, 124, 127–8, 136 *see also parrhesia*
Crates 136
Creusa 147n. 99
Croissant, Klaus 4–5
CRS *see* Republican Security Companies
currency 115, 138
  change the value of 138
CVT *see* Truth Committee of Toul
Cynic 2, 11, 124–5, 134, 136–40, 143
Cynic kingship 140
Cynic life 124–5, 137–9, 141, 143, 153
Cynic poverty 139–40
Cynic transvaluation 138
Cynicism 124, 137–8, 142

Damiens 36, 56
December 13, 1981 129, 131
Defert, Daniel 17, 23, 51–2
defiant life 152
Deleuze, Gilles 5, 24, 152
delinquency 25, 39, 96
Delphi 138
demagogic flattery 135
democracy 83, 128–9, 135, 141
destitute life 140
Diggers 62
Diogenes 136, 138, 140
disciplinary life 11, 124, 137–8, 140–1, 143, 153
disciplinary power 7–10, 16, 18, 26–39, 41n. 35, 47, 50, 56, 70, 93, 96–100, 104, 124–5, 135–6, 141, 150–1, 153, 155
disciplinary society 26, 34
discipline 7, 26–7, 39, 70, 81, 154, 164, 189, 195–6
  apparatuses of 125
*Discipline and Punish* (Foucault) 8, 10, 16–17, 22, 25–6, 35–6, 38–9, 50, 54–6, 75, 96–7, 100, 104, 151, 153
disciplined society 97
disciplined subject 11, 34, 124, 137
Djellali, Ben Ali 4, 50
Djellali committee 4
Doctors of the World 132
domination 10, 47–50, 55–6, 58–60, 62, 69, 76–9, 81–2, 84–5, 91n. 135 *see also* states of domination
Douai 35
Dreyfus affair 73
Dreyfus, Hubert 141
Dubos, Jean-Baptiste 67
duc de Bourgougne 63
Duffield, Mark 144n. 24

Eastern Europe 132–3
economic expertise 105, 107, 115
economism 59, 74, 77
Elysée 131
Engels, Friedrich 51
England 19, 62
*enkrateia* 85
equality of speech 135
equilibrium 71, 99
Eribon, Didier 129, 131
*Esprit* 17
Eucken, Walter 108
Euripides 128, 134, 147n. 99
*Europe I* 129–31
European Community 132
examination 27, 29, 31–2, 96
exclusion 115–16
  of lepers 97
  of others in Western societies 3
  of the other 141
  of women 147n. 99

factory inspectors 19
Fanon, Frantz 57–8, 113, 115–16
*Fearless Speech* (Foucault) 126
force 7, 10, 23, 33–4, 47, 49–51, 58–9, 75, 78–80, 102 *see also* force relations; Nietzsche's hypothesis; war model; warlike relations
  clash of 39, 50, 61
  collective 38, 51
  composition of 29
  concept of 56
  dissymmetry of 82
  force against 39, 58
  inequality of 56
  language of 51
  obliqueness of 57
  play of 85
  productive 26, 98
  relation of 66, 76, 80, 83, 85
  relationship of 60–1, 65
  renderings of 57
  security 22
  struggle of 50
  warlike struggle of 50
force relations 58, 79, 85 *see also* force; Nietzsche's hypothesis; war model; warlike relations
  warlike 59, 78–9
*Foucault 2.0* (Paras) 123
*Foucault and the Iranian Revolution* (Afary and Anderson) 15, 94
France 2–3, 5, 11, 16, 18, 62–4, 68, 110, 131–3, 150, 153, 155, 173, 181, 189
Franco, Francisco 4

Franco-Prussian War 74
Frankel, Leo 73
Franks 64–5, 67
freedom 64–6, 83, 106–7, 123, 125, 128
  intransigence of 82
  natural 65
  population as a collective subject of a kind of 106
French Communist Party 2, 130 *see also* party
French Democratic Confederation of Labor 4, 132
French foreign policy 126, 134
French Maoism 20 *see also* Proletarian Left
French revolution 68
Fresnes 36

Gallo-Romans 64–5
Gandal, Keith 16
Gaul 64–5, 67
gaze 30–1, 36, 139–40 *see also* surveillance
genealogy 10, 47, 49, 56, 81 *see also* Nietzschean genealogy
Geneva 129
Germans 65, 67
GIP *see* Information Group on Prisons
Gordon, Colin 93
Goths 67
Goutte d'Or 3, 50
government 81–3, 93, 101–2, 105, 135–6 *see also* conduct over conduct
  bloody 116
  French 4, 8, 11, 18, 124, 130, 132, 134
  Khomeini 112
  Socialist 11, 129–33
*The Government of Self and Others* (Foucault) 82, 126, 134, 136
governmentality 10, 48, 78, 80, 93, 95, 150–1
  history of 112
  liberal 8, 77, 94, 102, 106, 112, 137
  modern 41n. 35
  neoliberal 123
  reason of state 80, 102, 104–5
  techniques of 136
GP *see* Proletarian Left
Gradignan 36
Grandmontagne, Gérard 20
Greco-Latin trip 125, 142
Greek culture 101
*Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik* (Eucken) 108
Guarani republic 31
Guattari, Felix 152

Hardt, Michael 5, 116, 120n. 85, 125–6, 141, 152
Hebraic culture 101
*The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (Foucault) 126
*Hérodote* 78
hierarchical observation 27, 29, 31
*History of Madness* (Foucault) 3
*The History of Sexuality* (Foucault) 1, 78, 100–1
Hobbes, Thomas 26, 51–2, 60–1, 76
homeostasis 71, 98
Honig, Bonnie 95
Howison Lectures 81
human rights 110, 112
hunger strike 18–19, 23, 153, 157, 165, 172, 201–3

imperialism 51
*Imperialism* (Lenin) 51
"The Incorporation of the Hospital into Modern Technology" (Foucault) 96
individuality 26–7, 31, 35, 38, 53
  cellular 28
  combinatory 29
  disciplinary 8–9
  genetic 29
  organic 28
individualization 41n. 35
information 4, 19–20, 23, 30, 32, 35, 50, 111, 132–3, 150
Information Group on Prisons (GIP) 3–6, 9, 15–24, 35, 38–9, 41n. 35, 49, 132, 155
insolence 138
intellectuals 21, 110, 131, 156–7
internationalism 73
intolerance 19, 21–2, 24, 133
  active 21
  generalized 21
  mass 21

new 156
public 3, 9, 15, 22, 165
*Investigation in 20 Prisons* (GIP) 20, 23, 35–8, 155–204
investigation 20–1, 156–7, 166
*Ion* (Euripides) 134, 147n. 99
Iran 4, 15, 94–5, 110–13, 150, 153
Iran Air 114
Iranian revolution 4–6, 8–11, 15, 51, 94–5, 101, 110–13, 116, 123–4, 126, 129, 133, 150–1, 153
Islam 111 *see also* Shi'ism
Shi'ite 51, 113
Western stereotypes of 95
Islamic renewal 111
Islamic teachings 111–12

Jackson, George 20, 23
Jaruzelski, Wojciech 4, 129
Jaubert, Alain 4, 49
Jaubert affair 4, 50
Jesuits 31
Jospin, Lionel 131–2
Jouy 28

Kant, Immanuel 134, 141
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 111–12 *see also* government; party
Kurasawa, Fuyuki 94

Lagrange, Jacques 52
Lang, Jack 131–2
Latin Quarter 18
law 19, 49, 60, 65, 78, 104, 109–10, 112, 134, 138, 150, 173
anti-wreckers' 18, 129
apparatus of 167
biological 100
civil 49
common 68
implicit 63
interiorization of 82
martial 11, 124, 131
neoliberal problematizations of 108
penal 56
political and common 19
reign of 49
Roman 64
rule of 49
Statist 64
leftism 142
infantile 5
Lenin 51
leprosy model 96–7
*Letters* (Plato) 135
*Lettre d'un négociant sur la nature du commerce des grains* (Abeille) 103, 106, 113
Levellers 62
*Leviathan* (Hobbes) 52, 61
liberal democratic blackmail 116
liberal regimes of power 152
liberal societies 151–2
liberalism 5, 59, 102, 108, 153
*Libération* 130, 132
Lilburne 75
Livrozet, Serge 24
Locke, John 119n. 51
Louis XIV 31, 63, 65

Macey, David 3, 24, 129, 131–2
Madrid 4
Malby, Gabriel Bonnot de 67
*Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Marx and Engels) 51
Marat, Jean-Paul 67
market 103, 105–6, 108
Marx, Karl 19, 51, 73, 162
Marxism 51, 59, 73, 77
hyper- 3
Italian 20
Mauroy, Pierre 131
May 1968 3, 18, 156, 186, 199
Maoists 19, 149, 203
"The Meshes of Power" (Foucault) 100
militant life 2, 140–1
militantism 142
military-diplomatic apparatus 80
Miller, James 75
"Missed Appointments" (Bourdieu and Foucault) 130–1, 134
Mitterand, François 129
*Le Monde* 110, 130
Montand, Yves 130–1
Moreau, Jacob-Nicolas 67
Moscow 130
multitude 152

Nancy 22–3
nation 62–4, 68–9, 74
nationalism 115–16
  Polish 135
naturalness 102, 104–7, 113, 115 *see also* self-interest; self-regulation
Nealon, Jeffrey 57
Negri, Antonio 93, 116, 120n. 85, 152
Neocleous, Mark 119n. 51
neoliberalism 108
  American 112
  German 109
Nevers 35, 37
New Left 58
Nietzsche, Friedrich 10, 47, 55–6, 59–60, 95
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault) 48–9
Nietzschean genealogy 49 *see also* genealogy
Nietzsche's hypothesis 10, 47, 55–6, 59–60 *see also* force; force relations; war model; warlike relations
nihilism 142
nomadic life 152
non-disciplinary life 153
nondisciplinary power 7
norm 30, 55, 99
normal 30–1
normalizing judgment 27, 29–31
Norman Conquest 62
noso-politics 97–8
*nouveaux philosophes* 123

OAS *see* Organization of the Secret Army
obedience 37–8, 56, 58, 113, 129
Oberkampf manufactory 28
*On the Social Contract* (Rousseau) 52
*On Violence* (Arendt) 58
Ordoliberals 108
organization of geneses 29
Organization of the Secret Army (OAS) 202, 204n. 11
Orientalism 11, 94
other life 152
  radically 139

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza Shah 110, 112–13, 115
Panopticon 32–3
*Panopticon* (Bentham) 32, 35–6
Panzieri, Raniero 20
Paraguay 31
Paras, Eric 5, 123, 126, 135–6
Parham, Baqir 110
Paris 4, 18–19, 23, 36, 50, 110–11, 132, 155, 181
*parlementaires* 67
Parliament 19
*parrhesia* 8, 11, 42n. 43, 83, 124, 126–9, 133–7, 141, 147n. 99, 151 *see also* courageous truth-telling
  Christian 128
  Cynic 11, 124–5, 128, 136–7, 142
  ethical 128
  political 128, 141
  Socratic 128, 137
parrhesiastic game 128, 134
parrhesiastic pact 128
party 142–3 *see also* French Communist Party; Polish Communist Party; Socialist Party
  Khomeini 112
Patton, Paul 57
pastoral power 16, 27, 41n. 35, 95, 101, 112
Le Peletier de Saint-Fargeau 25
people 8–9, 11, 94–5, 101, 106–7, 112–16 *see also* collective will
*The People's Cause* 18
perpetual battle 54
perpetual observation 41n. 35
perpetual war 48–9, 51, 74
Philp, Mark 57
Physiocrats 102–3, 115
plague model 96–7
Plato 83, 134–5
Pleven, René 18–19, 22, 202, 204n. 10
Poland 4–5, 11, 95, 124, 126, 130–4, 150–1, 153
  coup d'état in 4, 8, 11, 124, 129–31, 133–4, 143, 153
Polanyi, Karl 105–6
Poles 130–1, 133
police 32, 80, 93, 97–9, 102, 104, 106–7, 113
Polish Communist Party 130 *see also* party
Political Economy 104–7
political militancy 143 *see also* analyses of power

Foucault's 11, 151
Foucault's final experience of 125
modern 12, 124, 135, 143, 153
political practices *see also* analyses of power
collective 17–18, 39
Foucault's 5, 7–12, 18, 123, 126, 129, 149–51
Foucault's militant 8, 11, 124–5
political spirituality 116
politics of truth 80
"The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century" (Foucault) 97
popular illegalities 25, 39
population 8, 10–11, 31–2, 70–1, 93–110, 112–13, 115–16, 150–1, 153
pre-Christian Mediterranean cultures 101, 112
prison 3, 5, 7–8, 10, 16–26, 33–9, 40n. 18, 42n. 36, 81, 96, 110, 129, 131–3, 155–8 *see also* Central Ney; Charles III; prison system; La Santé
Central Ney 50
French 133
model 32, 200
San Quentin 20
La Santé 23, 155
prison system 3, 9, 15, 19, 21–2, 24, 38, 155 *see also* prison
prisoner support movement 8–10, 15–17, 19, 34, 38–9, 40n. 18, 133, 155 *see also* prisoners
prisoners 3–5, 15–16, 19–24, 35–8, 41n. 35, 50–1, 150, 153, 155–8 *see also* prisoner support movement
political 18–9, 172, 190, 202–3
right of 22, 24
voices of 9, 16, 20–1
Prisoners' Action Committee 24
problematization 23–4, 83, 104, 108, 126, 152
Proletarian Left (GP) 18, 203–4n. 12 *see also* French Maoism
proto-psychiatric power 54
*Psychiatric Power* (Foucault) 26, 54
public torture and execution 56
spectacles of 26
*The Punitive Society* (Foucault) 25, 51–3, 55, 59–60, 76
*Quaderni Rossi* 20
questionnaire 20–1, 23, 35, 155, 157, 166

Rabinow, Paul 141
race 62, 71–2, 74–5, 86 *see also* race war; war of races
race war 10, 47–8, 61–2, 66, 74, 76–9, 83 *see also* race; war of races
racism 4, 50, 71–5, 89n. 97, 131
anti-racist 115
politico-cultural 89n. 97
state 10, 47, 86
Red Army Faction 4
regularization 74, 98–9, 102
Reich's hypothesis 55–6
Reid, Julian 151–3
repression 55–6, 59–60
*Republic* (Plato) 83
Republican Security Companies (CRS) 18, 156, 203, 204n. 1
resistance 10, 18, 26–7, 34, 39, 100, 120–1n. 85, 125, 143
collective 8, 151
Revel, Judith 77
revolt 16, 22–3, 35, 41n. 35, 50, 106, 110–11, 156–7, 165, 172, 195, 197, 201–3
individual 201
outbreak of 39
prison 16, 133
prisoners' 38
spirit of 197
student 3
urban 103
Revolutionary Communist League 17, 79
rhetoric 127
right to kill 71–2
Rio de Janeiro 96
risk-taking 138
Romans 64, 67, 139
La Roquette 35
Rose, Édith 22, 50
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 52

La Santé 23, 35–7, 155, 162, 173–4, 203–4
savage 66
Scullion, Rosemarie 94
Second International 73
secret societies 142

security 10, 71, 94–5, 99, 102–4, 106–7, 109, 116, 119n. 51, 137, 151, 154
*Security, Territory, Population* (Foucault) 11, 80, 101–4, 107, 112
self 149
  care of 128
  enjoyment of 138
  militant 86
  practices of 1, 11, 26, 80, 123, 134, 136
  techniques of 78, 81–2
  work of the self on 140
self-direction 11, 93–4, 100, 107, 110
self-interest 105, 114 *see also* naturalness; self-regulation
self-regulation 104 *see also* naturalness; self-interest
  market 106
  spontaneous 105
self-subjection 33, 140
Senellart, Michel 93
September 11, 2001 151
shameless life 140
Shi'ism 111, 113 *see also* Islam
Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph 68–9, 79
Signoret, Simone 130
social contract 26
social democracy 73
socialist movements 73–4, 131
Socialist Party 131 *see also* party
*"Society Must Be Defended"* (Foucault) 10, 47–8, 55–6, 59–60, 62, 70, 73–5, 77–8, 95, 98, 100, 102, 109
Socrates 134
Solidarity 4–6, 9, 11, 124, 126, 129, 132–3
sovereign life 138, 140
sovereign power 27, 53, 56, 120n. 85
sovereignty 26, 56, 59–61
  political 101–2, 115
Soviet Union 12n. 4, 72
state 59–60, 62–4, 68–75, 78–80, 102, 104, 141, 158
  forces of 80, 102
  modern 72
  Nazi 72
  socialist 72–3
  West German 5
state of war 61 *see also* war of all against all
states of domination 94 *see also* domination
State University of Rio de Janeiro 96
straight life 138–9
styles of existence 142–3
"The Subject and Power" (Foucault) 82
"Subjectivity and Truth" (Foucault) 81
subjugation 9, 154
  biopolitical 12, 151–3
  disciplinary 12, 151–2
Suicide 20, 23, 35, 157, 165, 172, 199, 201–2
*Suicides of Prison* (GIP) 24
surveillance 30, 35–7, 107 *see also* gaze
  hierarchical 38
  perpetual 96

techniques of power 1, 9, 26, 101–2, 137, 143, 151, 153
Tehran 111–12, 114
terrorism 142
Thibaud, Paul 17
Third Estate 67–8
Thucydides 134
timetable 28, 36, 38
Toul 22–3, 38, 50–1
Trombadori, Duccio 110
true life 124, 138–9, 142
Truth Committee of Toul (CVT) 22, 50
Tunisia 2–3, 95

unalloyed life 138–9
  radicalization of 139
unconcealed life 138–9
  radicalization of the principle of 139
unions 50, 131, 142, 153
United Nations 129
University of Bahia 100
University of California at Berkeley 81, 126
*The Use of Pleasure* (Foucault) 1, 85
United States 110 *see also* USA
USA 24 *see also* United States

Vincennes 3
Virilio, Paul 152

Walzer, Michael 5
war of all against all 52–3, 61, 78 *see also* state of war

war of races 75, 86 *see also* race; race war
war model 10, 47–8, 50, 54, 56, 60, 75–86 *see also* force; force relations; Nietzsche's hypothesis; warlike relations
warlike relations 10, 47, 69, 78, 82–3 *see also* force; force relations; Nietzsche's hypothesis; war model
Warsaw 131–2
Washington 130
Welch, Michael 16, 24, 41n. 35
West Germany 4
*The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon) 57

Žižek, Slavoj 116